Correction Mechanisms Shall Set Us Free

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Market Environment ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Market Protection ◽  
Protection Mechanisms ◽  
Structural Mechanisms

Market protection mechanisms work well during calm periods, but some fail miserably during slowdowns, at just the time we need them to work. When the market environment turns inhospitable, the accelerators take over from the brakes. This article frames the issues concerning oversight mechanisms, which enabled the crisis, and structural mechanisms, which in many ways advanced it. We detail the potential for competition for clients to interfere with the objective judgment of three financial markets gatekeepers: the credit rating agencies, auditors, and asset pricing firms. Any perceived bias in the quality of gatekeeping services can undermine market confidence. We then explore regulatory and contractual shortcomings that, in the event of a downturn or crisis in confidence, can exacerbate a narrow complication. In addition to the classic lemons problems in the context of information asymmetries, the tight relationship between ratings and prices perpetuate any re-rating or repricing scenarios—they combine to create an overwhelming downward force. Serious action is required. If unattended, these shortcomings leave our economy needlessly exposed to the same crisis-era systemic risk concerns that present themselves when downturns can spiral, unrestrained, into meltdowns.

Commercial Banking and Shadow Banking

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-94
Author(s):  
Arnoud W. A. Boot ◽  
Anjan V. Thakor
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Commercial Banking ◽  
Dark Side ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Consequent Increase

We review in this chapter the market developments related to the increasing blurring of the boundaries between banks and financial markets, and the literature associated with this. While traditionally viewed as competitors, institutions and markets are now viewed as engaging in three forms of interaction: competition, complementarity, and co-evolution. The blurring boundaries between banks and markets are evidenced by the growth in shadow banking and P2P lending. We discuss how this has led to economic gains as banks become increasingly dependent on and intertwined with markets. But we also point to a dark side of this intertwining, which is the consequent increase in systemic risk and financial institution fragility. The increased importance of “gatekeepers,” like credit rating agencies, and the implications of these developments for the regulation of banks and markets, are also discussed.

Uncertain Meanings of Risk

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia Besedovsky
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Assessment Practices ◽  
Structured Finance ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Measures Of Risk ◽  
Methodological Approaches ◽  
Ontological Uncertainty

This chapter studies calculative risk-assessment practices in credit rating agencies. It identifies two fundamentally different methodological approaches for producing ratings, which in turn shape the respective conceptions of credit risk. The traditional approach sees ‘risk’ as an only partially calculable and predictable set of hazards that should be avoided or minimized. This approach is particularly evident in the production of country credit ratings and gives rise to ordinal rankings of risk. By contrast, structured finance rating practices conceive of ‘risk’ as both fully calculable and controllable; they construct cardinal measures of risk by assuming that ontological uncertainty does not exist and that models can capture all possible events in a probabilistic manner. This assumption—that uncertainty can be turned into measurable risk—is a necessary precondition for structured finance securities and has become an influential imaginary in financial markets.

scholarly journals Three Letters that Move the Markets: Credit Ratings between Market Information and Legal Regulation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich G. Schroeter
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Applied Research ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Market Information ◽  
Market Reactions ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Sovereign Credit Ratings

Journal of Applied Research in Accounting and Finance, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2011), pp. 14-30As demonstrated by the market reactions to downgrades of various sovereign credit ratings in 2011, the credit rating agencies occupy an important role in today’s globalized financial markets. This article provides an overview of the central characteristics of credit ratings and discusses risks arising from both their widespread use as market information and from the increasing references to credit ratings contained in laws, legal regulations and private contracts.

China's Emerging Credit Rating Industry: The Official Foundations of Private Authority

2008 ◽  
Vol 193 ◽  
pp. 65-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Stock Markets ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Bond Ratings ◽  
Trade Associations ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Private Authority ◽  
Private Actors

AbstractAlthough China has had difficulty improving the performance of its banks and stock markets, it has struggled even more to develop a credit rating industry. Credit rating agencies (CRA), which provide bond ratings, are vital to financial markets in advanced capitalist countries, but China's credit rating companies are weak and have had little influence over the behaviour of those who issue or invest in bonds. Some argue that CRAs gain authority through their strong reputation in the eyes of market participants, but the experience of rating agencies in China supports evidence from elsewhere that their private authority is largely dependent on government mandate, a benefit China's CRAs have only recently begun to enjoy. Many private actors, from trade associations to charity groups, are struggling to gain public influence in China, but credit rating agencies may be the best barometer to measure the Chinese government's general stance towards private authority.

scholarly journals Will Greece go Bankrupt and kill the euro?

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-90
Author(s):  
Herbert Grubel
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Economic Data ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The World

This paper compares the benefits to Greece, the Euro zone and the rest of the world arising from policies that prevent a Greek default and exit from the Euro with the costs of preventive policies. It concludes that the benefits exceed the costs, though unpredictable politics and nationalist aspirations may prevent the adoption of the rational policies. The paper also considers the causes of Greece’s problems: the failure of lenders to ask for a proper risk premium on the country’s bonds; Greece’s publication of false economic data; the failure of credit rating agencies to down-grade its bonds; the global financial euphoria and supply of liquidity that made lenders disregard traditional standards in all their dealings. The paper recommends policies to ensure the proper functioning of financial markets to prevent future crises. Key words: Greece bankruptcy, Euro survival, Greek statistics, Credit ratings. JEL Classification: F33, F34, F36, F55, G15, G24. Resumen: Este artículo compara los beneficios con los costes derivados del salvamento griego, llegando a la conclusión de que los beneficios superan claramente a los costes. También se analizan las causas del problema, el papel de las sociedades de rating y la euforia previa especulativa, efectuán-dose unas consideraciones sobre el futuro del euro y del orden financiero internacional. Palabras clave: Bancarrota Griega, Euro, Estadísticas en Grecia, Credit ratings. Clasificación JEL: F33, F34, F36, F55, G15, G24.

Sovereign credit rating and contagion effects on financial markets of Asian region

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (6) ◽  
pp. 48-69
Author(s):  
Natalia Pivnitskaya ◽  
Tamara Teplova
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Contagion Effect ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Sovereign Credit ◽  
Asian Region ◽  
Contagion Effects ◽  
Rating Changes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Sovereign Credit Rating

This article studies the contagion effects on the emerging financial markets of the Asian region. The contagion effect is manifested in the change of interconnection degree of financial markets after the shock in one of the countries of the region. In the paper, we consider the information on potential or actual change in sovereign credit rating as a shock leading to a contagion effect. Our sample includes evidence from 7 Asian countries covering the period from 2000 to 2018. We use the DCC-GARCH model which allows us to take into account the peculiarities of financial data behavior. We intend to show the effect of inconsistencies in ratings assigned by various agencies on strengthening or weakening the processes of contagion on Asia’s stock markets. We also study the impact of historical inconsistencies between credit rating outlooks and actual rating changes on the level of «trust» to credit outlooks in the future. In assessing the impact of discrepancies we assume that the market remembers recent events better than more distant in time. We were able to confirm the impact of inconsistencies in the ratings given by different rating agencies for China, Hong Kong, and India. In addition, we found that the presence of inconsistencies between the outlooks and actual rating updates in the past tend to weaken the trust regarding positive outlooks rather than negative ones.

Too little, too late? Role of credit rating agencies in the Amtek AUTO default

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Shagun Thukral ◽  
Sunder Korivi ◽  
Dipasha Sharma ◽  
Dipali Krishnakumar
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Fixed Income ◽  
Red Flags ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Markets And Institutions ◽  
Analysis Process ◽  
Credit Analysis

Subject area Fixed Income markets, Financial Markets and Institutions. Study level/applicability This case can be used in a postgraduate finance course such as an MBA and executive program for courses such as Fixed Income Markets and Financial Markets and Institutions. Case overview In late August 2015, the sudden downgrade and eventual default of Amtek AUTO Ltd (Amtek) on its debentures upset mutual fund investors and regulators. Questions were raised about the credit rating agencies and their lack of timely action as well as about the independent credit analysis followed by fund houses to protect the interests of investors. One such investor, Suresh Nair, decided to gather all possible available information on Amtek to determine whether it was sheer negligence on the part of all parties involved or if Amtek was in fact in a situation of sudden distress. The case seeks to highlight the credit analysis process, while looking out for red flags to identify potential default or financial stress in a company. Expected learning outcomes To understand the credit analysis process through a fundamental analysis process. To analyze and interpret the financial position of the company through various financial ratios. Identifying “red flags” while evaluating a potential credit that pose as “risks” to credit assessment. Understanding the role and relevance of credit rating agencies in the bond market. Supplementary materials Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email [email protected] to request teaching notes. Subject code CSS 1: Accounting and Finance

scholarly journals Information as a condition of justice in financial markets: The regulation of credit-rating agencies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boudewijn de Bruin
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Informational Needs ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Mortgage Backed Securities

This chapter argues for deregulation of the credit-rating market. Credit-rating agencies are supposed to contribute to the informational needs of investors trading bonds. They provide ratings of debt issued by corporations and governments, as well as of structured debt instruments (e.g. mortgage-backed securities). As many academics, regulators, and commentators have pointed out, the ratings of structured instruments turned out to be highly inaccurate, and, as a result, they have argued for tighter regulation of the industry. This chapter shows, however, that the role of credit-rating agencies in achieving justice in finance is not as great as these commentators believe. It therefore argues instead for deregulation. Since the 1930s, lawgivers have unjustifiably elevated the rating agencies into official, legally binding sources of information concerning credit risk, thereby unjustifiably causing many institutional investors to outsource their epistemic responsibilities, that is, their responsibility to investigate credit risk themselves.

Management Tenure and the Quality of Corporate Bond Ratings

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliza X. Zhang ◽  
Jason D. Schloetzer
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Corporate Bond ◽  
Bond Ratings ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Rating Accuracy ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Bond Issues ◽  
Robust Evidence

We examine the implication of management for credit rating quality by focusing on the relation between management tenure and rating quality. Using a large sample of corporate bond issues in the U.S., we find robust evidence that firms with longer-tenured CEOs have lower rating quality, as reflected in lower rating accuracy, informativeness, and timeliness. Further analyses uncover two channels that underlie this relation. One channel is through learned confidence: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies learn about how the CEO influences firm value, which leads agencies to reduce their caution and effort in management assessment. The other channel is through developed relationships: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies develop relationships with the CEO, which leads agencies to reduce scrutiny of or cater to the CEO and her firm. Overall, we show that management tenure has important implications for the external oversight of rating agencies.

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