scholarly journals “The British Soldier is no Bolshevik”: The British Army, Discipline, and the Demobilization Strikes of 1919

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butler

Abstract This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilization at the end of the First World War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that the existing demobilization system was unjust, and men were soon organized by those more politically conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the flames of discontent, soldiers’ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were genuinely concerned that Bolshevism had ‘infected’ the army, or, at the very least, the army had been unionized, their fears were not realized. The article examines the government’s strategy regarding demobilization, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.

1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Gilbert

In the early morning hours of July 27, 1974, the military government of Peru employed riot police to seize control of the country's principal daily newspapers. The government announced that the newspapers were being transferred to independent organizations representative of broad sectors of Peruvian society. Peru's “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces,” which came to power in 1968, had already surprised students of the Latin American military with a series of radical measures which included an extensive land reform, the expropriation of a number of foreign companies, reorganization of the financial sector, and the creation of a system of worker control for industry. Now President Juan Velasco Alvarado presented the press takeover as an integral part of a fundamental reordering of the existing society along progressive nationalist lines.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (324) ◽  
pp. 142-151
Author(s):  
Bogdan Chrzanowski

The regaining of the country’s independence, and then its revival after the war damages, including itseconomic infrastructure – these were the tasks set by the Polish government in exile, first in Paris and thenin London. The maritime economy was to play an important role here. The Polish government was fullyaware of the enormous economic and strategic benefits resulting from the fact that it had a coast, withthe port of Gdynia before the war. It was assumed that both in Gdynia and in the ports that were to belongto Poland after the war: Szczecin, Kołobrzeg, Gdańsk, Elbląg, Królewiec, the economic structure was to betransformed, and they were to become the supply points for Central and Eastern Europe. Work on thereconstruction of the post-war maritime economy was mainly carried out by the Ministry of Industry, Tradeand Shipping. In London, in 1942–1943, a number of government projects were set up to rebuild the entiremaritime infrastructure. All projects undertaken in exile were related to activities carried out by individualunderground divisions of the Polish Underground State domestically, i.e. the “Alfa” Naval Department of theHome Army Headquarters, the Maritime Department of the Military Bureau of Industry and Trade of the Headof the Military Bureau of the Home Army Headquarters and the Maritime Department of the Departmentof Industry Trade and Trade Delegation of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Poland. The abovementionedorganizational units also prepared plans for the reconstruction of the maritime economy, and theprojects developed in London were sent to the country. They collaborated here and a platform for mutualunderstanding was found.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.


Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.


Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


2021 ◽  
pp. bmjmilitary-2021-001945
Author(s):  
Iain Parsons ◽  
J Ellwood ◽  
M J Stacey ◽  
N Gall ◽  
M Grundy-Bowers ◽  
...  

IntroductionReflex syncope is the most common subtype of syncope and, despite not being associated with increased mortality, often results in significant morbidity and costly diagnostics. Reflex syncope can be of concern for certain occupational groups and may be exacerbated by some occupations. Reflex syncope in the military is anecdotally common but the extent in the UK Armed Forces (UKAF) is unknown. The aim of this study was to assess the incidence and prevalence of reflex syncope in the UKAF.MethodsA retrospective search of the Defence Medical Information Capability Programme using prespecified read-codes was performed at defence primary healthcare centres over the period of 1 January 2019 to 1 January 2020. Data were obtained on 76 103 service personnel (SP) (53% of the UKAF).ResultsThe overall syncope case rate for the UKAF was 10.5 per 1000 person-years (p-yrs). In comparing services there was a significantly increased risk of syncope in the British Army (10.7 per 1000 p-yrs) compared with the Royal Air Force (8.6 per 1000 p-yrs) (p=0.0365), SP who served overseas (16.7 per 1000 p-yrs) in comparison with UK medical centres (10.3 per 1000 p-yrs) (p<0.0001), and British Army units that regularly took part in State Ceremonial and Public Duties (15.8 per 1000 p-yrs vs 10.2 per 1000 p-yrs) (p=0.0035). Army training units conferred a significantly reduced risk of syncope (p<0.0001).ConclusionsThese data are the first to define the incidence and prevalence of syncope in the UKAF. Orthostasis and heat are probable triggers, although recruits are potentially protected. These data offer opportunities to improve the health and well-being of SP, with economic, logistical and reputational benefits for the UKAF. Further research to identify personnel at risk of future syncopal events may allow for targeted use of countermeasures.


Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Igor P. Acácio

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.


Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.


Significance Tensions between the Gulf states and Iran have escalated significantly in 2016, in the wake of Iran's signing of a landmark deal in 2015 that brought to an end the decade-long dispute over its nuclear programme. The response of Iran's military to the heightened tensions will be partly influenced by the new chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the country's top military body, Major General Mohamad Hossein Bagheri. Impacts A more assertive and non-compromising IRGC will increase pressure on President Hassan Rouhani as he seeks re-election in 2017. Improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination are likely in Syria, aimed at reducing Iranian casualties. The military and government are likely to clash soon over the defence budget and its allocation. The government will try to keep the IRGC in check by tipping the media off about alleged financial wrongdoings. With the next US president expected to adopt a harder-line stance on Iran, the diplomatic rapprochement may be reversed partially.


Subject Counterterrorism in Burkina Faso. Significance Despite recent gains against jihadist groups, in recent months attacks have moved beyond the more insecure north and started to occur more frequently in the east and parts of the centre. Separately, authorities are growing increasingly intolerant of public dissent and protest, while revelations of abuses by the military risk scuppering crucial local community support necessary for counterinsurgency operations. Impacts The government will face growing political and public pressure to end persistent strikes. Patriotic support for the armed forces remains widespread, but growing revelations of abuse will tarnish its image. Opposition criticisms of the government’s counterterrorism strategy will increase but avoid directly blaming the military. Public dissatisfaction may grow with the Sahel Group of Five (G5) regional force if the slow pace of its operations persists. The prosecution of alleged coup plotter Gilbert Diendere will enjoy public backing amid calls for justice for victims of the old regime.


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