Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1540016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Uyttendaele ◽  
Frank Thuijsman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Global Dynamics ◽  
Local Interactions ◽  
Local Dynamics

In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Several examples show that there is a major difference between population dynamics using local dynamics versus global dynamics. Moreover, different modeling choices may lead to very diverse results.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2008 ◽  
pp. 306-323
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Nowak & May, 1993) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in Evolutionary Games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140037 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Liao ◽  
Thea D. Tlsty
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Treatment Strategies ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
And Control

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

scholarly journals Modelling population dynamics in a unicellular social organism community using a minimal model and evolutionary game theory

Open Biology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 200206
Author(s):  
Ravindra Garde ◽  
Jan Ewald ◽  
Ákos T. Kovács ◽  
Stefan Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Minimal Models ◽  
Unicellular Organisms ◽  
Cyclic Dynamics ◽  
High Level ◽  
Complex Phenomena ◽  
Social Organism

Most unicellular organisms live in communities and express different phenotypes. Many efforts have been made to study the population dynamics of such complex communities of cells, coexisting as well-coordinated units. Minimal models based on ordinary differential equations are powerful tools that can help us understand complex phenomena. They represent an appropriate compromise between complexity and tractability; they allow a profound and comprehensive analysis, which is still easy to understand. Evolutionary game theory is another powerful tool that can help us understand the costs and benefits of the decision a particular cell of a unicellular social organism takes when faced with the challenges of the biotic and abiotic environment. This work is a binocular view at the population dynamics of such a community through the objectives of minimal modelling and evolutionary game theory. We test the behaviour of the community of a unicellular social organism at three levels of antibiotic stress. Even in the absence of the antibiotic, spikes in the fraction of resistant cells can be observed indicating the importance of bet hedging. At moderate level of antibiotic stress, we witness cyclic dynamics reminiscent of the renowned rock–paper–scissors game. At a very high level, the resistant type of strategy is the most favourable.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2010 ◽  
pp. 150-159
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

The chapter explores the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, it explores effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. The chapter presents experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2009 ◽  
pp. 1477-1488
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Nowak & May, 1993; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Weibull, 1995) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-28
Author(s):  
Arij Michel
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Development Direction

The article uses evolutionary game theory analysis as the research object, which is the most commonly used research method of institutional change, and summarizes some methods in the research of institutional change, and points out the advantages and disadvantages of evolutionary game analysis in the research of institutional change and through the comparison of cutting-edge methods and evolutionary games to see the development direction of future research institutional changes.

scholarly journals Which games are growing bacterial populations playing?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (108) ◽  
pp. 20150121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang-Yi Li ◽  
Cleo Pietschke ◽  
Sebastian Fraune ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock ◽  
Thomas C. G. Bosch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Microbial Communities ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Community Dynamics ◽  
Growth Parameters ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Frequency Dependent

Microbial communities display complex population dynamics, both in frequency and absolute density. Evolutionary game theory provides a natural approach to analyse and model this complexity by studying the detailed interactions among players, including competition and conflict, cooperation and coexistence. Classic evolutionary game theory models typically assume constant population size, which often does not hold for microbial populations. Here, we explicitly take into account population growth with frequency-dependent growth parameters, as observed in our experimental system. We study the in vitro population dynamics of the two commensal bacteria ( Curvibacter sp. (AEP1.3) and Duganella sp. (C1.2)) that synergistically protect the metazoan host Hydra vulgaris (AEP) from fungal infection. The frequency-dependent, nonlinear growth rates observed in our experiments indicate that the interactions among bacteria in co-culture are beyond the simple case of direct competition or, equivalently, pairwise games. This is in agreement with the synergistic effect of anti-fungal activity observed in vivo . Our analysis provides new insight into the minimal degree of complexity needed to appropriately understand and predict coexistence or extinction events in this kind of microbial community dynamics. Our approach extends the understanding of microbial communities and points to novel experiments.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

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