scholarly journals Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

Author(s):  
James R. Beebe ◽  
Jake Monaghan

This chapter reports the results of four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested our shared epistemic practices may only include a closure principle that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. The chapter argues that the results of these studies provide reason for thinking individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the closure principle. When the chapter authors used research materials that overcome proposed difficulties with Turri’s original materials, they found that participants did not reject closure. Furthermore, when they presented Turri’s original materials to non-philosophers with expertise in deductive reasoning, they endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential beliefs. These results suggest that an unrestricted closure principle provides a better model of folk patterns of knowledge attribution than a source-relative one.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 567
Author(s):  
Arindam Das

M&A performance is a multifaceted, compound construct with no overarching factor that captures all different dimensions. This paper examines the concept of acquisition performance and proposes a model that links firm-level factors and transaction parameters with firms’ short-term and long-term performance, extending to financial-, market- and innovation measures. Building on past empirical studies on the influence of various factors on M&A performance, a multi-dimensional structural equation model has been developed and it has been tested with a dataset on acquisitions in the Indian technology sector over a period of ten years. The results suggest that: (a) smaller acquirers with higher book value and leveraged firms demonstrate better long-term performance; (b) contrary to established understanding, short-term market returns are not influenced by deal parameters; (c) majority stake purchases show relatively lesser gains—suggesting the possible presence of post-acquisition integration issues and, (d) acquirers with high intangible assets continue to do well on innovation performance post-acquisition. By indicating situations and conditions under which an acquisition would potentially lead to a performance gain for the acquirer, these results provide significant insight to practitioners pursuing M&As for growth opportunities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 199
Author(s):  
Karolis Andriuskevicius ◽  
Remigijus Ciegis

Research background: This study presents the results of the research which aimed to iden-tify and critically discuss existing methodologies in the merger and acquisition field. Value creation to merging and acquiring firms and national countries constitute the center of the research. This study distinguishes between specific methodologies employed to gauge M&A performance on a micro- (corporate) and macro- (economy and society) economic levels. The final section of the paper concludes with a theoretical methodological framework integrating methodologies employed to measure M&A performance on a firm level and methodologies measuring consequences and effects of M&A on the economy. The aim of the analysis described in the paper is to ascertain and evaluate theoretically existing methodologies used in empirical studies that would allow proper and critical understanding of the results of various findings in the holistic and global M&A area.Purpose of the article: The purpose of the paper is to investigate and critically discuss the methodologies employed within the M&A performance framework with the focus on specific anticipated outcomes of the M&A deal and methodology measuring this outcome. The following objectives are being raised: (1) To identify recent developments in the M&A market and determine challenges and changes they encompass; (2) To identify and critically discuss anticipated outcomes of the M&A deal and existing methodologies measuring M&A performance on the corporate level; (3) To identify and critically discuss anticipated outcomes of the M&A deal on the economy and methodologies measuring consequences and effects of M&As on the macro- economic level; (4) To integrate methodologies measuring M&As performance on a micro- and macro- eco-nomic levels into theoretical methodological framework enabling scholars and practitioners to evaluate M&A performance from a holistic perspective.Methods: Based on previous studies, the authors conduct a structured literature review aimed to critically discuss and evaluate developments and challenges of measuring M&A performance on corporate and macroeconomic levels. The research is carried out as a struc-tured assessment of past literature. The findings from scientific articles and studies by various scholars are being categorized, grouped and summarized to discern a meta‐analytic view of the work carried out to date. Finally, deep analysis of scientific literature, logical comparative analysis, systematization of scientific article and business cases are employed in the article.Findings & Value added: The paper evidences developments and challenges of measuring M&A performance on corporate and macroeconomic levels.  The re-search elaborates on several key developments in M&A methodology and performance studies carried out in empirical works during the last two decades. The findings help to independently and objec-tively assess performance of M&A from a holistic perspective.


Author(s):  
Tim Kraft ◽  
Alex Wiegmann

According to epistemic closure, if someone knows some proposition P and also knows that P entails Q, she knows Q as well. This is often defended by appealing to its intuitiveness. Only recently, however, was epistemic closure put to the empirical test: Turri ran experiments in which closure is violated in folk knowledge ascriptions surprisingly often. The chapter authors disagree with this diagnosis. It is by no means obvious which experimentally testable hypothesis proponents of epistemic closure should accept. The chapter formulates a different hypothesis and argues that it is more apt for empirically testing epistemic closure. In a series of experiments the chapter authors manipulated the strength of entailment between two propositions and found that the stronger the entailment, the lower the proportion of participants who violated closure, indicating folk knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to entailment. The chapter concludes that closure is a principle of folk epistemology after all.


Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

This volume presents, develops, and champions contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: The puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery (unless one is in fact the winner of the lottery, in which case one does not know that one has lost, but is reasonable in thinking that one knows it). Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all carefully explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.


2016 ◽  
Vol 118 (12) ◽  
pp. 2911-2930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khandoker Mahmudur Rahman ◽  
Nor Azila Mohd Noor

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the domain relevance of a comprehensive yet almost overlooked theoretical framework for studying organic food purchase behavior in a global context. This conceptual paper argues that there exists an apparently powerful model in health behavior domain that may readily be brought into organic food purchase behavior research. The paper argues for domain relevance and proposes that Montano and Kasprzyk’s integrated behavior model may readily be used in organic food behavior studies with some relevant modification. Design/methodology/approach The paper follows an exploratory approach and shows how variables used in the past may be aggregated to the model in question. The challenge is addressed by following both the inductive and the deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning calls for investigating whether such behavior may be classified as health behavior. Inductive reasoning calls for proving relevance of all the variables in the aforesaid model to the organic food research context. Findings The paper concludes that the Montano and Kasprzyk’s model is theoretically relevant to the organic food behavior domain. However, it is observed that the domain-specific operationalization is necessary for further empirical studies. Research limitations/implications Since the model was rarely tested empirically in predicting organic food purchase intention, the variable-specific relevance may not warrant the relevance of the whole model with intertwined relationships at the same time. Practical implications The paper may pave a way toward further empirical research and may also explain the apparent intention-behavior gap as often reported in literature. Originality/value The paper may provide a useful direction in future organic food purchase behavior studies by showing the domain relevance of an apparently powerful model, along with addition of some newer variables that may enrich the existing model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

I report two experiments studying the relationship among explicit judgments about what people see, know, and should assert. When an object of interest was surrounded by visibly similar items, it diminished people’s willingness to judge that an agent sees, knows, and should tell others that it is present. This supports the claim, made by many philosophers, that inhabiting a misleading environment intuitively decreases our willingness to attribute perception and knowledge. However, contrary to stronger claims made by some philosophers, inhabiting a misleading environment does not lead to the opposite pattern whereby people deny perception and knowledge. Causal modeling suggests a specific psychological model of how explicit judgments about perception, knowledge, and assertability are made: knowledge attributions cause perception attributions, which in turn cause assertability attributions. These findings advance understanding of how these three important judgments are made, provide new evidence that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and highlight some important subtleties in folk epistemology.


Author(s):  
Gina Cima Vallarino ◽  
Juan C. González González

Este trabajo atañe a la experiencia teatral desde la estética y las ciencias cognitivas. Se defiende la idea de que la actuación estética puede ser entendida como actuación verosímil. Si la experiencia estética posee tres dimensiones –sensorial, conceptual y hedonista–, la verosimilitud en la actuación se lograría en términos de una estrecha y apropiada relación entre ellas. La experiencia estética del espectador sería, pues, una consecuencia de lo que éste percibe, piensa y siente. A su vez, los estudios empíricos permiten establecer criterios objetivos de evaluación para juzgar una actuación como verosímil, tanto por parte del actor como del espectador. In Defense of the Concept of “Aesthetic Performance” as Truthful Theatrical PerformanceThis work concerns Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Furthermore, deals with theatrical issues, defending the idea that an aesthetic performance can be understood as a truthful performance. If the aesthetic experience has three dimensions –sensory, conceptual and hedonistic–, the truthfulness of the performance would be achieved thanks to a close and appropriate relationship between them. The aesthetic experience of the spectator would thus be a consequence of what he/she perceives, thinks and feels. At the same time, empirical studies allow to establish objective criteria of evaluation for judging the truthfulness of a performance, by both the actor and the spectator. Recibido: 03 de agosto de 2020Aceptado: 14 de diciembre de 2020


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document