The Significance of Epistemic Innocence
2020 ◽
pp. 132-141
In the concluding chapter, the author revisits the significance of the epistemic innocence framework in the light of the applications of epistemic innocence to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, elaborated delusional beliefs, motivated delusional beliefs, and optimistically biased beliefs in the preceding chapters. The somewhat counterintuitive conclusion is that some of the beliefs regarded as paradigmatic instances of epistemic irrationality can be attributed significant epistemic benefits, in the sense that they either enhance or restore epistemic functionality. The wider implications of the epistemic innocence project for research in philosophy and psychology are reviewed, and the limitations acknowledged.
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
pp. 42-69
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 76
(3)
◽
pp. 1-24