Phonology in Universal Grammar

Author(s):  
Brett Miller ◽  
Neil Myler ◽  
Bert Vaux

This chapter draws a distinction between Universal Grammar (the initial state of the computational system that underwrites the human capacity for language) and the Language Acquisition Device (the complex of components of the mind/brain involved in constructing grammar+lexicon pairs upon exposure to primary linguistic data). It then considers whether there are any substantive phonological components of Universal Grammar strictu sensu. Two of the strongest empirical arguments for the existence of such phonological content in UG have been (i) apparent constraints on the space of variation induced from the typological record, and (ii) apparently universal dispreferences against certain phonological configurations (known as markedness). The chapter examines these arguments in the light of recent literature, concluding that the phenomena submit at least as well to historical, phonetic, or other non-UG explanations. We suggest that language acquisition experiments, involving natural and artificial languages, may be a more fruitful domain for future research into these questions.

1996 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 726-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Gregg

AbstractEpstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono trivialize the question of access to universal grammar in second language acquisition by arguing against a straw-man version of the no-access position and by begging the question of how second language (L2) knowledge is represented in the mind/brain of an adult L2 learner. They compound their errors by employing a research methodology that fails to provide any relevant evidence.


1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 374-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
William O'Grady

This article explores the prospects for a 'general nativist' theory of first and second language acquisition. A modular acquisition device that does not include Universal Grammar (UG) is outlined and its role in the emergence of an L1 is considered. The relevance of this proposal for a theory of SLA is then explored, leading to the suggestion that the properties and outcome typical of postadolescent L2 learning can be traced to the fact that adults have only partial access to the L1 acquisition device.


Author(s):  
Norbert Hornstein

Fish swim, birds fly, people talk. The talents displayed by fish and birds rest on specific biological structures whose intricate detail is attributable to genetic endowment. Human linguistic capacity similarly rests on dedicated mental structures many of whose specific details are an innate biological endowment of the species. One of Chomsky’s central concerns has been to press this analogy and uncover its implications for theories of mind, meaning and knowledge. This work has proceeded along two broad fronts. First, Chomsky has fundamentally restructured grammatical research. Due to his work, the central object of study in linguistics is ‘the language faculty’, a postulated mental organ which is dedicated to acquiring linguistic knowledge and is involved in various aspects of language-use, including the production and understanding of utterances. The aim of linguistic theory is to describe the initial state of this faculty and how it changes with exposure to linguistic data. Chomsky (1981) characterizes the initial state of the language faculty as a set of principles and parameters. Language acquisition consists in setting these open parameter values on the basis of linguistic data available to a child. The initial state of the system is a Universal Grammar (UG): a super-recipe for concocting language-specific grammars. Grammars constitute the knowledge of particular languages that result when parametric values are fixed. Linguistic theory, given these views, has a double mission. First, it aims to characterize the grammars (and hence the mental states) attained by native speakers. Theories are ‘descriptively adequate’ if they attain this goal. In addition, linguistic theory aims to explain how grammatical competence is attained. Theories are ‘explanatorily adequate’ if they show how descriptively adequate grammars can arise on the basis of exposure to ‘primary linguistic data’ (PLD): the data children are exposed to and use in attaining their native grammars. Explanatory adequacy rests on an articulated theory of UG, and in particular a detailed theory of the general principles and open parameters that characterize the initial state of the language faculty (that is, the biologically endowed mental structures). Since the mid- 1990s Chomsky has emphasized a third mission: to explain how the capacity for language could have arisen in the species. Chomsky (2004) has described theories that address this third concern as going "beyond explanatory adequacy," meaning that they not only attain explanatory adequacy, but also provide a plausible path for the emergence in humans of the "Faculty of Language" (the name given to whatever it is that allows humans to acquire language in the way that they do). Chomsky has also pursued a second set of concerns. He has vigorously criticized many philosophical nostrums from the perspective of this revitalized approach to linguistics. Three topics he has consistently returned to are: - Knowledge of language and its general epistemological implications - Indeterminacy and underdetermination in linguistic theory - Person-specific ‘I-languages’ versus socially constituted ‘E-languages’ as the proper objects of scientific study.


Author(s):  
Norbert Hornstein

Fish swim, birds fly, people talk. The talents displayed by fish and birds rest on specific biological structures whose intricate detail is attributable to genetic endowment. Human linguistic capacity similarly rests on dedicated mental structures many of whose specific details are an innate biological endowment of the species. One of Chomsky’s central concerns has been to press this analogy and uncover its implications for theories of mind, meaning and knowledge. This work has proceeded along two broad fronts. First, Chomsky has fundamentally restructured grammatical research. Due to his work, the central object of study in linguistics is ‘the language faculty’, a postulated mental organ which is dedicated to acquiring linguistic knowledge and is involved in various aspects of language-use, including the production and understanding of utterances. The aim of linguistic theory is to describe the initial state of this faculty and how it changes with exposure to linguistic data. Chomsky (1981) characterizes the initial state of the language faculty as a set of principles and parameters. Language acquisition consists in setting these open parameter values on the basis of linguistic data available to a child. The initial state of the system is a Universal Grammar (UG): a super-recipe for concocting language-specific grammars. Grammars constitute the knowledge of particular languages that result when parametric values are fixed. Linguistic theory, given these views, has a double mission. First, it aims to ‘adequately’ characterize the grammars (and hence the mental states) attained by native speakers. Theories are ‘descriptively adequate’ if they attain this goal. In addition, linguistic theory aims to explain how grammatical competence is attained. Theories are ‘explanatorily adequate’ if they show how descriptively adequate grammars can arise on the basis of exposure to ‘primary linguistic data’ (PLD): the data children are exposed to and use in attaining their native grammars. Explanatory adequacy rests on an articulated theory of UG, and in particular a detailed theory of the general principles and open parameters that characterize the initial state of the language faculty (that is, the biologically endowed mental structures). Chomsky has also pursued a second set of concerns. He has vigorously criticized many philosophical nostrums from the perspective of this revitalized approach to linguistics. Three topics he has consistently returned to are: - Knowledge of language and its general epistemological implications - Indeterminacy and underdetermination in linguistic theory - Person-specific ‘I-languages’ versus socially constituted ‘E-languages’ as the proper objects of scientific study.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Jing Ding

Chomsky’s Theory of Universal Grammar was proposed in response to “the logical problem of language acquisition”, that is, how children come to acquire L1with ease and complete success despite the insufficiency of the L1 stimulus. Chomsky attributes the phenomenon to the Language Acquisition Device or UG inherited by human brain. Since “the logical problem” exists in SLA. What is the role of LAD or UG in SLA? Or, is UG accessible to L2 learners? This is a question that has attracted SLA researchers since the establishment of UG theory. This paper gives some own analysis of one of the most influential theory of UG accessibility—Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, which belongs to the no-access views and points out its weakness by discussing its theoretical explanation as well as the supporting evidence. To be more specific, this paper will discuss mainly 2 points, one is the nine fundamental characters of foreign language learning and the other is its theoretical explanation related to the Critical Period Hypothesis.


2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Gregg

‘Emergentism’ is the name that has recently been given to a general approach to cognition that stresses the interaction between organism and environment and that denies the existence of pre-determined, domain-specific faculties or capacities. Emergentism thus offers itself as an alternative to modular, ‘special nativist’ theories of the mind, such as theories of Universal Grammar (UG). In language acquisition, emergentists claim that simple learning mechanisms, of the kind attested elsewhere in cognition, are sufficient to bring about the emergence of complex language representations. In this article, I consider, and reject, several a priori arguments often raised against ‘special nativism’. I then look at some of the arguments and evidence for an emergentist account of second language acquisition (SLA), and show that emergentists have so far failed to take into account, let alone defeat, standard Poverty of the Stimulus arguments for ‘special nativism’, and have equally failed to show how language competence could ‘emerge’.


Author(s):  
Vsevolod Kapatsinski

By the time you were just a year old, you had learned which sound distinctions matter and which do not. From the constant streams of acoustic and visual input, you had extracted a few acoustic forms and linked them to meanings—your first words. The muscles of your tongue, jaw, and larynx (and a few others) had been shaped into producing intricate, precisely coordinated patterns that would reproduce some of these complex patterns of sound closely enough to evoke the adept at producing words and sentences you had never heard before, planning and executing a novel sequence of muscle movements to convey a novel meaning. These feats appear miraculous, impossible for mere animals to accomplish. And indeed, they have led many researchers of language acquisition to posit that we are born knowing much about what human languages are like (Universal Grammar) and equipped with specialized learning mechanisms, tailored to the acquisition of language, mechanisms not subject to the laws that govern learning in the rest of the biological world (the Language Acquisition Device). The aim of this book is to convince you that this conclusion is—if not wrong—then at least premature. Language acquisition is simply learning. This book is one illustration of how accepting this proposition gets us much closer to explaining why languages are the way they are—the ultimate goal of linguistic theory—than does accepting innate knowledge of language universals and the Language Acquisition Device. Learning changes minds, and changing minds change the tools they use to accomplish their communicative goals to fit....


Author(s):  
David Lightfoot

This paper discusses the life-cycle of languages: languages die, new languages are born, and languages undergo radical changes in form and structure. This paper considers three changes in the history of English: loss of split genitives, introduction of new inflectional categories, and loss of verb movement. The proposal is that these changes are the result of children's reanalysis during language acquisition, based on the interaction between primary linguistic data and universal grammar. These processes of I-language reanalysis lead to the gradual emergence of new E-languages.


2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROGER HAWKINS

Human beings have a genetically-determined capacity to walk, rather than to fly or swim. People can learn to swim, but it is not something that is genetically programmed. Do humans have a genetically-determined capacity to acquire language? Universal Grammar is a theory that assumes that they do. Except in cases of genetic disorder, humans have specialised mental architecture which is uniform across the species in its initial state, and which determines the ways in which samples of language encountered are converted into mental grammars. The specialised architecture is Universal Grammar, and it underlies our capacity to acquire particular languages like English, French, Chinese and so on. Two questions that need to be asked immediately about Universal Grammar if it is to be of any interest in understanding the acquisition of French as a second language are: (i) What evidence is there that Universal Grammar is operating when people who have already acquired a native language learn French as a second language? (ii) What insight does the adoption of a theory of Universal Grammar bring to understanding the processes involved, the course of development over time and the nature of the end state grammars that learners achieve? The article presents empirical evidence from a selection of studies bearing on these questions. It will be argued that the assumption that humans have mental architecture dedicated specifically to language acquisition – Universal Grammar – even in the case of second language acquisition, has allowed considerable progress to be made in understanding second language French.


2004 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
DEREK BICKERTON

As an occasional visitor to the land of SLA, I found myself somewhat mystified by the approach of Truscott and Sharwood Smith (henceforth TSS). Unless I have totally misunderstood them, they are arguing against the separate existence of both a Language Acquisition Device (LAD) and a Universal Grammar (UG). But who ever thought they were two? Occasionally linguists may write about one rather than the other, but I have always assumed them to be the same thing appearing in different guises (like Christ and the Holy Ghost in Christian theology). If you have UG, why would you need LAD? Processing with the aid of UG seems the only way to go – to the extent that UG is available to SLA, an issue TSS does not directly address.


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