Locke and Malebranche

Author(s):  
Nicholas Jolley

This chapter addresses the issue of whether Locke’s own empiricist theory of ideas offers, as Locke often suggested, a more intelligible way of explaining human understanding than Malebranche’s doctrine of Vision in God. Drawing on Locke’s statements about the corpuscularian hypothesis, it argues that although the empiricist theory may satisfy some criteria of intelligibility, it is forced to recognize the existence of processes that are ‘incomprehensible’; to that extent, Locke’s theory of ideas runs parallel with his mature philosophy of matter. The epistemic status of the empiricist theory of ideas is thus more problematic than it is often taken to be.

Locke Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Samuel C. Rickless

In his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke’s primary aim is to provide an empiricist theory of ideas that can support interesting results about the nature of language and knowledge. Within this theory, Locke distinguishes between simple ideas and complex ideas (E II.ii.1: 119). Roughly, an idea is complex if it has other ideas as parts; otherwise, it is simple. For Locke, as is well known, all simple ideas derive from sensation (perception through sight, taste, smell, hearing, or touch) or reflection (a form of introspection directed at mental acts) (E II.i.2–4: 104–106). Aetiology also plays a role in Locke’s classification of complex ideas: ideas of modes, ideas of substances, and ideas of relations. All complex ideas are formed by a voluntary act of combination or composition. Ideas of modes, such as numbers, beauty, and theft (E II.xii.5: 165) are formed without considering whether the combinations conform to real patterns existing in the world (E II.xi.6: 158, E II.xxii.1: 288, E II.xxxi.3: 376). Ideas of substances (such as human beings, sheep, and armies—E II.xii.6: 165), by contrast, are formed with a desire ‘to copy Things, as they really do exist’ (E II.xxxi.3: 377). Ideas of relations are like ideas of modes (E II.xxxi.14: 383–84), except that their aetiology includes, in addition to the mental act of composition, the distinct mental act of comparison on the basis of some respect or dimension (E II.xi.4: 157, E II.xxv.1: 319).


Author(s):  
Peter Anstey

John Locke was the leading English philosopher of the late seventeenth century. His two major works, An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government, both published in 1690, have exerted enormous influence on subsequent thought, particularly in metaphysics, theory of knowledge and political philosophy. Locke’s writings were central to the philosophy of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and set the terms of reference for modern liberalism. Educated in the arts at Oxford, a friend of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton, and a close associate of the leading politician the first Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke’s intellectual range was broad. He trained as a physician, dabbled in chemistry and botany and throughout his life kept abreast of developments in natural philosophy. At the same time, he developed theories of natural law and religious toleration, contributed to debates on contemporary economic issues, wrote a primer on the philosophy of education, defended the reasonableness of Christianity and maintained an extensive correspondence and intellectual network. It was not until the publication of the Essay when Locke was in his late 50s, however, that he became a public intellectual. The Essay provides an analysis of the scope and limits of the faculty of human understanding, using a sophisticated theory of ideas. It contains four books, the first of which seeks to refute the view that the mind contains innate metaphysical and moral principles. The second book sets out Locke’s theory of ideas and contains original and penetrating treatments of the nature of the will and motivation and the nature of personal identity. It also contains Locke’s theory of material qualities with his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and discussions of the nature of substance, duration, infinity and the association of ideas. Book Three deals with the nature of language, the theory of essences, and provides an account of the way in which humans divide substances into species. Book Four uses the resources set out in the preceding books to develop a theory of knowledge and belief and to explore the differences between faith and reason. Central to Locke’s project is the view that all knowledge is constructed out of ideas. Knowledge in its most basic form is nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas and ideas can only be acquired through the senses or through introspection on the operations of our minds. Once the understanding is furnished with enough simple ideas from these two sources of experience, it sets about constructing complex ideas, forming propositions out of its various ideas and giving the ideas names. Locke is fundamentally opposed to the view that knowledge and reason begin with a set of basic principles or maxims, such as that the whole is the sum of its parts. This is the motivation for his arguments against the claim that principles are innate. Instead we must construct the principles of all the different sciences from scratch out of our stock of ideas. In the cases of mathematics and morality this can be achieved. In the case of our knowledge of the sorts or species of substances we encounter in the external world, however, we are significantly constrained. This is because our senses are limited and we do not have epistemic access to the inner natures of things. We can see many effects but the underlying causes of those effects, such as magnetism or cohesion, are out of reach. As a result, Locke is pessimistic about the prospects of natural science, though he does believe that the method of experimental philosophy, particularly natural history, gives us the best chance to extend our knowledge of the natural world. Moreover, he believes that of all the speculative systems of natural philosophy, the corpuscular view of matter is the most intelligible. Locke’s political philosophy gives us some insight into his conception of the form that a demonstrative moral philosophy might take. However, the precise relation between the Two Treatises and the Essay remains a controversial issue. The starting point for Locke’s view of the formation of civil society is the natural equality of every human being. We are equal in freedom and equal in both power and obligation with respect to the law of nature. However, in the absence of civil society – that is, in the state of nature – we suffer many inconveniences, particularly with regard to protecting property and applying the law of nature. It is only by consenting to give up our basic power to enforce the law of nature, a power that is common to all, to an authority, that we are able to overcome the inconveniences of the state of nature. In so doing, we secure the integrity of our property, that is, our life, liberty and possessions. The handing over of our basic power does not render us politically impotent however. For, should the government, whether a democracy, oligarchy or monarchy, break the people’s trust, the citizens have a right of resistance and can dissolve the government. Locke’s Two Treatises was published anonymously and did not embroil him in ongoing debate in his own day, though its subsequent influence was profound. The same cannot be said of another anonymous work, his A Letter Concerning Toleration, which argued that religious toleration should be extended to all but atheists and those who submit to foreign authority. The most vigorous reaction to Locke’s writings, however, was to the Essay, particularly to Locke’s account of personal identity as continuity of consciousness and his suggestion that matter fitly disposed might have the power of thought. These two issues are indicative of the rich philosophical resources within the Essay, both in its positive theses and its illustrative material, which have ensured that this work continues to be read and studied with profit today.


Author(s):  
Martin Bell

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.


2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Bardon

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.


Author(s):  
Matias Kimi Slavov

Einstein acknowledged that his reading of Hume influenced the development of his special theory of relativity. In this article, I juxtapose Hume’s philosophy with Einstein’s philosophical analysis related to his special relativity. I argue that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts, and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. The main thesis of this article is that these two points are intertwined in Hume and Einstein.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Alessandro Prato

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke set out to offer an analysis of the human mind and its acquisition of knowledge still very current and important today. Locke offered also an empiricist theory according to which we acquire ideas through our experience of the world. The article examines Locke’s views on language and his principal innovation in the field of linguistic theory, represented by the recognition of the power of language with respect to the classification of the world, and its relative independence from reality. In particular the following topics are discussed: a) the polemical contrast with Cartesian philosophy b) the criticism that Locke levels against innatism c) the function of abstraction of the mind d) the concept of semiotics as a theory of thought and its expression e) the radical concept of arbitrariness f) the pragmatic factor intrinsic to Locke’s linguistics described as “communicational scepticism”.


2019 ◽  
pp. 133-146
Author(s):  
Refat E Rubaia

John Locke, Bishop Berkeley and David Hume are the pioneers of modern British Philosophy during 17th  and 18th  centuries. Among them, John Locke‟s epistemological work is one of the greatest defenses of modern empiricism. He attempts to determine the limits of human understanding and seeks to clear the ground for future developments by providing a theory of knowledge compatible with the study of human nature. In his discussion the term „ideas‟ plays an important role. To understand Locke‟s empiricism, one must realize what he means by „ideas‟. For Locke, ideas are all signs which represent the external world of physical objects and the inner world of consciousness. However, in his book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he discusses „ideas‟ in details but he does not provide a sufficiently clear account of the nature of ideas. This paper is an attempt to give a critical exposition of John Locke‟s theory of ideas in which I will try to show that his explanation about the nature of idea is not sufficient enough to establish the theory of ideas he presented. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 133-146


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