Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Difficult Cases ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Moral Explanation ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including the nature of reasons, the tenability of moral realism, moral explanation and grounding, and a variety of epistemological challenges.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including expressivism about gender, inferential expressivism, moral worth, moral and aesthetic testimony, and normative supervenience.

scholarly journals Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume cover normative supervenience; non-naturalism; non-descriptive relativism; learning about aesthetics and morality through acquaintance and deference; the possibility of moral epistemology; pure moral motivation; virtue ethics; moral uncertainty and value comparison; (in)coherence; the authority of formality; authoritatively normative concepts; ‘ought’ simpliciter; and the rationality of ends.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Cross Domain ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including self-undermining arguments from disagreement; contextualism, moral disagreement, and proposition clouds; internalism and prudential value; infinitism about cross-domain conflict; and the fundamentality of fit.

scholarly journals The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Do So

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity contains forty-four commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics. It will appeal especially to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology, but also to those with an interest in philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Both students and academics will benefit from the fact that the Handbook combines helpful overviews with innovative contributions to current debates. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason. This is the first edited collection to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such “metanormative” issues, bridging subfields as they do so.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 11

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Annual Basis ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This 11th volume brings together 13 new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including moral conscientiousness and moral wrongness; impartiality and the boundaries of morality; moral testimony; Kant’s categorical imperative; and ethical theories as methods of ethics.

Beyond Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Language Function ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
Natural Ontology

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

scholarly journals Ethical Theory and Moral Practice at 24

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Lubomira Radoilska ◽  
Emanuela Ceva
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Recent Developments

AbstractThis Editorial outlines recent developments in the Journal’s scope, mission and review policy. It also illustrates the range of topics addressed on the pages of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, which is now entering its 24th year.

Constructivist Moral Realism

1998 ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
J. K. Swindler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Social World ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Realm

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

scholarly journals Language Acquisition in the Light of Rationalist Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Halina Święczkowska ◽  
Beata Piecychna
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Speech Acquisition ◽  
The Way

Abstract The present study deals with the problem of the acquisition of language in children in the light of rationalist philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The main objective of the paper is to present the way Gerauld de Cordemoy’s views on the nature of language, including its socio-linguistic aspects, and on the process of speech acquisition in children are reflected in contemporary writings on how people communicate with each other. Reflections on 17th-century rationalist philosophy of mind and the latest research conducted within the field of cognitive abilities of human beings indicate that between those two spheres many similarities could be discerned in terms of particular stages of the development of speech and its physical aspects.

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