Philosophy, Logic, and Nominalism

Author(s):  
Fabienne Michelet ◽  
Martin Pickavé

This chapter attempts a reappraisal of the philosophical nature of Chaucer’s writings and sketches the philosophical currents that may have formed the intellectual background of his poetry, in particular medieval nominalism and realism. A brief outline of fourteenth-century English philosophy assesses the nature and content of contemporary debates, offering insights on the kind of philosophical knowledge that may have been accessible to Chaucer. An overview of nominalism and realism follows, exploring in particular the differing views these two currents had of the signification of singular and general terms, and of the status of scientific knowledge. This part also scrutinizes some of the traditional arguments for nominalism and realism in Chaucer’s poetry. Chaucer’s use of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy is key to the last section, which focuses on the question, extensively debated during the fourteenth century, of human agency and more precisely the possible compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.

Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Teubner

Chapter 6 examines Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, focusing in particular on book 5. In Consolation 5, references to prayer are embedded within a dialogue between a prisoner and a personification of philosophy on the theme of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. By placing prayer within a broader philosophical and literary context, Boethius extends his Augustinianism to explore the boundaries and texture of Christian existence as it attempts to reach up from human ratio to divine intellegentia. Here Boethius demonstrates his Augustinianism 2, as he creatively reconstellates Augustine’s use of prayer in De trinitate to help him solve a different, though related, problem. The Augustinianism of the Consolation best comes into view when seen through Boethius’ references to prayer.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-133
Author(s):  
Mohammed Rustom

An Introduction to Islam by David Waines consists of three parts:“Foundations,” “Islamic Teaching and Practice,” and “Islam in the ModernWorld.” The author begins by characteristically painting the picture of pre-Islamic pagan Arabia on the eve of Islam’s advent. He discusses the role andsignificance the pre-Islamic Arabs accorded their pantheon of deities, as wellas the (largely inherited) moral codes that governed their conduct in tribalsociety. Waines neatly ties this into what follows, where he discusses thebirth of Prophet Muhammad, the event of the Qur’an’s revelation, and theopposition he encountered from his fellow tribesmen in Makkah. This is followedby an analysis of the Qur’an’s significance, its conception of divinity,and the content and importance of the Hadith as a source of guidance forMuslims. The section is rounded off with examinations of such topics as the first period of civil strife (fitnah) after the Prophet’s death and the interestingbody of literature devoted to Muslim-Christian polemics in earlymedieval Islam.The transition from the first part of the book to the second part is ratherfluid, for the second part is essentially an elaboration of the themes discussedin the first. With remarkable ease and accuracy, the author elucidatesthe historical development and main features of Islamic law in both its theoryand practice. Returning to his earlier discussion on the Hadith, here hebriefly outlines how its corpus came to be collected. Readers unfamiliar withthe main theological controversies that confronted Islam in its formativeyears (e.g., the problem of free will and the status of the grave sinner) willfind the section devoted to Islamic theology fairly useful.Waines goes on to explain some of the principle Mu`tazilite andAsh`arite doctrines, and outlines some of the ideas of Neoplatonic Islamicphilosophy, albeit through the lenses of al-Ghazali’s famous refutation.Surprisingly, the author does not address any of the major developments inIslamic philosophy post-Ibn Rushd, such as the important work of theIshraqi (Illuminationist) school (incidentally, the founder of this school,Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi, was a contemporary of Ibn Rushd). The last twochapters are devoted to Sufism and Shi`ism, respectively. Although Wainesdoes misrepresent Ibn al-`Arabi’s metaphysics of Being by calling it a “system”(pp. 153 and 192), on the whole he presents the Islamic mystical traditionin a refreshing and informed manner. His section on Shi`ism is splendid.It is written with considerable care, and he effectively isolates the mainthemes characteristic of Twelver Shi`ite thought and practice.In the third and longest part of this work, Waines incorporates IbnBattutah’s travel accounts into the book’s narrative. This works very well, asit gives readers a sense of the diverse and rich cultural patterns that wereintricately woven into the fabric of fourteenth-century Islamic civilization.After reading through the section, this present reviewer could not help butmarvel at how the observations of a fourteenth-century traveler and legaljudge from Tangiers could so effectively contribute to a twenty-first centuryintroductory textbook on Islam. Additionally, Waines takes readers throughsome of the essential features of the three important “gunpowder” Muslimdynasties, devotes an interesting discussion to the role played by the mosquein a Muslim’s daily life, and outlines some of its different architectural andartistic expressions throughout Islamic history ...


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 365-391
Author(s):  
Ka Lok Yip

This article explores the oscillation between individualism and holism and between voluntarism and determinism underlying Philip Allott’s philosophy of social idealism and attributes it to an under-analysis of the relationship between human agency, culture, and structure. Drawing on different social theoretical perspectives and philosophical approaches, it examines this aspect of social idealism through the lens of two recent cases, Alexander Blackman in the United Kingdom and Elor Azaria in Israel. It argues that a dominant focus on either the individuals or their context is necessarily reductionist while collapsing the two risks obscuring causality and responsibility and relegating their apportionment to those in possession of cultural and structural power. Only by differentiating between the relative degrees of human freedom and constraints in different situations, can the limits to human agency become recognisable, comprehensible, and therefore amenable to being tackled, transformed, and potentially overcome.


1980 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Rowe

Author(s):  
Jennifer Hornsby

Philosophical study of human action owes its importance to concerns of two sorts. There are concerns addressed in metaphysics and philosophy of mind about the status of reasoning beings who make their impact in the natural causal world, and concerns addressed in ethics and legal philosophy about human freedom and responsibility. ‘Action theory’ springs from concerns of both sorts; but in the first instance it attempts only to provide a detailed account that may help with answering the metaphysical questions. Action theorists usually start by asking ‘How are actions distinguished from other events?’. For there to be an action, a person has to do something. But the ordinary ‘do something’ does not capture just the actions, since we can say (for instance) that breathing is something that everyone does, although we don’t think that breathing in the ordinary way is an action. It seems that purposiveness has to be introduced – that someone’s intentionally doing something is required. People often do the things they intentionally do by moving bits of their bodies. This has led to the idea that ‘actions are bodily movements’. The force of the idea may be appreciated by thinking about what is involved in doing one thing by doing another. A man piloting a plane might have shut down the engines by depressing a lever, for example; and there is only one action here if the depressing of the lever was (identical with) the shutting down of the engines. It is when identities of this sort are accepted that an action may be seen as an event of a person’s moving their body: the pilot’s depressing of the lever was (also) his moving of his arm, because he depressed the lever by moving his arm. But how do bodies’ movings – such events now as his arm’s moving – relate to actions? According to one traditional empiricist account, these are caused by volitions when there are actions, and a volition and a body’s moving are alike parts of the action. But there are many rival accounts of the causes and parts of actions and of movements. And volitional notions feature not only in a general account of the events surrounding actions, but also in accounts that aim to accommodate the experience that is characteristic of agency.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
Peter A. Graham ◽  

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