Review for "Modelling population dynamics in a unicellular social organism community using a minimal model and evolutionary game theory"

Open Biology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 200206
Author(s):  
Ravindra Garde ◽  
Jan Ewald ◽  
Ákos T. Kovács ◽  
Stefan Schuster

Most unicellular organisms live in communities and express different phenotypes. Many efforts have been made to study the population dynamics of such complex communities of cells, coexisting as well-coordinated units. Minimal models based on ordinary differential equations are powerful tools that can help us understand complex phenomena. They represent an appropriate compromise between complexity and tractability; they allow a profound and comprehensive analysis, which is still easy to understand. Evolutionary game theory is another powerful tool that can help us understand the costs and benefits of the decision a particular cell of a unicellular social organism takes when faced with the challenges of the biotic and abiotic environment. This work is a binocular view at the population dynamics of such a community through the objectives of minimal modelling and evolutionary game theory. We test the behaviour of the community of a unicellular social organism at three levels of antibiotic stress. Even in the absence of the antibiotic, spikes in the fraction of resistant cells can be observed indicating the importance of bet hedging. At moderate level of antibiotic stress, we witness cyclic dynamics reminiscent of the renowned rock–paper–scissors game. At a very high level, the resistant type of strategy is the most favourable.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140037 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Liao ◽  
Thea D. Tlsty

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (108) ◽  
pp. 20150121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang-Yi Li ◽  
Cleo Pietschke ◽  
Sebastian Fraune ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock ◽  
Thomas C. G. Bosch ◽  
...  

Microbial communities display complex population dynamics, both in frequency and absolute density. Evolutionary game theory provides a natural approach to analyse and model this complexity by studying the detailed interactions among players, including competition and conflict, cooperation and coexistence. Classic evolutionary game theory models typically assume constant population size, which often does not hold for microbial populations. Here, we explicitly take into account population growth with frequency-dependent growth parameters, as observed in our experimental system. We study the in vitro population dynamics of the two commensal bacteria ( Curvibacter sp. (AEP1.3) and Duganella sp. (C1.2)) that synergistically protect the metazoan host Hydra vulgaris (AEP) from fungal infection. The frequency-dependent, nonlinear growth rates observed in our experiments indicate that the interactions among bacteria in co-culture are beyond the simple case of direct competition or, equivalently, pairwise games. This is in agreement with the synergistic effect of anti-fungal activity observed in vivo . Our analysis provides new insight into the minimal degree of complexity needed to appropriately understand and predict coexistence or extinction events in this kind of microbial community dynamics. Our approach extends the understanding of microbial communities and points to novel experiments.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1540016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Uyttendaele ◽  
Frank Thuijsman

In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Several examples show that there is a major difference between population dynamics using local dynamics versus global dynamics. Moreover, different modeling choices may lead to very diverse results.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Anuraag Bukkuri ◽  
Joel S. Brown

Classical evolutionary game theory allows one to analyze the population dynamics of interacting individuals playing different strategies (broadly defined) in a population. To expand the scope of this framework to allow us to examine the evolution of these individuals’ strategies over time, we present the idea of a fitness-generating (G) function. Under this model, we can simultaneously consider population (ecological) and strategy (evolutionary) dynamics. In this paper, we briefly outline the differences between game theory and classical evolutionary game theory. We then introduce the G function framework, deriving the model from fundamental biological principles. We introduce the concept of a G-function species, explain the process of modeling with G functions, and define the conditions for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). We conclude by presenting expository examples of G function model construction and simulations in the context of predator–prey dynamics and the evolution of drug resistance in cancer.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vandana R. Venkateswaran ◽  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale

AbstractEvolutionary game theory has been successful in describing phenomena from bacterial population dynamics to the evolution of social behavior. Interactions between individuals are usually captured by a single game. In reality, however, individuals take part in many interactions. Here, we include multiple games and analyze their individual and combined evolutionary dynamics. A typical assumption is that the evolutionary dynamics of individual behavior can be understood by constructing one big comprehensive interactions structure, a single big game. But if any one of the multiple games has more than two strategies, then the combined dynamics cannot be understood by looking only at individual games. Devising a method to study multiple games – where each game could have an arbitrary number of players and strategies – we provide a concise replicator equation, and analyze its resulting dynamics. Moreover, in the case of finite populations, we formulate and calculate a basic and useful property of stochasticity, fixation probability. Our results reveal that even when interactions become incredibly complex, their properties can be captured by relatively simple concepts of evolutionary game(s) theory.


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