The Oxford Handbook of Law and Humanities

How might law matter to the humanities? How might the humanities matter to law? In its approach to both of these questions, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Humanities shows how rich a resource the law is for humanistic study, as well as how and why the humanities are vital for understanding law. Tackling questions of method, key themes, and concepts and a variety of genres and areas of the law, this collection of chapters by leading scholars from a variety of disciplines illuminates new questions and articulates an exciting new agenda for scholarship in law and humanities.

2021 ◽  
pp. 174387212110066
Author(s):  
Edward Mussawir

This paper presents a response to the question of whether there is or should be a law and humanities canon. It is Franz Kafka’s The New Advocate (Der Neue Advokat). Between the lines of this text, a brief argument has been added concerning the use of the humanities for legal expertise. While the main text – a work of fiction – narrates the story of Dr Bucephalus, the war-horse of Alexander the Great, and his becoming admitted to practice as an advocate and to study the law, the added argument contributes little by way of additional commentary or interpretation of this fiction. Instead it suggests that legal scholars, rather than treating their art and expertise as a means only to advocate for public causes, should also not neglect the studious inutility of it. The suggestion states that jurisprudence is the source of this expertise and therefore, in so far as it ensures that law may be studied out of a genuine scholarly interest in it, remains the site for a work of law and the humanities. The main text concludes that it may be better to have done what Bucephalus has done and, under a quiet lamp, to bury oneself in the lawbooks.


2019 ◽  
pp. 174387211989332
Author(s):  
Cathrine O. Frank

This commentary approaches the question of whether there is or should be a law and humanities canon through John Guillory’s analysis of canon formation as an adjunct to specific forms of literacy and their perceived social value within “school culture.” Returning to the law and literature movement, with a focus on literature, this essay contends that in order to determine what should be in a canon, law and humanities must first revisit its aims and objectives, link what it reads to pedagogical goals, and draw clearer connections between teaching and scholarship. As the field’s texts modernize and diversify, so too should the literacies students need to engage with them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanne Gaakeer

Benjamin Cardozo, a great promoter of the concept of the unity of form and content in law and literature, once wrote that “[t]he perplexity of judges becomes the scholar's opportunity.” Cardozo's observation prompts my contribution on narratives in the law to this special issue on pluralities in the law because of the interrelation between law in academic theory and law in practice. My experience as a judge and an academic working in both the fields of law and literature, and law and humanities, allows me to provide a unique point of view. This Article argues the following: First, “to narrate is already to explain” as Paul Ricoeur wrote; the way in which the facts of a case are narrated largely determines the outcome of that case, therefore jurists need to develop and cherish narrative knowledge. Second, jurists should be imaginative about both the law and the people whose fates they determine when they use language to translate brute facts into the reality of the legal narrative. Third, this Article investigates and critically responds to literary theorists' various views on narrative and narratology, explaining which elements can be fruitfully incorporated into a legal narratology. I argue that jurists, while acting as authors and readers of legal narratives, all too often disregard what literary theory and the humanities more generally have to offer to legal practice, which is to highlight points of misunderstanding in our interdisciplinary literary-legal discussions. Here, too, scholarly opportunities remain to be seized for further clarification and theoretical elaboration of the bond of law and narrative.


Anthropology ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin B. Richland ◽  
Anna Weichselbraun

The emergence since the 1970s of social scientific and humanistic studies of law that orient to its linguistic, discursive, and textual features has added both empirical and critical theoretical perspectives to a study of legal language that diverges dramatically from what once was the domain of technicians of legal text and rhetoric. Resonant with the “linguistic turn” of the social sciences and the “sociocultural turn” of humanities, researchers with backgrounds in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, semiotics, and literature, among others, have converged around the structure and use of language and discourse in the expression and operation of the law. The earliest work in this area focused on the face-to-face interactions that constitute the legal process, including witness examination, judge-lawyer or judge-litigant exchanges, plea barging discourses, and even juror deliberation and lawyer-client interactions that happen out of public view. Much of it was conducted by social scientists and legal scholars taking seriously the main thesis of American legal realism, that law must be understood in the details of its actual processes, discursive or otherwise, and not just through the interpretive logics and internal histories of its legislative and judicial texts. More recently however, law and humanities scholars, as well as some social scientists, have returned to the language of legal texts, analyzing how their content is informed by narrative tropes from their sociocultural surround, but likewise by their materiality and mediation as documents, records, and files, of which the circulation between social actors figure importantly in law’s making. While their different disciplinary commitments result in different positions on a variety of methodological concerns—i.e., the need for empirical data to support their claims, the possibility and necessity of posing larger critical and/or normative interventions, and/or the value of offering policy reform recommendations, among others—most of these studies nonetheless concur on a basic vision of language use as a medium not only for reference to, but fundamentally for construction of social realities and orders. Legal language is thus understood as a central mode for the exercise of social power through law, and, increasingly, a focus of inquiry that figures centrally in sociolegal studies that considers how law is always a hermeneutic and empirical phenomenon. What counts as legal language scholarship is necessarily broadly scoped, ever widening, and susceptible to varied opinions about how to delimit it. Legal language scholarship is taken here to be all analyses of law—from both the social sciences and the humanities—that suggest a commitment to understanding law’s discursive and textual dimensions and their impact in shaping law’s force in the world. In the following sections, provided first is a list of texts that offers an overview of law and language scholarship, then a section listing Journals dedicated to sociolinguistic, semiotic, and interpretive approaches to law. The article then presents organized additional key scholarship, according to its origins in social scientific or humanities disciplines, with subheadings in each of these sections as relevant to important themes in the law and language literature.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document