Intellectual Property and Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Scott Hemphill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Core Ability

This chapter surveys the intersection of competition law—or antitrust law, as it is known in the United States—with intellectual property (IP). It examines whether and how IP rights alter the substantive scope of antitrust law, either by operation of statute or as a matter of economic policy. It discusses a wide variety of antitrust claims, alleging collusion, exclusion, or both, that have been raised against IP rights holders. The examples are drawn mainly from the United States, although European developments are also included where relevant. The analysis supports the conclusion that, beyond a rights holder’s core ability to assert a valid, infringed right against a rival, IP restricts antitrust law less than one might expect. Moreover, the restrictions that do exist are often subtle.

scholarly journals When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICE BOUGETTE ◽  
MARC DESCHAMPS ◽  
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Minor Influence

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

The Intersection Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 121-134
Author(s):  
Mariateresa Maggiolino ◽  
Laura Zoboli
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Alternative Scenarios

The interface between intellectual property rights (IPR) and the rules to protect the correct functioning of the market can be canvassed by looking at when these two sets of provisions converge and collide. This chapter analyses four alternative scenarios, by stressing that policy decisions become crucial to solve the cases of conflict and, in particular, the case where antitrust law forbids practices that intellectual property (IP) laws allow. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that it is in relation to these policy decisions that scholars and practitioners can appreciate how different jurisdictions, as in the United States (US) and European Union (EU), conceptualize the role that property rights and competition are called to play in spurring innovation.

scholarly journals Beyond Refusal to Deal: A Cross-Atlantic View of Copyright, Competition and Innovation Policies

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Katz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Copyright Protection ◽  
The United States ◽  
Copyright Law ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
External Check

Conventional wisdom holds that the European Union has opted to apply its competition law to the exercise of intellectual property rights to a much greater extent than has the United States. We argue that, at least in the context of copyright protection, this conventional wisdom is false. While European antitrust regulation of refusal to license one's intellectual property does seem much more robust and activist than U.S. antitrust regulation of similar conduct, focusing solely on one narrow aspect of antitrust doctrine — the treatment of a unilateral refusal to deal — tells less than half the story.Once various doctrines of copyright law are taken into account, the substantive difference between the European and American approaches not only narrows, but in some key respects is reversed. While European jurisdictions have relatively expansive copyright protection which may require antitrust intervention to check anti-competitive uses of copyrighted works, American copyright law provides stronger internal limits on copyright protection, which thereby lessens the need for resort to antitrust law as an external check on anti-competitive uses of copyrighted works. Furthermore, when the broader impact that antitrust law might have on the exercise of IPRs in the United States is considered (not only in substance, but also in antitrust process), it becomes apparent that in key respects, when innovative-competition is at stake, U.S. law grants overall weaker copyright protection than that available in Europe. We also explain why the two jurisdictions have adopted distinct approaches to resolving similar problems and evaluate those approaches.

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