Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism

Author(s):  
Peter Bernholz

Totalitarian regimes and terrorist groups striving to create them are characterized by ideologies with lexicographic preference orderings. This means that they demand that their followers sacrifice everything, if required, including the lives of others and of themselves to reach the aims postulated. More than twenty such regimes have existed, from the Mongolian and Aztec Empires among the first, to much later Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Union, and in recent years to the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This means that the respective ideologies are usually very different, but that all follow a lexicographic preference order. This chapter studies the development, success, and demise of such regimes, which usually persecute, torture, and even kill nonbelievers, and often are engaged in bloody wars of expansion with many victims. This is also the case concerning their secularly or religiously based aims, which, moreover, characteristically control their behavior concerning the lifestyle of their populations, the arts, and their culture. Totalitarian regimes that have reached their aims are called mature ideocracies. They are characterized by the fact that the whole population has accepted (or at least pretends to accept) the ruling ideology.

Experiment ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
Lorin Johnson ◽  
Donald Bradburn

In the 1970s and 1980s, Los Angeles audiences saw Soviet defectors Mikhail Baryshnikov, Alexander Godunov, Natalia Makarova, and Rudolf Nureyev in the prime of their careers at the Hollywood Bowl, The Dorothy Chandler Pavilion and the Greek Theater. Dance photographer Donald Dale Bradburn, a local Southern California dancer describes his behind-the-scenes access to these dancers in this interview. Perfectly positioned as Dance Magazine’s Southern California correspondent, Bradburn offers a candid appraisal of the Southern California appeal for such high-power Russian artists as well as their impact on the arts of Los Angeles. An intimate view of Russian dancers practicing their craft on Los Angeles stages, Bradburn’s interview is illustrated by fourteen of his photographs, published for the first time in this issue of Experiment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Gerard Alexander

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against the United States is not occurring because contemporary U.S. grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. Most countries either share U.S. strategic interests in the war on terrorism or do not have a direct stake in the confict. As such, balancing behavior is likely only among a narrowly circumscribed list of states and actors being targeted by the United States.


2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-418
Author(s):  
CARL LEVY

David Roberts has published widely on Italian fascism and more recently a significant comparative study of totalitarianism in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. The short essay published here is a useful compression of the arguments presented in the longer work. Unfortunately, this piece represents all that is problematic and frustrating in totalitarian/political religion studies. Roberts gives us a useful review of the growth and evolution of totalitarianism and political religion from the inter-war period through the Cold War until we reach the sunny postmodern uplands of the cultural turn. A review of the arguments of Gentile, Griffin, Morgan, Kershaw, Eatwell, Payne, Burrin and Voegelin is helpful to the reader who is unfamiliar with a series of complex arguments, which straddle decades.


2018 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Oksana Salata

The second world and its constituent German-Soviet wars became the key events of the 20th century. Currently, the study of domestic and foreign historiography in the context of the disclosure of the information policy of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the information confrontation of the Nazi and Soviet systems of information and psychological infl uence on the enemy population is relevant. Thanks to the work of domestic and foreign scholars, the attraction of new archival materials and documents, the world saw scientifi c works devoted to various aspects of the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany, including in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Among them are the works of Ukrainian historians: A. Podolsky, Y. Nikolaytsya, P. Rekotov, O. Lysenko, V. Shaikan, M. Mikhailyuk, V. Grinevich; Russian historians M. I. Semiaryagi, E. Makarevich, V. I. Tsymbal and G. F. Voronenkova. An analysis of scientifi c literature published in Germany, England and the United States showed that the eff ectiveness and negative eff ects of German information policy are revealed in the works of German historians and publicists O. Hadamovsky, N. Muller, P. Longerich, R. Coel, et al. Along with the works devoted to armed confrontation, one can single out a study in which the authors try to show the information technologies and methods of psychological action that were used by the governments of both countries to infl uence the consciousness and the moral and psychological state of their own population and the enemy’s population, on the results of the Second World War. Most active in the study of Nazi propaganda and information policy of the Third Reich, in general, were the German historians, in particular E. Hadamovskie , G. Fjorsterch and G. Schnitter, and others. The value of their work is to highlight the process of the creation in 1933–1945 of the National Socialist Party in Germany of an unprecedented system of mass manipulation in the world’s history, fully controlled by the Nazi leadership of the information space. Thus, an analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scholars shows that the information confrontation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was extremely powerful, since both warring parties possessed the most up-to-date information and ideological weapon. Unfortunately, today there is no comprehensive study of this problem that could reveal all aspects of the information confrontation in the modern information world.


2021 ◽  
pp. 28-42
Author(s):  
Marlene Laruelle

This chapter goes back in time to look at the Soviet construction of the Russian term fashizm and some of the ambiguities that the Soviet society cultivated toward the term and its historical personification, Nazi Germany. It recalls that the term fascism (fashizm), in Soviet times, belonged more to an emotional than to an analytical lexicon. The chapter also discusses Russia's history and Russians' memories of the Second World War, called the Great Patriotic War in Russian (Velikaia otechestvennaia voina) and Victory Day (Den´ pobedy). It reviews how the cult of war is intimately linked to the Brezhnev era and provided the context in which commemoration of the Great Patriotic War was institutionalized as a sacred symbol of the Soviet Union, a confirmation of the soundness of the socialist system and the unity of its peoples. The chapter then argues that the very solemnity of Soviet anti-fascism, and its centrality to the country's political identity constitute the fundaments inherited from Soviet times on the basis of which the notion of fascism is operationalized in today's Russia. Ultimately, the chapter further elaborates the three main sources of the Soviet's cryptic fascination with Nazi Germany and source of knowledge about fashizm: the Nazi propaganda, criminal culture, and cinema and culture.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Bazyler ◽  
Kathryn Lee Boyd ◽  
Kristen L. Nelson ◽  
Rajika L. Shah

The independent Republic of Estonia was attacked and formally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. It was subsequently invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany in 1941 until Soviet troops re-entered the country in 1944. At the end of the war, virtually every member of Estonia’s small prewar Jewish community had been murdered, deported, or had fled the country. Estonia’s independence was restored in 1991, and post-Communist Estonia passed restitution laws that applied generally to private and communal immovable property confiscated during the Communist era. Estonia endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009 and the Guidelines and Best Practices in 2010.


1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES L. GIBSON ◽  
RAYMOND M. DUCH

Political tolerance is a democratic value that has often been studied by those interested in the relationship between mass public opinion and democracy. Yet most research efforts have been mounted in relatively democratic regimes. Little is known about political tolerance in relatively totalitarian regimes. The authors' purpose in this article is to explore intolerance within the mass public of the Soviet Union. Focusing on two surveys of public opinion conducted in the USSR in 1990, the authors demonstrate that political intolerance is fairly widespread in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the objects of intolerance are focused, not dispersed pluralistically. Many of the predictors of intolerance found useful in the West (e.g., perceptions of threat, closed-mindedness) are also good predictors in the Soviet Union. Level of education plays an especially interesting role, contributing to support for more general democratic values, but not directly to political tolerance. The authors conclude this article by speculating about the future of the democratization process in the USSR in light of regnant intolerance in that country.


Slavic Review ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 896-918
Author(s):  
Emily Wang

In the 1930s, Viacheslav Ivanov – erstwhile leader of Russian symbolism – found himself suspended between two totalitarian regimes, Stalin's Soviet Union and Mussolini's Italy. A Soviet citizen living in Italy, he adapted to his new circumstances, converting to Catholicism and embracing Italian cultural traditions, including Petrarch's legacy of transnational humanism. In this period, however, fascist and Nazi thinkers were also claiming humanism for their own nationalist purposes. In his Italian-language writings, Ivanov navigates these dangerous waters by attempting to represent himself as simultaneously national and transnational, and as both a Russian poet and a latter-day Italian humanist.


Author(s):  
Richard King

This article includes literature (principally fiction, but also poetry, spoken drama, opera, and popular performances), cultural policy and debate, and the history of the Communist Party’s relations with cultural intellectuals for the years 1942–1976. The starting point is Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,” delivered in May 1942, when China was politically divided and at war with Japan, and the period ends with Mao’s death in September 1976, an event closely followed by the arrest of his widow and her closest associates in a coup the following month. Mao’s “Talks” set the tone for the entire period, demanding the subordination of the arts to the Party’s mission as currently defined, and insisting that culture serve the Party’s constituency of “workers, peasants, and soldiers.” The “Talks,” variously interpreted, remained Party policy through the civil war period (1945–1949), and following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. The new communist state established a Soviet Union–style cultural bureaucracy, and the most fortunate writers, performers, and artists were rewarded with official recognition and state sponsorship; also imported from the Soviet Union was the doctrine of socialist realism, with its requirement for loyalist and heroic works celebrating the nation’s prospective progress along the road to the glorious future of communism. Throughout the Mao era, the authorities sought to sponsor a new socialist Chinese culture, with varying degrees of tolerance for indigenous traditions and Western influence. The Communist Party and its leader believed in the power of the arts to support, and in the wrong hands to undermine, the cause of socialism; Mao intervened periodically in cultural matters, and many of the political campaigns that disrupted the period had cultural components. The effect of mercurial and often vindictive policy changes on writers and artists could be devastating: the Anti-Rightist campaign of the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution of Mao’s last decade (1966–1976) saw the persecution of many of the nation’s leading cultural figures; virtually no writer or artist had an uninterrupted career. Chinese cultural histories customarily view the Yan’an and civil war period as distinct, and they divide the period from 1949 to 1976 into the seventeen years before 1966 and the Cultural Revolution decade that followed. Although this periodization overstates the discontinuity of cultural policy and artistic output, it will be observed for convenience here. A note on Romanization: English-language publications from China prior to 1979 use a modified, and inefficient, version of the now little-used Wade-Giles Romanization; after 1979, Chinese publishers converted to the now conventional pinyin Romanization. For Western scholarship or translations, the transition from Wade-Giles (in its more precise form) to pinyin took place at around the same time.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document