HMRC wades in offshore: Gresh v RBC Trust Company (Guernsey) Ltd & HM Revenue and Customs, Court of Appeal of Guernsey, 16 September 2009

2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 331-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Davies ◽  
J. Ellis
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Machell

Abstract The Court of Appeal for Bermuda (Clarke P, Smellie JA and Subair Williams JA) recently handed down judgment in Grand View Private Trust Company Limited v Wong 20 April 2020, overturning the decision by Kawaley AJ at first instance and rejecting his use of the so-called substratum principle to limit the scope of widely drawn powers. The trust and wealth management industry should breath a collective sigh of relief. The industry is able to sell modern discretionary trusts to wealthy clients precisely because of their flexibility and the extent of the powers they contain, particularly discretionary powers of amendment, powers to add and remove beneficiaries and powers to distribute and resettle assets. The decision at first instance threatened to undermine that flexibility and to hamper the way in which trustees operate trusts of this kind. It is suggested that the Court of Appeal was right to reject the argument based on the supposed substratum rule. The argument gives inappropriate and independent life to what (if it is useful at all in this context) should only be a conclusionary metaphor; the argument involves what philosophers might describe as “unjustified reification”, or what the rest of us may think of as the tail wagging the dog. Use of the substratum metaphor risks distraction from the true task, that is, the proper construction of the words used in the relevant instrument in the light of the admissible factual matrix. The purpose of this article is to examine the Court of Appeal’s decision in Grand View, and tentatively to offer some thoughts on the analytical framework within which the validity of the exercise of powers is assessed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Sherwin

Abstract In this article, I consider the nature and enforcement of the trustee’s right of indemnity. I set out the principles underlying the trustee’s right of indemnity; and I assess the recent decisions Meritus Trust Company Limited v Butterfield Trust (Bermuda) Limited (“Meritus v Butterfield”) and Rawlinson & Hunter Trustees SA v Chiddicks (the “Z Trusts” case), dealing with enforcement of the right of indemnity in light of those principles. Finally, I conclude, in line with the Court of Appeal in Z Trusts that the trustee’s right of indemnity is enforceable by way of a lien or charge, in which lien or charge is an equitable proprietary right that has priority over any subsequent transaction, including over a successor trustee’s rights of indemnity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc-Aurele Racicot

These days, is there a topic more significant and provocative than the protection of privacy in the private sector? The importance of this topic has been highlighted since the Canadian Parliament adopted the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act which came into full force on 1 January 2004 and which is scheduled for review in 2006. Although it seems that everywhere we turn, the word "privacy" and its companion PIPEDA are at centre stage, many say that this attention is unwarranted and a knee-jerk reaction to the information age where one can run but cannot hide. Like it or not, we are subject to the prying eyes of cameras in public places, the tracking and trailing of Internet activities, the selling of address lists and other such listings, and the synthesizing by marketers of frightful amounts of personal information that, when pulled together, reveals a lot about our personal life, our ancestry, our relationships, our interests and our spending habits.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
N. V. Buzova ◽  
◽  
M. M. Karelina ◽  

The final stage of the judicial reform was the creation of new cassation and appeal courts in the system of courts of general jurisdiction that provide additional guarantees for the effective judicial protection of citizens. Russian legislation establishes a mechanism for the protection of infringed copyright and related rights on the Internet. Such a mechanism provides for the imposition of interim measures by the Moscow City Court and the termination by Roskomnadzor of access to the site or page of the site on the Internet, on which information is posted in violation of copyright and related rights. In the case of interim measures, the case decision belongs to competence of the Moscow City Court. As a result of changes in the legislation on the judicial system, the courts of appeal and cassation of general jurisdiction began to work. Consideration of complaints against judicial acts of the Moscow City Court, rendered by them at first instance, are referred to the competence of the new courts. The article notes the stages of development of legislation on copyright protection on the Internet, as well as some problematic aspects of copyright and related rights protection on the Internet.


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