scholarly journals Reorganization of the connectivity between elementary functions as a common mechanism of phenomenal consciousness and working memory: from functions to strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Mogensen ◽  
Morten Overgaard
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Situational Factors ◽  
Surface Phenomenon ◽  
Common Mechanism ◽  
Elementary Functions ◽  
Connectionist Networks ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In the present communication, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and the closely related concept of working memory are presented in the context of a neurocognitive model—the REF (reorganization of elementary functions) framework. The REF framework is based on connectionist networks within which the ‘units’ are advanced processing modules called elementary functions (EFs). In this framework, the focus is on dynamically changeable ‘strategies’—based on reorganizations of the connectivity between EFs—rather than on the more traditional ‘cognitive functions’. The background for the REF framework and especially how the neural correlate of consciousness is understood within these models is summarized. According to the REF framework, phenomenal consciousness cannot ‘overflow’ availability of information for action. Phenomenal consciousness may, however, overflow working memory because working memory in the present context is seen as a surface phenomenon reflecting underlying dynamic strategies—influenced by both experience and situational factors. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

scholarly journals Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 509-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Koch ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Frontal Cortex ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Endogenous Attention ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Basic Hypothesis

AbstractWe agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.

scholarly journals Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Overgaard
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Phenomenal Content ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Ned Block ◽  
Existing Data

In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible—yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate—under the condition that ‘cognitive access’ is defined as working memory or attention. However, if ‘access’ is defined as information becoming ‘cognitively available’, in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 500-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Burge
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological Evidence

AbstractInference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.

scholarly journals The offline stream of conscious representations

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Sergent
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Sensory Processing ◽  
Psychological Refractory Period ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Iconic Memory ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Capacity Limitations ◽  
Sequence Of Events ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Conscious Processing

When do we become conscious of a stimulus after its presentation? We would all agree that this necessarily takes time and that it is not instantaneous. Here, I would like to propose not only that conscious access is delayed relative to the external stimulation, but also that it can flexibly desynchronize from external stimulation; it can process some information ‘offline’, if and when it becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast with initial sensory processing, conscious experience might not strictly follow the sequence of events in the environment. In this article, I will review gathering evidence in favour of this proposition. I will argue that it offers a coherent framework for explaining a great variety of observations in the domain of perception, sensory memory and working memory: the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, post-dictive phenomena, iconic memory, latent working memory and the newly described retro-perception phenomenon. I will integrate this proposition to the global neuronal workspace model and consider possible underlying brain mechanisms. Finally, I will argue that this capacity to process information ‘offline’ might have made conscious processing evolutionarily advantageous in spite of its sluggishness and capacity limitations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

scholarly journals The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse J. Winters
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Neural Correlate ◽  
Resonance Theory ◽  
Thalamocortical System ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

Additional Resources for Sparse Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 125-147
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Feature Binding ◽  
Subjective Impression ◽  
The Rich

The phenomenal overflow debate is a debate about the richness of phenomenal consciousness. There are two candidate views: the rich view and the sparse view. The rich view says phenomenal consciousness outstrips access consciousness and the contents of working memory. The sparse view denies this. Moreover, according to some conceptions of the sparse view, the subjective impression of richness depends on scene statistics and the refrigerator-light illusion. The purpose of this paper is to show there are additional resources available to the sparse view in accommodating intuitions of richness that have yet to be fully appreciated by participants in the debate. To this end, research pertaining to feature binding and activity-silent working memory will be discussed.

scholarly journals Consciousness without report: insights from summary statistics and inattention ‘blindness’

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Usher ◽  
Zohar Z. Bronfman ◽  
Shiri Talmor ◽  
Hilla Jacobson ◽  
Baruch Eitam
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Visual Awareness ◽  
Simple Relation ◽  
Attentional Focus ◽  
Summary Statistics ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Task Relevance ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Visual Elements ◽  
Cognitive Access

We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of ‘inattention blindness’ and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, ‘task relevance’, which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual elements. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

scholarly journals The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Negative Answer ◽  
Partial Report ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

Animal minds

2019 ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Strong Discontinuity ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Turn On

If animals lack mental states altogether then of course they can’t be capable of phenomenal consciousness, either. And even assuming that they have mental states, it would be natural to think that much might turn on just how sophisticated the minds of various species of animal are, and on the extent of the discontinuities between human and animal minds. The present chapter argues against strong discontinuity views. It also considers evidence of working memory, planning, self-control, metacognition, and language in animals, which are especially relevant to later discussions. I argue that there is significant and widespread support for the first three, but little evidence supporting metacognition or language.

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