Bedeutung

Frege ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
Charles Travis
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Truth Value

Chapters 1–4 unfolded Frege’s general, fruitful, picture of the business of being true. Chapter 5 concerns some elaborations of that picture, in 1891–1895, with an eye on his then-central project: proving arithmetic to be logic. Here we find some interesting false steps, culminating in his technical notion, Bedeutung. This chapter examines and unravels some of these. They involve his treatment of the notion function, correlatively, a radical (but not properly motivated) syntactic revisionism, the conflation of two different sorts of Bedeutung, one having to do with evaluation and transmission of truth value, the other having to do with forming a representation, something to be either true or false.

scholarly journals Loodus tuleb tagasi: delfiinid ja saurused. Libauudistest, photoshop-muistenditest ja meemidest koroonakarantiini ajal

Mäetagused ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 167-184
Author(s):  
Eda Kalmre ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Coping Strategies ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Existence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fake News ◽  
The Social ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Positive Effect

The article follows the narrative trend initiated by the social media posts and fake news during the first months of the corona quarantine, which claims that the decrease of contamination due to the quarantine has a positive effect on the environment and nature recovery. The author describes the context of the topic and follows the changes in the rhetoric through different genres, discussing the ways in which a picture can tell a truthful story. What is the relation between the context, truth, and rhetoric? This material spread globally, yet it was also readily “translated” into the Estonian context, and – what is very characteristic of the entire pandemic material – when approaching this material, truthful and fabricated texts, photos, and videos were combined. From the folkloristic point of view, these rumours in the form of fake news, first presented in the function of a tall tale and further following the sliding truth scale of legends, constitute a part of coping strategies, so-called crisis humour, yet, on the other hand, also a belief story presenting positive imagery, which surrounds the mainly apocalyptically perceived pandemic period and interprets the human existence on a wider scale. Even if these fake news and memes have no truth value, they communicate an idea – nature recovers – and definitely offer hope and a feeling of well-being.

Function words and polarity

2021 ◽  
pp. 66-85
Author(s):  
Matteo Greco
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Function Words ◽  
Closed Class ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Syntactic Derivation

Function words are commonly considered to be a small and closed class of words in which each element is associated with a specific and fixed logical meaning. Unfortunately, this is not always true as witnessed by negation: on the one hand, negation does reverse the truth-value conditions of a proposition, and the other hand, it does not, realizing what is called Expletive Negation. This chapter aims to investigate whether a word that is established on the basis of its function can be ambiguous by discussing the role of the syntactic derivation in some instances of so-called Expletive Negation clauses, a case in which negation seems to lose its capacity to deny the proposition associated with its sentence. Both a theoretical and an experimental approach has been adopted.

Presupposition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Rumfitt
Keyword(s):  
Sentence Type ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Semantic Presupposition ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Pragmatic Presupposition

There are various senses in which one statement may be said to ‘presuppose’ another, senses which are in permanent danger of being confused. Prominent among them are Strawsonian presupposition, a relation which obtains between statements when the falsity of one deprives the other of truth-value (for example, ‘There was such a person as Kepler’ is a Strawsonian presupposition of ‘Kepler died in misery’); semantic presupposition, which obtains between a statement and a particular use of a sentence type, when the falsity of the statement means that that use will not after all constitute the making of a statement (for example, ‘The name "Kepler" has a bearer’ is a semantic presupposition of ‘Kepler died in misery’); and pragmatic presupposition, a broader notion exemplified by the legitimate presumption that accepting or denying the statement ‘Fred knows that the earth moves’ means accepting ‘The earth moves’.

scholarly journals Scientific discourse from the aspect of interaction between the categories of modus and modality

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-460
Author(s):  
N. V. Zinevich
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Category ◽  
Scientific Discourse ◽  
The Other ◽  
Functional Potential ◽  
Unique Nature ◽  
Limited Application ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Scientific Discourses ◽  
Concrete Language

The paper explores the correlation between the universal categories of modus and modality in scientific discourse. It is claimed that the two categories demonstrate different ontological nature and, consequently, should be treated separately. In this light the domain of modality needs to be reduced to the expression of truth value, while the functional potential of modus will include all the other ways in which the speaker assesses his/her utterance. Hence, it’s more expedient to characterize modality as a functional-semantic category, with modus assuming communicative-pragmatic dimensions. It has been revealed that in scientific discourse there is absolute domination of modus, which can be attributed to the unique nature of communication in this field. The category of modality, in its turn, has a limited application and is mostly restricted to combinations with different modi. Further investigation has found out that English and Belarusian scientific discourses share their major modus-modality characteristics but differ in terms of modi their authors prefer to modalize and concrete language means used for the purpose.

Presuppositions of Religious Dialogue

1972 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 289-310
Author(s):  
J. N. Chubb
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Religious Dialogue ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Truth Value

I would like to explain the point of view from which this paper is written. And this in itself will be a difficult task. In a religious dialogue we could be concerned in some way with questions which arise as a result of serious differences in doctrines between adherents of different religions or religious faiths. The ensuing debate or dialogue could take the form of an argument conducted from points of view that are distinctly partisan. If two doctrines are or are taken to be in head-on collision with each other by those who accept these doctrines, the holder of one doctrine would argue with the holder of the other doctrine with the object of showing that he is partly or wholly in error. If two statements both claiming to have truth-value are, or are taken to be, inconsistent with each other, then it is clear that one or both of them are or must be taken to be partly or wholly false. To attempt to show by marshalling reasons that the proposition inconsistent with that which one holds is wholly or partly false is what I mean by the partisan approach. The approach in a dialogue is partisan even if truth is claimed and the opposing ‘error’ exposed by reference to authority; for so long as there is to be a dialogue the setting up of a particular authority or of an authority specified in a particular way has to be justified by reasoning or at least a show of reasoning. If reasoning flows from and terminates in an authority without flowing beyond it and around it, so to speak, the fact that that ‘authority’ is not accepted by the other party is sufficient to bring the dialogue to an immediate end, leaving room only for a futile talking at cross purposes.

scholarly journals Indexical Relativism?

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Personal Taste ◽  
Faultless Disagreement ◽  
Predicates Of Personal Taste ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One

AbstractThe particular behavior exhibited by sentences featuring predicates of personal taste such as “tasty” may drive us to claim that their truth depends on the context of assessment, as MacFarlane does. MacFarlane considers two ways in which the truth of a sentence can depend on the context of assessment. On the one hand, we can say that the sentence expresses a proposition whose truth-value depends on the context of assessment. This is MacFarlane’s position, which he calls “truth relativism” and, following Weatherson, I rebrand as “nonindexical relativism”. On the other hand, we can say that what proposition a sentence expresses depends on the context of assessment. MacFarlane calls this position “content relativism” and rejects it on the grounds that it leads to implausible readings of certain sentences and is unable to account for the speaker’s authority over the content of her assertions. In this paper, I too argue against content relativism, which, again following Weatherson, I rebrand as “indexical relativism”. However, my arguments against the theory are different from MacFarlane’s, which I prove unsound. In particular, I show that any version of indexical relativism will be unable to account for at least one of the phenomena that have been standardly used to motivate nonindexical relativism—faultless disagreement and retraction—in most of the ways in which it has been proposed to understand them.

scholarly journals Truth-Graph Method: a Handy Method Different from that of Leśniewski’s

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-111
Author(s):  
Lei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Visual Representation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Graph Method ◽  
Convenient Tool ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Truth Tables

Abstract The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.

Objective or Subjective ‘Ought’?

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
SVEN OVE HANSSON
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Subjective Interpretation ◽  
Objective Sense ◽  
Ordinary Usage ◽  
Truth Value

The prescriptive ‘ought’ has both an objective and a subjective interpretation. In the objective sense, what one ought to do depends on what is actually true. In the subjective sense it depends on what one believes to be true. Ordinary usage seems to vacillate between these two interpretations. An example (the indecisive terrorist) is used to show that a subjective ought statement can have a determinate truth-value in situations where the corresponding objective ought statement has no truth-value, not even an unknowable one. Therefore the subjective ought is not definable in terms of the objective ought. However, definability in the other direction is not excluded by this argument.

The independence of Quine's axioms *200 and *201

1941 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 96-97
Author(s):  
Barkley Rosser
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Single Object ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Image Position

We refer to the axioms in Quine's book, Mathematical logic, New York, 1940.To prove the independence of *200, give xϵ α the truth value F in all cases and give (x)ϕ the same truth value as ϕ. Then clearly all formulas derivable from the other axioms besides *200 have the value T, whereas from *200 one can derive (∃x)(∃α)(xϵ α) which has the value F. This method of proving independence amounts to taking for a model a universe consisting of the single object Λ.For *201 we prove a contingent independence. That is, we prove that if Quine's system is consistent, then *201 is independent. The line of argument is the following. Suppose *201 can be derived from the other axioms. Let us replace xϵ α by throughout all the axioms. Then what *201 becomes can be derived from what the other axioms become. However what *201 becomes will lead to a contradiction in Quine's system whereas the rules which the other axioms become are valid in Quine's system.We now get down to technical details. Let us refer to the replacement of xϵ α by throughout an expression as an r replacement. Denote the result of performing an r replacement on ϕ by ϕr. Let Wα denoteThenNote that if x and y are variables, then by D10,

Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox and Its Reception in Qāḍī Mubārak and Mullā Mubīn

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan John Rezakhany
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Other ◽  
Major Premise ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
False Self ◽  
Liar Sentence ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

AbstractI examine the views of Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī (d. 1502) on the Liar paradox and their reception in the work of Qāḍī Mubārak (d. 1748) and Mullā Mubīn (d. 1810). Dawānī argues that the Liar sentence is neither true nor false since it is not the kind of utterance that is capable of bearing a truth-value (i.e., it is not truth-apt). In the course of justifying this view, he proposes a criterion for a sentence’s being truth-apt and attempts to counter a number of objections. I address two of these: one involves certain intuitively true or false self-referential sentences and the other is the ‘strengthened Liar.’ I then argue that both Qāḍī Mubārak and Mullā Mubīn present a version of the solution Dawānī gives in his Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb and, moreover, that Dawānī does not endorse this solution in all his other works. Furthermore, the solution they attribute to Dawānī differs slightly from the one he gives in his Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb in terms of how the major premise is justified. I present evidence which shows that this modification was inspired by Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī’s (d. 1689) gloss on Dawānī’s Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb.

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