The Metaphysical Status of Tracterian Objects

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-303
Author(s):  
Chon Tejedor
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


Phronesis ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 371-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Eunyoung Ju

AbstractScholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy.


Res Publica ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-214
Author(s):  
Tim Heysse

Historians and theoreticians of nationalism and nationalist movements are perplexed by the fact that so much of what nationalists believe is evidently not the case. One example of this concerns the ontological or metaphysical status of the nation: whether nations as a form of political community are in the very nature of things or whether they are rather a recent way of imagining the political community.I question the meaning terms such as 'natural', 'imagined' and 'objective'/'subjective' have when we are talking about the nation as the foundation of political legitimacy. Ido this by explaining what meaning those terms have in the philosophical reconstruction of interpretation and communication by the American philosopher Donald Davidson.


Author(s):  
Edward A David

Abstract In recent years, a variety of corporate litigants, from houses of worship to for-profit enterprises, have brought religious liberty suits to the US Supreme Court. Interestingly, the metaphysical status of such litigants has been subject to intense debate by judges and commentators alike. Are these litigants corporate moral persons or mere aggregates of individuals? How, if at all, does their metaphysical status affect our assignment of corporate rights to religious freedom? While many have entertained such questions, others reject them as morally distracting. This article challenges that latter position. Drawing upon the natural law tradition, I argue that group ontology can be used in the assignment of corporate rights in a morally illuminating way. I point out the tradition’s distinctive ontology, which views groups primarily as social actions, subject to moral evaluation. I then discuss how this conception moves attention away from polarizing rights-based discourse towards measured consideration of what is morally right. Finally, I show how this ontology helps practical reasoning to discover a variety of (non-rights-based) reasons and means to protect religious freedoms as well as other moral stakes. Far from causing moral distraction, a natural law group ontology facilitates careful moral deliberation.


1991 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-22
Author(s):  
Austin Lewis ◽  

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1989-2003
Author(s):  
Milton T. Pardosi ◽  
Septiana Dwiputri Maharani

Introduction: One of the developments in modern science today is a surgery to change genitals in humans.  This has become an important issue in society because of the pros and cons. The most opposed groups are religious groups.  Some countries have legalized this action while others have not. The backgrounds of people deciding to change their genitals are twofold: first, because they feel they are in the “wrong body” where their behavior is contrary to the genitals they have.  Second, the development of genital devices is not perfect. That is why an axiology study needs to be made on the decision to change the genitals in humans. Axiology itself means the science or theory of the nature of values ​​which investigates values ​​in terms of their nature, their size, and their metaphysical status relating to their usefulness.  In axiology, Max Scheler gave four levels of value, namely: (1) The value of “enjoyment” or “pleasure” (agreeable) and “dislike” or “displeasure” (disagreeable); (2) The value of vitality or welfare or life (vital feeling); (3) Spiritual values; (4) Holiness or holy value. Of the four values ​​of Max Scheler, it was found that the decision to change the genitals in humans does not have the essence of any value except just the value of enjoyment or pleasure.   Result:That is, this kind of action actually denies the nature of existing values.  The value of enjoyment obtained through sex change surgery is actually only “mortal” or for a moment enjoyment because it is precisely the disappointment that appears at the end.  It is just the lowest value out of four.  Discussion: Therefore, the author suggested that those who feel themselves trapped in the “wrong body” are better off doing psychiatric and religious therapy so that the nature of the values ​​that they have can be developed rather than making changes to the genitals.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105971232092236
Author(s):  
Farid Zahnoun

This article tries to offer a different perspective on the issue of what it means for some physical structure to be a representation. In the first sections, it will be shown how and why this issue is still far from settled. This will be done by emphasizing the—what I will call—metaphysically promiscuous character of representation. For although representations are typically assumed to be some sort of physical objects or structures, on closer inspection, the notion of representation is used in such a variety of ways that its fundamental metaphysical status is far from obvious. Proceeding from these observations, it will be argued that, even though “representation” pre-theoretically indeed often picks out objects, their representational status is best not understood in terms of their physical properties or their causal-functional profile. It will be argued that, what it means for some physical structure to be—as a matter of fact—a representation, only first becomes intelligible in relation to certain socio-normative practices in which the cognitive capacity to relate to something as something it is not is prescriptively called upon. Moreover, an answer to the oft-heard question of what makes something (i.e., some physical object or structure) a representation is readily available, provided we take into account certain cognitive abilities, as well as a socio-normative context in which these abilities are normatively regulated. It will be concluded that at the fundamental metaphysical level, the phenomenon of representation is best understood as a triadic relation which involves, but does not reduce to, certain physical objects or structures. Finally, this socio-normative account of representation will be compared with two dominant notions of representation within cognitive science: symbolic representation and S-representation.


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