scholarly journals A Qualitative Analysis of Local Health Departments' Experiences With Contact-Tracing Tools in Response to COVID-19

2022 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Layné Clements ◽  
Christina Baum
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E DeWitt

Contact tracing is a well-known tool for public health professionals to trace and isolate contacts of known infectious persons. During a pandemic contact tracing is critical to ending an outbreak, but the volume of cases makes tracing difficult without adequate staffing tools. Hospitals equipped with electronic medical records can utilize these databases to automatically link cases into possible transmission chains and surface potential new outbreaks. While this automatic contact tracing does not have the richness of contact tracing interviews, it does provide a way for health systems to highlight potential super-spreader events and support their local health departments. Additionally, these data provide insight into how a given infection is spreading locally. These insights can be used to inform policy at the local level.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003335492097466
Author(s):  
Kristen Pogreba Brown ◽  
Erika Austhof ◽  
Ayeisha M. Rosa Hernández ◽  
Caitlyn McFadden ◽  
Kylie Boyd ◽  
...  

Objectives In June 2020, Arizona had the fastest-growing number of cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) worldwide. As part of the growing public health response, the University of Arizona Student Aid for Field Epidemiology Response (SAFER) team was able to modify and increase case investigation efforts to assist local health departments. We outline the recommended logistical and management steps to include students in a public health response of this scope. Methods From April 1 through September 1, 2020, the SAFER team identified key components of a successful student team response: volunteer training, management that allows more senior students to manage newer students, adoption of case-management software, and use of an online survey platform for students to conduct interviews consistently and allow for data quality control and management. Results From April 1 through September 1, 2020, SAFER worked with 3 local health departments to complete 1910 COVID-19 case investigations through a virtual call center. A total of 233 volunteers and 46 hourly student workers and staff members were involved. As of September 2020, students were completing >150 interviews per week, including contact-tracing efforts. Practice Implications Developing relationships between applied public health and academic programs can relieve the burden of low-risk, high-volume case investigations at local and state health departments. Furthermore, by establishing a virtual call center, health sciences faculty and students can volunteer remotely during a pandemic with no additional risk of infection.


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-57
Author(s):  
Linda Niccolai ◽  
Tyler Shelby ◽  
Brian Weeks ◽  
Christopher Schenck ◽  
Justin Goodwin ◽  
...  

Contact tracing was one of the core public health strategies implemented during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this essay, we describe the rapid establishment of a volunteer contact tracing program in New Haven, Connecticut. We describe successes of the program and challenges that were faced. Going forward, contact tracing efforts can best be supported by increased funding to state and local health departments for a stable workforce and use of evidence-based technological innovations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather MacDougall

Abstract This article compares the Toronto Health Department’s role in controlling the 1918 influenza epidemic with its activities during the SARS outbreak in 2003 and concludes that local health departments are the foundation for successful disease containment, provided that there is effective coordination, communication, and capacity. In 1918, Toronto’s MOH Charles Hastings was the acknowledged leader of efforts to contain the disease, care for the sick, and develop an effective vaccine, because neither a federal health department nor an international body like WHO existed. During the SARS outbreak, Hastings’s successor, Sheela Basrur, discovered that nearly a decade of underfunding and new policy foci such as health promotion had left the department vulnerable when faced with a potential epidemic. Lack of cooperation by provincial and federal authorities added further difficulties to the challenge of organizing contact tracing, quarantine, and isolation for suspected and probable cases and providing information and reassurance to the multi-ethnic population. With growing concern about a flu pandemic, the lessons of the past provide a foundation for future communicable disease control activities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 152483992097298
Author(s):  
Alexis K. Grant

Local health departments (LHDs) are positioned to act as the community health strategist for their catchment area, which requires cross-sector collaboration. However, little research exists to understand how much and what types of cross-sector collaboration occur and its impact on LHD practice. Data from 490 LHDs who participated in the 2016 National Profile of Local Health Departments survey were analyzed to identify patterns of cross-sector collaboration among LHDs. In the survey, LHDs reported the presence of collaborative activities for each of 22 categories of organizations. Factor analysis was used to identify patterns in the types of organizations with which LHDs collaborate. Then, cluster analysis was conducted to identify patterns in the types of cross-sector collaboration, and cross-sectional analyses examined which LHD characteristics were associated with cluster assignment. LHDs collaborated most with traditional health care–oriented organizations, but less often with organizations focused on upstream determinants of health such as housing. Three distinct clusters represented collaboration patterns in LHDs: coordinators, networkers, and low-collaborators. LHDs who were low-collaborators were more likely to serve smaller populations, be unaccredited, have a smaller workforce, have a White top executive, and have a top executive without a graduate degree. These findings imply that public health practitioners should prioritize building bridges to a variety of organizations and engage in collaboration beyond information sharing. Furthermore, LHDs should prioritize accreditation and workforce development activities for supporting cross-sector collaboration. With these investments, the public health system can better address the social and structural determinants of health and promote health equity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Freed

AbstractWhen attempting to provide lessons for other countries from the successful Israeli COVID-19 vaccine experience, it is important to distinguish between the modifiable and non-modifiable components identified in the article by Rosen, et al. Two specific modifiable components included in the Israeli program from which the US can learn are (a) a national (not individual state-based) strategy for vaccine distribution and administration and (b) a functioning public health infrastructure. As a federal government, the US maintains an often complex web of state and national authorities and responsibilities. The federal government assumed responsibility for the ordering, payment and procurement of COVID vaccine from manufacturers. In designing the subsequent steps in their COVID-19 vaccine distribution and administration plan, the Trump administration decided to rely on the states themselves to determine how best to implement guidance provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This strategy resulted in 50 different plans and 50 different systems for the dissemination of vaccine doses, all at the level of each individual state. State health departments were neither financed, experienced nor uniformly possessed the expertise to develop and implement such plans. A national strategy for the distribution, and the workforce for the provision, of vaccine beyond the state level, similar to that which occurred in Israel, would have provided for greater efficiency and coordination across the country. The US public health infrastructure was ill-prepared and ill-staffed to take on the responsibility to deliver > 450 million doses of vaccine in an expeditious fashion, even if supply of vaccine was available. The failure to adequately invest in public health has been ubiquitous across the nation at all levels of government. Since the 2008 recession, state and local health departments have lost > 38,000 jobs and spending for state public health departments has dropped by 16% per capita and spending for local health departments has fallen by 18%. Hopefully, COVID-19 will be a wakeup call to the US with regard to the need for both a national strategy to address public health emergencies and the well-maintained infrastructure to make it happen.


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