Chomsky, Noam (1928–)

Author(s):  
Norbert Hornstein

Fish swim, birds fly, people talk. The talents displayed by fish and birds rest on specific biological structures whose intricate detail is attributable to genetic endowment. Human linguistic capacity similarly rests on dedicated mental structures many of whose specific details are an innate biological endowment of the species. One of Chomsky’s central concerns has been to press this analogy and uncover its implications for theories of mind, meaning and knowledge. This work has proceeded along two broad fronts. First, Chomsky has fundamentally restructured grammatical research. Due to his work, the central object of study in linguistics is ‘the language faculty’, a postulated mental organ which is dedicated to acquiring linguistic knowledge and is involved in various aspects of language-use, including the production and understanding of utterances. The aim of linguistic theory is to describe the initial state of this faculty and how it changes with exposure to linguistic data. Chomsky (1981) characterizes the initial state of the language faculty as a set of principles and parameters. Language acquisition consists in setting these open parameter values on the basis of linguistic data available to a child. The initial state of the system is a Universal Grammar (UG): a super-recipe for concocting language-specific grammars. Grammars constitute the knowledge of particular languages that result when parametric values are fixed. Linguistic theory, given these views, has a double mission. First, it aims to characterize the grammars (and hence the mental states) attained by native speakers. Theories are ‘descriptively adequate’ if they attain this goal. In addition, linguistic theory aims to explain how grammatical competence is attained. Theories are ‘explanatorily adequate’ if they show how descriptively adequate grammars can arise on the basis of exposure to ‘primary linguistic data’ (PLD): the data children are exposed to and use in attaining their native grammars. Explanatory adequacy rests on an articulated theory of UG, and in particular a detailed theory of the general principles and open parameters that characterize the initial state of the language faculty (that is, the biologically endowed mental structures). Since the mid- 1990s Chomsky has emphasized a third mission: to explain how the capacity for language could have arisen in the species. Chomsky (2004) has described theories that address this third concern as going "beyond explanatory adequacy," meaning that they not only attain explanatory adequacy, but also provide a plausible path for the emergence in humans of the "Faculty of Language" (the name given to whatever it is that allows humans to acquire language in the way that they do). Chomsky has also pursued a second set of concerns. He has vigorously criticized many philosophical nostrums from the perspective of this revitalized approach to linguistics. Three topics he has consistently returned to are: - Knowledge of language and its general epistemological implications - Indeterminacy and underdetermination in linguistic theory - Person-specific ‘I-languages’ versus socially constituted ‘E-languages’ as the proper objects of scientific study.

Author(s):  
Norbert Hornstein

Fish swim, birds fly, people talk. The talents displayed by fish and birds rest on specific biological structures whose intricate detail is attributable to genetic endowment. Human linguistic capacity similarly rests on dedicated mental structures many of whose specific details are an innate biological endowment of the species. One of Chomsky’s central concerns has been to press this analogy and uncover its implications for theories of mind, meaning and knowledge. This work has proceeded along two broad fronts. First, Chomsky has fundamentally restructured grammatical research. Due to his work, the central object of study in linguistics is ‘the language faculty’, a postulated mental organ which is dedicated to acquiring linguistic knowledge and is involved in various aspects of language-use, including the production and understanding of utterances. The aim of linguistic theory is to describe the initial state of this faculty and how it changes with exposure to linguistic data. Chomsky (1981) characterizes the initial state of the language faculty as a set of principles and parameters. Language acquisition consists in setting these open parameter values on the basis of linguistic data available to a child. The initial state of the system is a Universal Grammar (UG): a super-recipe for concocting language-specific grammars. Grammars constitute the knowledge of particular languages that result when parametric values are fixed. Linguistic theory, given these views, has a double mission. First, it aims to ‘adequately’ characterize the grammars (and hence the mental states) attained by native speakers. Theories are ‘descriptively adequate’ if they attain this goal. In addition, linguistic theory aims to explain how grammatical competence is attained. Theories are ‘explanatorily adequate’ if they show how descriptively adequate grammars can arise on the basis of exposure to ‘primary linguistic data’ (PLD): the data children are exposed to and use in attaining their native grammars. Explanatory adequacy rests on an articulated theory of UG, and in particular a detailed theory of the general principles and open parameters that characterize the initial state of the language faculty (that is, the biologically endowed mental structures). Chomsky has also pursued a second set of concerns. He has vigorously criticized many philosophical nostrums from the perspective of this revitalized approach to linguistics. Three topics he has consistently returned to are: - Knowledge of language and its general epistemological implications - Indeterminacy and underdetermination in linguistic theory - Person-specific ‘I-languages’ versus socially constituted ‘E-languages’ as the proper objects of scientific study.


2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Chomsky

The biolinguistic perspective regards the language faculty as an “organ of the body,” along with other cognitive systems. Adopting it, we expect to find three factors that interact to determine (I-) languages attained: genetic endowment (the topic of Universal Grammar), experience, and principles that are language- or even organism-independent. Research has naturally focused on I-languages and UG, the problems of descriptive and explanatory adequacy. The Principles-and-Parameters approach opened the possibility for serious investigation of the third factor, and the attempt to account for properties of language in terms of general considerations of computational efficiency, eliminating some of the technology postulated as specific to language and providing more principled explanation of linguistic phenomena


Author(s):  
Jayant K. Lele

To an outsider looking at linguistic theory, the problem of internal vs. external evidence seems to arise out of a conflation of two relatively distinct enterprises. The first of these tries to establish a claim that there is a distinct, organic, language faculty (a language organ), that is, a species-specific characteristic common to all humans. The second is an attempt to abstract from the facts of diversity a structure that has equivalent universal characteristics and thus can be seen as an ideal type or as an ideal initial state condition (of a pure and uniform experience) under which a language is acquired by a native speaker. As I understand it, the relationship between these two enterprises is yet to be fully determined given the fact that the physical mechanism that has been deduced to correspond to a property of mind is as of now largely unknown.


Author(s):  
Brett Miller ◽  
Neil Myler ◽  
Bert Vaux

This chapter draws a distinction between Universal Grammar (the initial state of the computational system that underwrites the human capacity for language) and the Language Acquisition Device (the complex of components of the mind/brain involved in constructing grammar+lexicon pairs upon exposure to primary linguistic data). It then considers whether there are any substantive phonological components of Universal Grammar strictu sensu. Two of the strongest empirical arguments for the existence of such phonological content in UG have been (i) apparent constraints on the space of variation induced from the typological record, and (ii) apparently universal dispreferences against certain phonological configurations (known as markedness). The chapter examines these arguments in the light of recent literature, concluding that the phenomena submit at least as well to historical, phonetic, or other non-UG explanations. We suggest that language acquisition experiments, involving natural and artificial languages, may be a more fruitful domain for future research into these questions.


Author(s):  
Ranya Ahmed Rashid Shaheen, Abdelrahman Mudawi Abdelrahim Al Ranya Ahmed Rashid Shaheen, Abdelrahman Mudawi Abdelrahim Al

The object of inquiry in Linguistics is the human ability to acquire and use a natural language, and the goal of linguistic theory is an explicit characterization of that ability. Looking at the communicative abilities of other species, it becomes clear that our linguistic ability is specific to our species, undoubtedly a product of our biology. But how do we go about determining the specifics of this Language faculty? _here are two primary ways in which we infer the nature of Language from the properties of individual languages: arguments from the Poverty of the Stimulus, and the search for universals that characterize every natural language. Arguments of the first sort are not easy to construct (though not as difficult as sometimes suggested), and apply only to a tiny part of Language as a whole. Arguments from universals or typological generalizations are also quite problematic. In phonology, morphology, and syntax, factors of historical development, functional underpinnings, limitations of the learning situation, among others conspire to compromise the explanatory value of arguments from observed cross-linguistic regularities. Confounding the situation is the likelihood that properties found across languages as a consequence of such external forces have been incorporated into the Language faculty evolutionarily through the ‘Baldwin Effect.’ _e conflict between the biologically based specificity of the human Language faculty and the difficulty of establishing most of its properties in a secure way cannot, however, be avoided by ignoring or denying the reality of either of its poles.


2009 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Herschensohn

This article reexamines Bley-Vroman’s original (1990) and evolved (this issue) fundamental difference hypothesis that argues that differences in path and endstate of first language acquisition and adult foreign language learning result from differences in the acquisition procedure (i.e., language faculty and cognitive strategies, respectively). The evolved assessment of the theoretical and empirical developments of the past 20 years is taken into account with respect to Universal Grammar and parameters in generative theory and with respect to cognition and acquisition in data processing. This article supports the spirit of Bley-Vroman’s proposals in light of the discussion of three topics: pathway of acquisition, endstate age of acquisition effects, and language processing by monolinguals and bilinguals. I argue that the difference between child and adult language acquisition is, above all, quantitative not qualitative, a gradient continuum rather than a precipitous break.


2002 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
LYNN SANTELMANN ◽  
STEPHANIE BERK ◽  
JENNIFER AUSTIN ◽  
SHAMITHA SOMASHEKAR ◽  
BARBARA LUST

This paper examines two- to five-year-old children's knowledge of inversion in English yes/no questions through a new experimental study. It challenges the view that the syntax for inversion develops slowly in child English and tests the hypothesis that grammatical competence for inversion is present from the earliest testable ages of the child's sentence production. The experimental design is based on the premise that a valid test of this hypothesis must dissociate from inversion various language-specific aspects of English grammar, including its inflectional system. An elicited imitation method was used to test parallel, lexically-matched declarative and question structures across several different verb types in a design which dissociated subject-auxiliary inversion from the English-specific realization of the inflectional/auxiliary system. Using this design, the results showed no significant difference in amount or type of children's errors between declarative (non-inverted) and question (inverted) sentences with modals or auxiliary be, but a significant difference for sentences with main verbs (requiring reconstruction of inflection through do-support) and copula be. The results from sentences with auxiliary be and those with modals indicate that knowledge of inversion is present throughout our very young sample and does not develop during this time. We argue that these results indicate that the grammar of inversion is present from the youngest ages tested. Our results also provide evidence of development relevant to the English-specific inflectional system. We conclude with a new developmental hypothesis: development in question formation occurs in integrating language-specific knowledge related to inflection with the principles of Universal Grammar which allow grammatical inversion.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICIA J. BROOKS

It is not unusual for developmental psychologists to become frustrated with the theory of universal grammar (UG), whose proponents have tended to dismiss most research on children's language production and comprehension as irrelevant to explaining how human languages are acquired. This is because children's actual linguistic behaviour is presumed to reflect factors besides their grammatical competence, rendering most methods of sampling linguistic behaviour unsuitable for evaluating UG theory. This means, in practice, that UG proponents do not view performance errors as evidence against their hypothesis that grammatical knowledge is largely innate. When children perform at ceiling on a given task, this is usually taken as proof of their adultlike grammatical competence, while poor performance is dismissed as due to research design flaws or limitations in information processing capacities (e.g. working memory). Crain & Thornton (1998) attempt to eliminate what they consider to be post hoc processing accounts of children's linguistic behaviour by arguing, counter to Chomsky (1965) and many others, that children and adults share identical language processing mechanisms, and that linguistic performance directly reflects grammatical competence. Therefore, if UG principles are available from an early age, child and adult performance should be the same when tasks are properly constructed to avoid extra-linguistic demand characteristics (excepting adult–child differences predicted by parameter-setting or maturational models). It should not be surprising then that some psycholinguists, such as Drozd (target article), would find C&T to be misguided with respect to these issues, because children's linguistic behaviour surely differs from adults' in seemingly unpredictable ways.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 484-488
Author(s):  
BARBARA LUST

C&T deserve credit for their concern for attaining empirical evidence, in particular evidence from language acquisition, for linguistic theory. They also deserve credit for bringing to the attention of the linguistic community the fact that variations in methodology do indeed produce variations in child behaviours, a fact well appreciated in behavioural sciences such as psychology, but often not fully appreciated outside of it; in particular, not in linguistics, a field which is fundamentally and rightfully ambivalent about its standing as a behavioural science, considering its relation to mathematics and formal theory as well as to sociolinguistics (Lust, Flynn, Foley & Chien, 1999). C&T also deserve credit for their appreciation of the importance of what children do NOT do (constraints) in language, and attempts to empirically verify such.


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