Uncertain Meanings of Risk

Author(s):  
Natalia Besedovsky

This chapter studies calculative risk-assessment practices in credit rating agencies. It identifies two fundamentally different methodological approaches for producing ratings, which in turn shape the respective conceptions of credit risk. The traditional approach sees ‘risk’ as an only partially calculable and predictable set of hazards that should be avoided or minimized. This approach is particularly evident in the production of country credit ratings and gives rise to ordinal rankings of risk. By contrast, structured finance rating practices conceive of ‘risk’ as both fully calculable and controllable; they construct cardinal measures of risk by assuming that ontological uncertainty does not exist and that models can capture all possible events in a probabilistic manner. This assumption—that uncertainty can be turned into measurable risk—is a necessary precondition for structured finance securities and has become an influential imaginary in financial markets.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich G. Schroeter

Journal of Applied Research in Accounting and Finance, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2011), pp. 14-30As demonstrated by the market reactions to downgrades of various sovereign credit ratings in 2011, the credit rating agencies occupy an important role in today’s globalized financial markets. This article provides an overview of the central characteristics of credit ratings and discusses risks arising from both their widespread use as market information and from the increasing references to credit ratings contained in laws, legal regulations and private contracts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 65-90
Author(s):  
Herbert Grubel

This paper compares the benefits to Greece, the Euro zone and the rest of the world arising from policies that prevent a Greek default and exit from the Euro with the costs of preventive policies. It concludes that the benefits exceed the costs, though unpredictable politics and nationalist aspirations may prevent the adoption of the rational policies. The paper also considers the causes of Greece’s problems: the failure of lenders to ask for a proper risk premium on the country’s bonds; Greece’s publication of false economic data; the failure of credit rating agencies to down-grade its bonds; the global financial euphoria and supply of liquidity that made lenders disregard traditional standards in all their dealings. The paper recommends policies to ensure the proper functioning of financial markets to prevent future crises. Key words: Greece bankruptcy, Euro survival, Greek statistics, Credit ratings. JEL Classification: F33, F34, F36, F55, G15, G24. Resumen: Este artículo compara los beneficios con los costes derivados del salvamento griego, llegando a la conclusión de que los beneficios superan claramente a los costes. También se analizan las causas del problema, el papel de las sociedades de rating y la euforia previa especulativa, efectuán-dose unas consideraciones sobre el futuro del euro y del orden financiero internacional. Palabras clave: Bancarrota Griega, Euro, Estadísticas en Grecia, Credit ratings. Clasificación JEL: F33, F34, F36, F55, G15, G24.


Equilibrium ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-438
Author(s):  
Łukasz Dopierała ◽  
Daria Ilczuk ◽  
Liwiusz Wojciechowski

Research background: Sovereign credit ratings play an important role in determining any country’s access to the international debt market. During the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, credit rating agencies were harshly criticized for the timing of their announcements regarding ratings downgrades and the ranges of those downgrades. Therefore, it is worth considering whether the sovereign credit rating is still a useful benchmark for investors. Purpose of the article: This article examines whether credit rating agencies still provide financial markets with new information about the solvency of governments in Emerging Europe countries. In addition, it describes the differences in the effect of particular types of rating events on financial markets and the impact of individual agencies on the market situation. Our study also focuses on evaluating these occurrences at different stages of the business cycle. Methods: This article uses data about ratings events that took place between 2008 and 2018 in 17 Emerging Europe economies. We took into consideration positive, neutral, and negative events related to ratings changes and the outlooks reported by Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s. We used a methodology based on event studies. In addition, we performed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and used a logit model to determine the usefulness of cumulative adjusted credit default swap (CDS) spread changes in predicting the direction of ratings changes. Findings & Value added: Our research provides evidence that the CDS market reflects information regarding government issuers up to three months before ratings downgrades are announced. Information reported to the market by ratings agencies is only relevant in the short timeframe surrounding ratings downgrades and upgrades. However, positive credit rating changes convey more information to the market. We also found strong evidence that, in the post-crisis period, credit ratings provide markets with less information.


Author(s):  
Mustafa Batuhan Tufaner ◽  
Sıtkı Sönmezer ◽  
Ahmet Alkan Çelik

Sovereign credit ratings are of great importance in terms of country's economy in recent years. Sovereign credit ratings can greatly affect both financial markets and macroeconomic balances. On the other hand, these credit ratings are closely related to the political situation of the countries. Therefore, all factors behind the credit rating announcements operating in global markets needs to be put forward. The content of this paper is to identify policy interest reaction towards sovereign credit ratings and examine of countries that experienced severe rating changes. In this bulletin, big three credit rating agencies are compared and critically assessed various credit rating of Turkey. The analyzed dataset covers sovereign rating announcements released by reputable rating agencies, stock price, Dollar / TL exchange rate, Dollar / Euro exchange rate and benchmark bond.


There are many different gauges of credit risk that investors can use to inform their decisions. Credit rating agencies have produced measures of credit risk for many decades, but financial markets also offer a guide to these risks. The authors examine the behavior of ratings relative to market signals on credit risk. In particular, the authors examine what happens when ratings and market signals differ, in terms of any subsequent convergence (or not). They find that, on average, market signals move more frequently toward ratings than vice versa. In terms of the magnitude of these movements, however, the picture is less clear. When market signals suggest lower credit risk than ratings do, they tend to close more of the gap; when ratings are higher than market signals, however, sometimes ratings close the gap more.


Market protection mechanisms work well during calm periods, but some fail miserably during slowdowns, at just the time we need them to work. When the market environment turns inhospitable, the accelerators take over from the brakes. This article frames the issues concerning oversight mechanisms, which enabled the crisis, and structural mechanisms, which in many ways advanced it. We detail the potential for competition for clients to interfere with the objective judgment of three financial markets gatekeepers: the credit rating agencies, auditors, and asset pricing firms. Any perceived bias in the quality of gatekeeping services can undermine market confidence. We then explore regulatory and contractual shortcomings that, in the event of a downturn or crisis in confidence, can exacerbate a narrow complication. In addition to the classic lemons problems in the context of information asymmetries, the tight relationship between ratings and prices perpetuate any re-rating or repricing scenarios—they combine to create an overwhelming downward force. Serious action is required. If unattended, these shortcomings leave our economy needlessly exposed to the same crisis-era systemic risk concerns that present themselves when downturns can spiral, unrestrained, into meltdowns.


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