Animal minds

2019 ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Strong Discontinuity ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Turn On

If animals lack mental states altogether then of course they can’t be capable of phenomenal consciousness, either. And even assuming that they have mental states, it would be natural to think that much might turn on just how sophisticated the minds of various species of animal are, and on the extent of the discontinuities between human and animal minds. The present chapter argues against strong discontinuity views. It also considers evidence of working memory, planning, self-control, metacognition, and language in animals, which are especially relevant to later discussions. I argue that there is significant and widespread support for the first three, but little evidence supporting metacognition or language.

Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Function ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Current Location ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Development Of Language

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 500-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Burge
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological Evidence

AbstractInference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.

scholarly journals Reorganization of the connectivity between elementary functions as a common mechanism of phenomenal consciousness and working memory: from functions to strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Mogensen ◽  
Morten Overgaard
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Situational Factors ◽  
Surface Phenomenon ◽  
Common Mechanism ◽  
Elementary Functions ◽  
Connectionist Networks ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In the present communication, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and the closely related concept of working memory are presented in the context of a neurocognitive model—the REF (reorganization of elementary functions) framework. The REF framework is based on connectionist networks within which the ‘units’ are advanced processing modules called elementary functions (EFs). In this framework, the focus is on dynamically changeable ‘strategies’—based on reorganizations of the connectivity between EFs—rather than on the more traditional ‘cognitive functions’. The background for the REF framework and especially how the neural correlate of consciousness is understood within these models is summarized. According to the REF framework, phenomenal consciousness cannot ‘overflow’ availability of information for action. Phenomenal consciousness may, however, overflow working memory because working memory in the present context is seen as a surface phenomenon reflecting underlying dynamic strategies—influenced by both experience and situational factors. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Additional Resources for Sparse Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 125-147
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Feature Binding ◽  
Subjective Impression ◽  
The Rich

The phenomenal overflow debate is a debate about the richness of phenomenal consciousness. There are two candidate views: the rich view and the sparse view. The rich view says phenomenal consciousness outstrips access consciousness and the contents of working memory. The sparse view denies this. Moreover, according to some conceptions of the sparse view, the subjective impression of richness depends on scene statistics and the refrigerator-light illusion. The purpose of this paper is to show there are additional resources available to the sparse view in accommodating intuitions of richness that have yet to be fully appreciated by participants in the debate. To this end, research pertaining to feature binding and activity-silent working memory will be discussed.

The Ghost of Clever Hans

2019 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands
Keyword(s):  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
Animal Minds

According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human minds. Inferentialist approaches argue that the justification lies in the appropriate form of inference. These approaches are inadequate for a variety of reasons. Direct perception approaches claim our access to the minds of animals is, in some cases, perceptual. A novel form of the direct perception account is defended. This is based on three ideas: (a) a distinction between seeing and seeing that, (b) a distinction between formal and functional descriptions of behavior, and (c) the idea that functional descriptions of behavior are (often) disguised psychological descriptions. If we wish to have any useful descriptions of animal behavior, we must accept that we can often see their mental states.

scholarly journals Cognitive and affective Theory of Mind in adolescence: developmental aspects and associated neuropsychological variables

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edith Theresa Gabriel ◽  
Raphaela Oberger ◽  
Michaela Schmoeger ◽  
Matthias Deckert ◽  
Stefanie Vockh ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
Late Adolescents ◽  
Affective Processes ◽  
Neuropsychological Tasks ◽  
Neuropsychological Variables

Abstract Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to represent and attribute mental states to oneself and others. So far, research regarding ToM processing across adolescence is scarce. Existing studies either yield inconsistent results or did not or not thoroughly investigate aspects like higher order ToM and associated neuropsychological variables which the current study tried to address. 643 typically developing early, middle, and late adolescents (age groups 13–14; 15–16; 17–18) performed cognitive and affective ToM tasks as well as neuropsychological tasks tapping the cognitive or affective domain. Regarding both ToM types, 15- to 16-year-olds and 17- to 18-year-olds outperformed 13- to 14-year-olds, whereas females were superior regarding cognitive ToM. Across adolescence, cognitive and affective ToM correlated with attention and affective intelligence, whereas working memory, language comprehension, and figural intelligence additionally correlated with cognitive ToM. In early adolescence, attention correlated with both ToM types, whereas cognitive ToM further correlated with language comprehension and affective ToM with verbal intelligence, verbal fluency, and verbal flexibility. In middle and late adolescence, affective intelligence correlated with both ToM types, whereas cognitive ToM additionally correlated with working memory, language comprehension, and figural intelligence. The current study shows a developmental step regarding cognitive and affective ToM in middle adolescence as well as gender differences in cognitive ToM processing. Associations between neuropsychological variables and ToM processing were shown across adolescence and within age groups. Results give new insights into social cognition in adolescence and are well supported by neuroscientific and neurobiological studies regarding ToM and the integration of cognitive and affective processes. Graphic abstract

scholarly journals Drifting codes within a stable coding scheme for working memory

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Wolff ◽  
J. Jochim ◽  
E. G. Akyürek ◽  
T. J. Buschman ◽  
M. G. Stokes
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Memory Performance ◽  
Specific Impulse ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Dynamic Component ◽  
Coding Scheme ◽  
Stable Maintenance ◽  
Low Dimensional ◽  
Time Specific

AbstractWorking memory (WM) is important to maintain information over short time periods to provide some stability in a constantly changing environment. However, brain activity is inherently dynamic, raising a challenge for maintaining stable mental states. To investigate the relationship between WM stability and neural dynamics, we used electroencephalography to measure the neural response to impulse stimuli during a WM delay. Multivariate pattern analysis revealed representations were both stable and dynamic: there was a clear difference in neural states between time-specific impulse responses, reflecting dynamic changes, yet the coding scheme for memorized orientations was stable. This suggests that a stable subcomponent in WM enables stable maintenance within a dynamic system. A stable coding scheme simplifies readout for WM-guided behaviour, whereas the low-dimensional dynamic component could provide additional temporal information. Despite having a stable subspace, WM is clearly not perfect – memory performance still degrades over time. Indeed, we find that even within the stable coding scheme, memories drift during maintenance. When averaged across trials, such drift contributes to the width of the error distribution.

scholarly journals Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexa Weiss ◽  
Matthias Forstmann ◽  
Pascal Burgmer
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Causal Chain ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Perceived Ability ◽  
Overt Behavior ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

Which attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others’ thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people’s ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others’ mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person’s fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one’s own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants’ self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others’ purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition.

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