Fiduciary Principles in Health Care

Author(s):  
Mark A. Hall

This chapter examines fiduciary principles in health care law. There is no unanimous agreement when it comes to the precise doctrinal consequences of labeling health care actors as fiduciaries in various contexts, such as personal injury, decisional authority, financial influence, and procedural rules. In the case of patients and physicians, certain attributes are said to constitute an archetypal fiduciary relationship, including agency, dependency, trust, and information asymmetry. Thus, many legal decisions and commentators argue that physicians have fiduciary responsibilities to patients. For courts, however, hospitals are not fiduciaries. They regard private hospitals as ordinary commercial enterprises. This chapter first provides an overview of arguments over whether physicians and non-physicians (for example, hospitals and health insurers) are “fiduciaries” before discussing health care fiduciaries’ duty of loyalty and duty of care, along with their other obligations such as duties of confidentiality and full disclosure. It also explores the ability of health care fiduciaries and patients to waive fiduciary duties, as well as how courts have addressed distinct causes of action for physicians’ breach of fiduciary duty. It shows that courts often invoke fiduciary concepts and terminology in discussing physicians’ obligations to patients, and that physician-patient (and other medical treatment) relationships have classic attributes of fiduciary status.

Author(s):  
Nina A. Kohn

This chapter examines the fiduciary principles governing surrogate decision-making. Surrogate decision-making relationships arise when one person is appointed to make decisions for another, and are often used to make decisions for individuals with acute medical conditions or cognitive disabilities that make it difficult or impossible for the individuals to make decisions for themselves. A surrogate decision maker may be authorized by the individual for whom decisions are to be made or by a third party, including a court or a federal agency providing benefits to the individual. This chapter first considers how fiduciary duties are triggered in surrogate decision-making relationships and describes the requirements for appointment and acceptance by type of surrogate: guardians and conservators, agents acting under a power of attorney for finances or health care, and representative payees and other government fiduciaries. The discussion then turns to the surrogate decision maker’s duty of loyalty and duty of care, along with other fiduciary obligations. The chapter concludes with an overview of remedies available for a breach of fiduciary duty by a surrogate.


2021 ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Abraham Fuks

Health care takes place in the relationship between patient and physician that is crafted mutually and relies crucially on the words and behaviors of the participants. The physician has a duty of care to the person who is ill and must therefore engage fully to respond to the needs of the patient. A language of alliance and shared goals that are clearly communicated shifts the doctor’s attention from the disease to the patient. This chapter examines schemas that have been put forward to characterize the clinical relationship and critiques the dual discourses that separate science and art, and posit technical skills and humane attentiveness as competing frames. It reviews phenomenological analyses of the clinical interaction and cautions against a form of autonomy and empowerment that permits clinicians to shed their responsibilities. The chapter explores clinical presence and relational understanding as necessary features of responsive and responsible clinical care.


ASHA Leader ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Ingrida Lusis
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Arthur B. Laby

This chapter examines the fiduciary principles governing investment advice. Fiduciary principles in investment advice are both straightforward and complex. They are straightforward because most investment advisers are considered fiduciaries and subject to strict fiduciary duties under federal and state law. Their complex nature arises from the fact that many individuals and firms provide investment advice but are not deemed investment advisers and, therefore, are not subject to a fiduciary obligation. This chapter first explains whether and when an advisory relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties by focusing on both federal and state law, as well as the individuals and firms that typically provide investment advice. In particular, it looks at certain persons and entities excluded from the definition of investment adviser and thus not subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, namely broker-dealers, banks, and family offices as well as accountants, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. The chapter also considers fiduciaries under ERISA, the Investment Company Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act before discussing the fiduciary duty of loyalty and how it is expressed and applied in investment advisory relationships; the fiduciary duty of care and how it differs from other standards of conduct, such as a duty of suitability; and other legal obligations imposed on investment advisers and how those obligations relate to an adviser’s fiduciary duty. Finally, the mandatory or default terms with regard to an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are explored, along with remedies available for breach of fiduciary duty.


Author(s):  
Julian Velasco

This chapter examines fiduciary duty in corporate law. Fiduciary duty is pervasive as well as all encompassing in corporate law. One common misconception about fiduciary duty in corporate law is that it is merely aspirational. Fiduciary duties are not simply moral requirements, they are legal ones. They are not merely suggestions, they represent the demands of the law. Although corporate law has often compromised rather than insisting upon strict enforcement of fiduciary law principles, these compromises are due to practical considerations that are entirely consistent with the goals of fiduciary law. In corporate law, general fiduciary law principles are balanced with practical considerations concerning the profit motive in order to achieve the best overall result for the shareholders. Understanding this tension between ambition and practicality is key to understanding fiduciary duty in corporate law. This chapter first considers the triggers for fiduciary duty in corporate law before discussing the role that the duty of loyalty plays in corporate law. It then explores the duty of care in corporate law, along with other fiduciary duties such as good faith, takeover situations and contests for control, shareholder voting rights, and the duty to monitor and the duty to disclose. The chapter proceeds by analyzing mandatory and default rules regarding the extent to which fiduciary duties can be waived in corporate law and concludes with an overview of remedies for breach of fiduciary duty.


Author(s):  
Matthew Conaglen

This chapter examines the principles of fiduciary doctrine that are found in contemporary common law systems. More specifically, it considers the current similarities and differences between various jurisdictions such as England, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The similarities focus on the duties of loyalty, care and skill, and good faith, as well as when fiduciary duties arise and the kinds of interests that are protected by recognition of fiduciary relationships. The chapter also discusses the issue of differences between various jurisdictions with regard to the duty of care and skill before concluding with an analysis of differences between remedies that are made available in the various contemporary common law jurisdictions when a breach of fiduciary duty arises. It shows that the regulation of fiduciaries appears to be reasonably consistent across common law jurisdictions and across various types of actors, even as such actors are expected to meet differing standards of care. Statute plays a key role in the regulation of various kinds of fiduciary actors, especially corporate directors.


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