scholarly journals The evolution of partner specificity in mutualisms

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher I Carlson ◽  
Erol I Akcay ◽  
Bryce Morsky
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Spatial Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanisms ◽  
Focal Species ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stable Equilibria ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Mutualistic species vary in their level of partner specificity, which has important evolutionary, ecological, and management implications. Yet, the evolutionary mechanisms which underpin partner specificity are not fully understood. Most work on specialization focuses on the trade-off between generalism and specialism, where specialists receive more benefits from preferred partners at the expense of benefits from non-preferred partners, while generalists receive similar benefits from all partners. Because all mutualisms involve some degree of both cooperation and conflict between partners, we highlight that specialization to a mutualistic partner can be cooperative, increasing benefit to a focal species and a partner, or antagonistic, increasing resource extraction by a focal species from a partner. We devise an evolutionary game theoretic model to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative specialization, antagonistic specialization, and generalism. Our model shows that cooperative specialization leads to bistability: stable equilibria with a specialist host and its preferred partner excluding all others. We also show that under cooperative specialization with spatial effects, generalists can thrive at the boundaries between differing specialist patches. Under antagonistic specialization, generalism is evolutionarily stable. We provide predictions for how a cooperation-antagonism continuum may determine the patterns of partner specificity that develop within mutualistic relationships.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

scholarly journals Critical transitions in a game theoretic model of tumour metabolism

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Kianercy ◽  
Robert Veltri ◽  
Kenneth J. Pienta
Keyword(s):  
Stromal Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tumour Cells ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Hybrid Energy ◽  
Critical Transitions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Strategies

Tumour proliferation is promoted by an intratumoral metabolic symbiosis in which lactate from stromal cells fuels energy generation in the oxygenated domain of the tumour. Furthermore, empirical data show that tumour cells adopt an intermediate metabolic state between lactate respiration and glycolysis. This study models the metabolic symbiosis in the tumour through the formalism of evolutionary game theory. Our game model of metabolic symbiosis in cancer considers two types of tumour cells, hypoxic and oxygenated, while glucose and lactate are considered as the two main sources of energy within the tumour. The model confirms the presence of multiple intermediate stable states and hybrid energy strategies in the tumour. It predicts that nonlinear interaction between two subpopulations leads to tumour metabolic critical transitions and that tumours can obtain different intermediate states between glycolysis and respiration which can be regulated by the genomic mutation rate. The model can apply in the epithelial–stromal metabolic decoupling therapy.

AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF CANNIBALISM

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. CUSHING ◽  
SHANDELLE M. HENSON ◽  
JAMES L. HAYWARD
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Optimizing the Community’s Supports in Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Sticks – Carrots Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
M. O. Oladejo ◽  
I. J. Udoh ◽  
A. O. Abam
Keyword(s):  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Operational Cost ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

A terrorist group’s (TG) ability to withstand attacks and recovered from sudden high strength depreciation after a major counterterrorism operation, as well as the Security Agencies’ (SA) ability to execute successful credible counter-terrorism operation is a function of both their individual bureaucratic structures and the level of community’s supports each organization is able to optimize within the period of operation. To study the security implications of undermining a given community’s optimal supports, we present and analysed a two-person two-periods evolutionary game theoretic model for an interaction between the SA and the TG; each playing either the “Sticks” or the “Carrots” or mixed strategies to win the community’s optimal supports. In the symmetric game variant, the result of the analysis shows that if the operational cost drops by 80%, then the SA playing the “Stick” may enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would be at-most 33.3% advantageous, while the “Carrots” approach would yield at-least 66.7% advantage. In the asymmetric variant, if the operational cost drops by 80%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 100% chance of winning the community’s optimal supports, while the “Carrots” would yield at most 20% advantage. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 50:50 advantage. Comparatively, the TG would enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports by playing the “Sticks” if the cost of operation drops by 90%. But if the cost rises by at least 20%, then TG playing the “Sticks” would enjoy at most 33.3% while the “Carrots” would yield at least 66.7% advantage. Thus, the cost of operation is the major determinant of either player’s strategic approach. Under the mixed strategy, if the benefit of operation exceeds its cost, then SA playing the “Sticks” is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), otherwise, combining the “Sticks and Carrots” simultaneously would yield an ESS. Summarily, the SAs’ stake in terrorism prevention and control using the “Sticks” approach is proportional to its operational cost and vice versa. Therefore, considering the capital intensive as well as the intelligence deficient characteristics of the “Sticks” approach, the SA cannot prevent/control terrorism using the “Stick” instruments only. Rather a viable “Carrots” approach or its combination with credible “Sticks” instruments would be necessary and sufficient to win the community’s optimal supports for effective terrorism prevention and control.

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