scholarly journals Optimizing the Community’s Supports in Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Sticks – Carrots Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
M. O. Oladejo ◽  
I. J. Udoh ◽  
A. O. Abam
Keyword(s):  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Operational Cost ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

A terrorist group’s (TG) ability to withstand attacks and recovered from sudden high strength depreciation after a major counterterrorism operation, as well as the Security Agencies’ (SA) ability to execute successful credible counter-terrorism operation is a function of both their individual bureaucratic structures and the level of community’s supports each organization is able to optimize within the period of operation. To study the security implications of undermining a given community’s optimal supports, we present and analysed a two-person two-periods evolutionary game theoretic model for an interaction between the SA and the TG; each playing either the “Sticks” or the “Carrots” or mixed strategies to win the community’s optimal supports. In the symmetric game variant, the result of the analysis shows that if the operational cost drops by 80%, then the SA playing the “Stick” may enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would be at-most 33.3% advantageous, while the “Carrots” approach would yield at-least 66.7% advantage. In the asymmetric variant, if the operational cost drops by 80%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 100% chance of winning the community’s optimal supports, while the “Carrots” would yield at most 20% advantage. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 50:50 advantage. Comparatively, the TG would enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports by playing the “Sticks” if the cost of operation drops by 90%. But if the cost rises by at least 20%, then TG playing the “Sticks” would enjoy at most 33.3% while the “Carrots” would yield at least 66.7% advantage. Thus, the cost of operation is the major determinant of either player’s strategic approach. Under the mixed strategy, if the benefit of operation exceeds its cost, then SA playing the “Sticks” is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), otherwise, combining the “Sticks and Carrots” simultaneously would yield an ESS. Summarily, the SAs’ stake in terrorism prevention and control using the “Sticks” approach is proportional to its operational cost and vice versa. Therefore, considering the capital intensive as well as the intelligence deficient characteristics of the “Sticks” approach, the SA cannot prevent/control terrorism using the “Stick” instruments only. Rather a viable “Carrots” approach or its combination with credible “Sticks” instruments would be necessary and sufficient to win the community’s optimal supports for effective terrorism prevention and control.

The Interrelationship between Estimated Tax Payments and Taxpayer Compliance

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 27-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn D. Feltham ◽  
Suzanne M. Paquette
Keyword(s):  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Type ◽  
Compliance Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Audit Strategy ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
The Cost

This paper examines taxpayers' compliance behavior and the tax agency's audit decision in a broader, more realistic, setting. Whereas prior research has taken the taxpayer's prepayment position as exogenous, this study extends the literature by incorporating the estimated tax payment decision into a tax compliance game. A two-period game-theoretic model is used to examine the effect that the estimated tax payment rules have on taxpayers' incentives to evade and on the tax agency's audit strategy. Our primary results are as follows. First, in equilibrium taxpayers' estimated tax payment decision will depend upon the uncertainty about their true tax liability, and the cost from overpayment (the taxpayer's cost of capital) or underpayment (penalty interest) of installments of estimated tax. Second, under reasonable assumptions, high-type taxpayers who make higher installments of estimated tax are less likely to lie about their level of income than those who make lower installments—that is, taxpayers who pay low are more likely to evade. Third, the tax agency audits taxpayers who have made low reports and low estimated tax payments with a higher probability than those who have made high estimated tax payments. The gain to the tax agency from auditing taxpayers who make lower payments and evade arises not only from the penalties charged for evasion, but also from the interest charged on deficient installments of estimated tax.

scholarly journals Sexual signaling and the persistence of alternative reproductive tactics: a test of game theoretic predictions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney R. Garrison ◽  
Scott K. Sakaluk ◽  
Ned A. Dochtermann
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Variation ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Cost ◽  
Reproductive Tactics ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Fitness Value ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

AbstractIn many species, males produce signals to attract females. However, in some species and populations, only some males produce these signals with other males competing for and “sneaking” reproductive opportunities. In these systems, at least three tactics are expected: always signal, signal only when others are not (assessors), and never signal. The representation of these tactics within a population is unknown in part because the costs of signaling (C) and the fitness value of a single reproductive bout (V) are unknown. Using a game-theoretic model we predict that the always signal strategy only persists if the fitness value of calling is greater than twice the cost. We also show that always signal males are apparently absent in decorated crickets (Gryllodes sigillatus). Moreover, males of this species were not strict assessors and instead signaled infrequently (30% of the time) when signaling by others was constant. Males also exhibited substantial among-individual variation in the propensity to call when other males were not signaling (τ = 0.3). Our results suggest a high relative cost of signaling (2C > V) in this species. The presence of among-individual variation is indicative of underlying genetic variation and a mixed evolutionary stable strategy.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

scholarly journals Critical transitions in a game theoretic model of tumour metabolism

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Kianercy ◽  
Robert Veltri ◽  
Kenneth J. Pienta
Keyword(s):  
Stromal Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tumour Cells ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Hybrid Energy ◽  
Critical Transitions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Strategies

Tumour proliferation is promoted by an intratumoral metabolic symbiosis in which lactate from stromal cells fuels energy generation in the oxygenated domain of the tumour. Furthermore, empirical data show that tumour cells adopt an intermediate metabolic state between lactate respiration and glycolysis. This study models the metabolic symbiosis in the tumour through the formalism of evolutionary game theory. Our game model of metabolic symbiosis in cancer considers two types of tumour cells, hypoxic and oxygenated, while glucose and lactate are considered as the two main sources of energy within the tumour. The model confirms the presence of multiple intermediate stable states and hybrid energy strategies in the tumour. It predicts that nonlinear interaction between two subpopulations leads to tumour metabolic critical transitions and that tumours can obtain different intermediate states between glycolysis and respiration which can be regulated by the genomic mutation rate. The model can apply in the epithelial–stromal metabolic decoupling therapy.

Design for Repair: A Game Between Manufacturer and Independent Repair Service Provider

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostafa Sabbaghi ◽  
Sara Behdad
Keyword(s):  
Efficient Solution ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Repair Service ◽  
Design Decisions ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

Design for ease-of-repair is an efficient solution to effectively use resources by extending the lifespan of products. However, designing a repairable product may not be necessarily an economically viable solution for manufacturers. Repairable products enable independent repair businesses to compete with original manufacturers on offering repair services. On the other hand, although designing a less repairable product may dissuade competition, it increases the cost of repair for manufacturers at the same time, in addition to decreasing consumers’ satisfaction. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to represent the competition between a manufacturer acting as a leader, and a coalition of independent repair service providers acting as a follower. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived, representing the optimal prices for repair services offered by the two service-providers based on the level of repairability. In addition, based on the information extracted from a repair-related survey, we provide insights about consumers’ attitudes towards repairability of products to help manufacturers make better design decisions.

scholarly journals When Does Mutualism Offer a Competitive Advantage? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Host-Host Competition in Mutualism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdel H Halloway ◽  
Katy D Heath ◽  
Gordon G McNickle
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Neighborhood Size ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Local Neighborhood ◽  
Specific Direction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

Questions: Can resource-resource trade mutualism offer a competitive advantage to plants? If so, what are the conditions that give mutualism an advantage especially with regard to the size of the neighborhood? Hypothesis: We hypothesized that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the benefits outweighed the costs. We also hypothesized that this competitive advantage could lead to coexistence between mutualist and non-mutualist strategies within the same population. We also hypothesize that local neighborhood size (the number of competitors at a given moment) would change this response, though the specific direction of change was unclear to us. Method: We created an evolutionary game theoretic model in which a plant could either be a mutualist or non-mutualist that incorporated nutrients freely available to the plant, nutrients obtained only through mutualism with microbes, the cost of producing roots, the cost of trade with microbes, and neighborhood size. We sought ESS solutions as defined by the Nash equilibrium criterion. Key Assumptions: 1) Costs and benefits are fixed for all plants. 2) Freely available nutrients are equally shared between all competing plants in a local neighborhood. 3) Microbially obtained nutrients are shared equally between mutualistic plants in the local neighborhood. Conclusion: We found that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the net benefit was positive. Coexistence between mutualist strategies in our model happens because of competition between mutualists over the microbially available nutrient. Coexistence was more likely with greater neighborhood size but at the expense of mutualist fixation.

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