scholarly journals Supererogation and Consequentialism

2020 ◽  
pp. 268-288
Author(s):  
Alfred Archer
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Act Consequentialism

The thought that acts of supererogation exist presents a challenge to all normative ethical theories. This chapter will provide an overview of the consequentialist responses to this challenge. I will begin by explaining the problem that supererogation presents for consequentialism. I will then explore consequentialist attempts to deny the existence of acts of supererogation. Next, I will examine a range of act consequentialist attempts to accommodate supererogation, including satisficing consequentialism, dual-ranking act consequentialism, and an anti-rationalist form of consequentialism. Finally, I will explore how indirect consequentialists have responded to this problem. Throughout the chapter, I will argue that in responding to the challenge of supererogation, consequentialists must choose between a more theoretically satisfying version of consequentialism and a form of consequentialism that is better able to accommodate our everyday moral intuitions and concepts.

Consequentialism, Blame, and Moral Responsibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Elinor Mason
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Holding Responsible ◽  
Blameless Wrongdoing

In this chapter I examine various accounts of the relationship between consequentialism and moral responsibility. The first idea is that the only reason we have for praising and blaming, for holding responsible, is that it will produce good consequences. This view is widely derided, but a descendant, the view that our responsibility practices as a whole can be defended on consequentialist grounds, has been gaining popularity in recent years. I go on to look at the idea of blameless wrongdoing and give an account of how that might fit into to a consequentialist picture. Finally, I discuss the possibility that the direction of influence is the other way: that consequentialist ethical theories are constrained by theories of moral responsibility, and I discuss possible upshots of a responsibility constrained account of consequentialism.

Moral Enhancement, Instrumentalism, and Integrative Ethical Education

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 293-311
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Turchi
Keyword(s):  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Ethical Education ◽  
The Future ◽  
Global Catastrophe ◽  
Contemporary Liberalism

AbstractIn this chapter I will discuss some of the arguments presented in Unfit for the Future, where the authors stress the necessity of moral enhancement to prevent a global catastrophe. Persson and Savulescu promote a reductionistic view of moral intuitions suggesting that oxytocin, serotonin, and genetic treatments could save humanity from the perils of contemporary liberalism, weapons of mass destruction, and uncontrolled pollution. I will contend that although we need a moral enhancement it cannot be a brute manipulation of our biology but something where human plasticity is seen as paramount. Following the lesson of Dewey's instrumentalism, I advocate a non-reductionistic, pluralistic view where neuroscientific data may be used to develop a more effective moral pedagogy. In my opinion, this prospect is currently much more feasible (and less risky) than a hypothetical mass psycho-civilisation created using drugs and electrodes.

Global Consequentialism

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-440
Author(s):  
Hilary Greaves
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Decision Procedures ◽  
The Self ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Moral Assessment

Many types of things are arguably appropriate objects of deontic moral assessment: not only acts but also decision procedures, character traits, motives, public moral codes, and so on. Global consequentialism recommends, for every type that is an appropriate object of deontic assessment at all, that we assess items of that type in terms of their consequences. This (and not simple act consequentialism alone) seems to be roughly the kind of consequentialist thesis that real-life consequentialists, both past and present, have generally been sympathetic to. In this chapter, I articulate a thesis along these lines and defend the thesis in question against the most common objection it faces (“the inconsistency objection”). I discuss the extent to which “going global” deals satisfactorily with three standard objections to act consequentialism: the incorrect verdicts objection, the self-defeatingness objection, and the silence objection. I conclude that global consequentialism has adequate responses to all of these objections, but that it is unclear whether global consequentialism is superior to an account that simply stresses the importance of global axiological assessment.

Rule-Consequentialism and the Significance of Species

Utilitas ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 396-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
PEDRO GALVÃO
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Proper Treatment ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Jeff Mcmahan ◽  
Special Obligations ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
The Ideal

According to rule-consequentialism, we ought to follow the principles that would result in the best consequences if they were generally accepted. These principles constitute the ideal code. My aim is to make clear what the ideal code says about what we owe to animals. I argue that it accords moral status to them: the rule-consequentialist should acknowledge both general duties and special obligations to animals. However, in the ideal code there is no place for animal rights, conceived as deontological constraints. Within the animal rights debate, I conclude, rule-consequentialism is superior to some of the most prominent ethical theories in its agreement with widely shared moral intuitions. But some of its practical implications regarding the proper treatment of animals remain unclear. This point is illustrated by a discussion of what Jeff McMahan called ‘benign carnivorism’.

Folk-economic beliefs as moral intuitions

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Malhotra
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

AbstractAlthough Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.

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