scholarly journals Social enforcement depending on the stage of colony growth in an ant

2018 ◽  
Vol 285 (1875) ◽  
pp. 20172548
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Shimoji ◽  
Tomonori Kikuchi ◽  
Hitoshi Ohnishi ◽  
Noritsugu Kikuta ◽  
Kazuki Tsuji
Keyword(s):  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Colony Growth ◽  
Darwinian Evolution ◽  
Worker Policing ◽  
Colony Demography ◽  
Conditional Expression ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Reproductive Altruism

Altruism is a paradox in Darwinian evolution. Policing is an important mechanism of the evolution and maintenance of altruism. A recently developed dynamic game model incorporating colony demography and inclusive fitness predicts that, in hymenopteran social insects, policing behaviour enforcing reproductive altruism in group members depends strongly on the colony growth stage, with strong policing as the colony develops and a relaxation of policing during the reproductive phase. Here, we report clear evidence supporting this prediction. In the ant Diacamma sp., reproduction by workers was suppressed by worker policing when the colony was small, whereas in large, mature colonies worker policing was relaxed and worker-produced males emerged. Conditional expression of traits can provide strong empirical evidence for natural selection theory if the expression pattern is precisely predicted by the theory, and our results illustrate the importance of intracolony population dynamics in the evolution of social systems.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Game Model of Collective Choice in Multiagent Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 768-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rabih Salhab ◽  
Roland P. Malhame ◽  
Jerome Le Ny
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Impact Research on a Nonlinear Cold Chain Evolutionary Game Under Three Various Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Tiantong Xu ◽  
Yalan Hong ◽  
Xueli Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Cold Chain ◽  
Chain Dynamic ◽  
Management Advice ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

In this paper, we establish a cold chain dynamic game model including a milk manufacturer and two downstream oligopoly supermarkets under the wholesale price contract in the real world. The manufacturer is responsible for the production and cold transportation, and the two retailers sell the product. The Nash equilibrium points and the complexity of the system are discussed. The influence of the decision parameters and the stability of the system are studied by using complexity theory. We reveal the stable regions for the dynamic system. In addition, revenue sharing contract and profit sharing contract are two valuable contracts. In order to see how the two contracts would impact on the system’s equilibrium solution and the profits, we establish and analyze two new dynamic models for the cold chain. By the comparison of the analyses under three contracts, we find that the manufacturer’s effort of cold transportation will change under different contracts, and the profit distribution of the whole cold chain will be affected. Chaos control is also studied by the method of delay feedback control, in order to provide some management advice.

Dynamic game model for finding the equilibrium level of migration flows

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandr A. Tarasyev ◽  
Gavriil A. Agarkov ◽  
Tatyana V. Tarasyeva ◽  
Jeenat B. Jabbar
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Migration Flows ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

scholarly journals Research on the Relationship between Price Mechanism and Short-Term Behavior in Chinese Farmland Trusteeships

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunxian Hou ◽  
Pengfei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Service ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Price System ◽  
High Price ◽  
Sustainable Utilization ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Social Service Providers ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

After the policy of separating ownership rights, contract rights, and management rights to rural land, some Chinese farmers entrusted their land to agricultural social service providers. However, at present in land trusteeships, short-term behaviors exist, which are not good for the sustainable utilization of land. This article uses a dynamic game model to analyze the economic reasons for short-term behavior and to explore possible mechanisms. The study’s results showed that fluctuations in trusteeship prices encouraged farmers to sign low-price, long-term contracts or high-price, short-term contracts that allowed agricultural social service providers choose short-term behaviors. A variable-price system may avoid short-term contracts as a result of fluctuations in trusteeship prices, allowing both sides to build a long-term stable partnership, encouraging long-term investment in land. To ensure the sustainable utilization of land, it is suggested that both sides adopt a variable price system.

scholarly journals Dynamic Nonlinear Pricing Model Based on Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Bi ◽  
Yinghui Sun ◽  
Haiying Liu ◽  
Xiaohong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Nonlinear Pricing ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Purchase Behavior ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Steady State Solutions

Existing dynamic pricing models which take consumers’ learning behavior into account generally assume that consumers learn on the basis of reinforcement learning and belief-based learning. Nevertheless, abundant empirical evidence of behavior game indicates that consumers’ learning is normally described as a process of mixed learning. Particularly, for experience goods, a consumer’s purchase decision is not only based on his previous purchase behavior (adaptive learning), but also affected by that of other consumers (sophisticated learning). With the assumption that consumers are both adaptive and sophisticated learners, we study a dynamic pricing model dealing with repeated decision problems in a duopoly market. Specifically, we build a dynamic game model based on sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning model (SEWA) and analyze the existence of the equilibrium. Finally, we show the characteristics and differences of the steady-state solutions between models considering adaptive consumers and models considering sophistical consumers by numerical results.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document