scholarly journals Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume cover normative supervenience; non-naturalism; non-descriptive relativism; learning about aesthetics and morality through acquaintance and deference; the possibility of moral epistemology; pure moral motivation; virtue ethics; moral uncertainty and value comparison; (in)coherence; the authority of formality; authoritatively normative concepts; ‘ought’ simpliciter; and the rationality of ends.

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including the nature of reasons, the tenability of moral realism, moral explanation and grounding, and a variety of epistemological challenges.


This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including expressivism about gender, inferential expressivism, moral worth, moral and aesthetic testimony, and normative supervenience.


This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including self-undermining arguments from disagreement; contextualism, moral disagreement, and proposition clouds; internalism and prudential value; infinitism about cross-domain conflict; and the fundamentality of fit.


This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.


The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity contains forty-four commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics. It will appeal especially to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology, but also to those with an interest in philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Both students and academics will benefit from the fact that the Handbook combines helpful overviews with innovative contributions to current debates. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason. This is the first edited collection to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such “metanormative” issues, bridging subfields as they do so.


Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.


Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn't an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, character, events, and objects as good, cruel, beautiful, etc., almost every day of our lives. Although evaluative judgement—for instance, judging that an institution is unjust—is usually regarded as the paradigm of evaluation, it has been thought by some philosophers that a distinctive and significant kind of evaluation is perceptual. For example, in aesthetics, some have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgement must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand perceptual experience of the item judged. In ethics, reference to the existence and importance of something like ethical perception is found in a number of traditions, for example, in Virtue Ethics and Sentimentalism. This volume brings together philosophers in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value theory, to contribute in novel ways to debates about what we call Evaluative Perception. Specifically, they engage with (1) Questions regarding the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are perceptual experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experience? (2) Questions about Epistemology: Can evaluative perceptual experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are perceptual experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about Value Theory: Is the existence of evaluative perceptual experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of evaluative perceptual experience?


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Lubomira Radoilska ◽  
Emanuela Ceva

AbstractThis Editorial outlines recent developments in the Journal’s scope, mission and review policy. It also illustrates the range of topics addressed on the pages of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, which is now entering its 24th year.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Halina Święczkowska ◽  
Beata Piecychna

Abstract The present study deals with the problem of the acquisition of language in children in the light of rationalist philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The main objective of the paper is to present the way Gerauld de Cordemoy’s views on the nature of language, including its socio-linguistic aspects, and on the process of speech acquisition in children are reflected in contemporary writings on how people communicate with each other. Reflections on 17th-century rationalist philosophy of mind and the latest research conducted within the field of cognitive abilities of human beings indicate that between those two spheres many similarities could be discerned in terms of particular stages of the development of speech and its physical aspects.


Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 1279
Author(s):  
Rabeay Y.A. Hassan ◽  
Ferdinando Febbraio ◽  
Silvana Andreescu

Microbial electrochemical systems are a fast emerging technology that use microorganisms to harvest the chemical energy from bioorganic materials to produce electrical power. Due to their flexibility and the wide variety of materials that can be used as a source, these devices show promise for applications in many fields including energy, environment and sensing. Microbial electrochemical systems rely on the integration of microbial cells, bioelectrochemistry, material science and electrochemical technologies to achieve effective conversion of the chemical energy stored in organic materials into electrical power. Therefore, the interaction between microorganisms and electrodes and their operation at physiological important potentials are critical for their development. This article provides an overview of the principles and applications of microbial electrochemical systems, their development status and potential for implementation in the biosensing field. It also provides a discussion of the recent developments in the selection of electrode materials to improve electron transfer using nanomaterials along with challenges for achieving practical implementation, and examples of applications in the biosensing field.


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