Satanically Great Instigators and Banal Compliers

Evil ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 444-449
Author(s):  
Avishai Margalit
Keyword(s):  

This Reflection focuses on three of the great threats we confront in thinking about evil. First, we often forget to distinguish clearly between instigators of evil and compliers with evil. Second, we are too often tempted to think of the instigators as satanically great embodiments of pure evil—outside the moral domain. Second, we are also tempted to think that compliers are all banal and, in some sense, less guilty than the instigators.

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rumen Iliev ◽  
Douglas Medin
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Mateus Matos Tormin

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhea Luana Arini ◽  
Juliana Bocarejo Aljure ◽  
Nereida Bueno ◽  
Clara Bayón González ◽  
Estrella Fernández Alba ◽  
...  

Most developmental studies of the role of outcomes and intentions in third-party moral evaluations sampled children from English-speaking countries and focused on harm and property transgressions. We tested instead 5- to 11-year-old children from Colombia and Spain (N = 123) employing moral scenarios involving disloyalty and unfairness. We found that the outcome-to-intent shift in judgements of transgression severity was moral domain-dependent in Colombian but not Spanish children. More specifically, by age 5 Spanish children judged failed intentional transgressions more severely than accidental transgressions regarding both disloyalty and unfairness. In comparison, Colombian children judged failed intentional transgressions more severely than accidental transgressions in the case of disloyalty but not unfairness. This suggests that it may be adaptive for children to develop sensitivity to intentionality earlier within the moral domain their own culture is more concerned about (e.g., loyalty in collectivistic cultures). Regarding punishment severity, we observed an outcome-to-intent shift in Spanish but not Colombian children. In other words, while Colombian children punished failed intentional transgressions and accidental transgressions equally for the whole age range, Spanish children began to punish failed intentional transgressions of both moral domains more severely than accidental transgressions around 8 years of age. Finally, neither Colombian nor Spanish children enjoyed engaging in punishment. Colombian children even anticipated administering punishment to feel worse than it actually felt during and after punishment allocation. These enjoyment findings suggest that retribution is unlikely to be the primary motive for children’s third-party punishment in this context.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117
Author(s):  
Jianjin Liu

Based on the Social Cognitive Domain Theory, the paper explored the adolescents’ conceptions of teacher authority in different domains and their relations to rule violations in school. The main results are: 1) Adolescents viewed moral, conventional, and prudential issues as legitimately subject to teachers’ authority and personal issues as under personal jurisdiction, but they were equivocal about contextually conventional issues. 2) Seventh graders judged all acts as more legitimately subject to teachers’ authority, all rule violations as more negative than did older students. 3) Compared with adolescents from big cities, adolescents from rural area viewed moral, conventional, contextually conventional, and personal issues as more legitimately subject to teacher authority, and endorsed less personal jurisdiction over those issues; but there were no significant differences in moral domain. 4) Male subjects reported more violations in conventional and prudential domain. 5)Adolescents’ older age, less endorsement of legitimacy of teacher authority, and greater dislike for school predicted more teacher- and self-reported misconducts. Implications for moral education from these results were also discussed.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Webster ◽  
Donald A. Saucier
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
pp. 195-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot Turiel ◽  
Audun Dahl

This chapter discusses norms in the domains of morality, social convention, and personal jurisdiction from the perspective of psychological development. Many studies have documented that by a young age children think in different ways about each of these domains and that each represents a different developmental pathway. Reasoning about the moral domain, which is a main focus of the chapter, is connected with emotions, and the development of moral judgments stems from individuals’ reciprocal social interactions in direct and everyday experiences. Whereas the domains of norms are distinct, many social situations include considerations from different domains and, therefore, social decisions often involve processes of coordination of weighing those differing and sometimes conflicting considerations. After discussion of processes of coordination, the chapter considers ways that individuals reflect upon the fairness of systems of social organization and coordinate acceptance of norms and opposition to norms through their moral judgments.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document