Introduction

Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

This chapter examines the historiography of the post-war British Army. It demonstrates that the Army’s nuclear mission in Germany is underrepresented in the mainstream literature, in spite of this being its most important commitment after 1945. The chapter explains how the Army became a potential agent of nuclear warfare and its role in national and alliance strategy. It argues that the Army was largely successful in overcoming the conceptual difficulties of planning for future war, but that it displayed a cognitive dissonance when faced with uncomfortable realities about the nature of nuclear warfare.

Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

This chapter demonstrates that the British Army possessed the intellectual capacity for organizational innovation after 1945. It argues that the officer corps understood the significance of the nuclear revolution and arrived at logical conclusions as to how tactical nuclear weapons might affect land warfare. Its ability to think critically about the challenges posed by nuclear weapons calls into question the traditional narrative of the post-war British Army as an anti-intellectual organization, tied to out-of-date methods and a stagnant military doctrine. The chapter concludes that although the Army played an important role in NATO strategy, it displayed a cognitive dissonance about the logical inconsistencies of nuclear deterrence.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

The primary mission assigned to the British Army from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War was deterring Soviet aggression in Europe by demonstrating the will and capability to fight with nuclear weapons in defence of NATO territory. This ‘surreal’ mission was unlike any other in history, and raised a number of conceptual and practical difficulties. This book provides the first comprehensive study on how the British Army imagined the character of a future nuclear land warfare, and how it planned to fight it. Based on new archival evidence, the book analyses British thinking about the political and military utility of tactical nuclear weapons, the role of land forces within NATO strategy, the development of theories of tactical nuclear warfare, how nuclear war was taught at the Staff College, the Army’s use of operational research, and the evolution of the Army’s nuclear war-fighting doctrine. The book argues that the British Army was largely successful in adapting to its new nuclear mission in Germany, but that it displayed a cognitive dissonance when faced with some of the more uncomfortable realities of nuclear war.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butler

Abstract This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilization at the end of the First World War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that the existing demobilization system was unjust, and men were soon organized by those more politically conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the flames of discontent, soldiers’ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were genuinely concerned that Bolshevism had ‘infected’ the army, or, at the very least, the army had been unionized, their fears were not realized. The article examines the government’s strategy regarding demobilization, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.


2019 ◽  
pp. 151-171
Author(s):  
Nick Mansfield

In contrast to chapters 3, 4 and 5, this chapter examines the traditional anti-foreigner and particularly anti-French feeling shared by many working class people. It examines how this aided the British army in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and assesses how it contributed to the strengthening of political loyalism rather than radicalism. The account looks at examples of extraordinary rank and file unsolicited wartime bravery, and general keeness for battle which were promoted by post war commemoration and growing loyalty amongst soldiers to the martial traditions of their regiments. With rank and file support for regiment, army and nation, and with the army’s growing imperial role after 1815, this loyalism was combined with incipient imperialism. In addition, the survival of officer paternalism, albeit patchy, contributed to rank and file loyalty, often absorbing the anti-radicalism of the officer class. All this contributed to soldiers almost universally ‘doing their duty’ and explains why radical subversion was unsuccessful and why regiments could be safely used by the Victorian authorities against Chartists and strikers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Zwigenberg

The onset of nuclear warfare in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had far-reaching implications for the world of medicine. The study of the A-bomb and its implications led to the launching of new fields and avenues of research, most notably in genetics and radiation studies. Far less understood and under-studied was the impact of nuclear research on psychiatric medicine. Psychological research, however, was a major focus of post-war military and civilian research into the bomb. This research and the perceived revolutionary impact of atomic energy and warfare on society, this paper argues, played an important role in the global development of post-war psychiatry. Focusing on psychiatrists in North America, Japan and the United Nations, this paper examines the reaction of the profession to the nuclear age from the early post-war period to the mid 1960s. The way psychiatric medicine related to atomic issues, I argue, shifted significantly between the immediate post-war period and the 1960s. While the early post-war psychiatrists sought to help society deal with and adjust to the new nuclear reality, later psychiatrists moved towards a more radical position that sought to resist the establishment’s efforts to normalise the bomb and nuclear energy. This shift had important consequences for research into the psychological trauma suffered by victims of nuclear warfare, which, ultimately, together with other research into the impact of war and systematic violence, led to our current understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).


2009 ◽  
Vol 195 (5) ◽  
pp. 381-381

Denis Reed was born in Bristol in 1917. Despite suffering ill-health in youth, he had a happy boyhood. He enrolled at London's Royal College of Art in 1938 but his studies were interrupted by the outbreak of World War II and his subsequent enlistment in the British Army. Reed eventually qualified in 1948 and the Principal of the College, P.H. Jowett, remarked, ‘His painting is always good in colour and interesting in design.’ Denis Reed's work was displayed in many galleries during the post-War years. He became a member of the Royal West of England Academy and was appointed Senior Lecturer in Painting at Loughborough College of Art. Increasingly severe bouts of depression forced him to relinquish this post and he became a resident at Glenside Psychiatric Hospital in Bristol during the 1950s and 1960s.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

Chapter 6 assesses the evolution of the British Army’s doctrine for tactical nuclear war. It challenges the orthodox narrative of an intellectually stagnant post-war British Army by demonstrating that the service was continually engaged with the development of new doctrine throughout the Cold War. In particular, the chapter draws attention to how formal written doctrine was influenced by two of the Rhine Army’s most coveted, and controversial, commanders: Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery and Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall. It argues that the post-war military thought of Montgomery was much more progressive than has hitherto been described by historians, and that the doctrinal reforms instigated by Bagnall in the 1980s were merely a logical progression of concepts articulated in the 1950s, calling into question the revolutionary nature of the reforms.


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