scholarly journals Cleaner wrasse pass the mark test. What are the implications for consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masanori Kohda ◽  
Takashi Hotta ◽  
Tomohiro Takeyama ◽  
Satoshi Awata ◽  
Hirokazu Tanaka ◽  
...  

AbstractThe ability to perceive and recognise a reflected mirror image as self (mirror self-recognition, MSR) is considered a hallmark of cognition across species. Although MSR has been reported in mammals and birds, it is not known to occur in any other major taxon. A factor potentially limiting the ability to test for MSR is that the established assay for MSR, the mark test, shows an interpretation bias towards animals with the dexterity (or limbs) required to touch a mark. Here, we show that the cleaner wrasse fish, Labroides dimidiatus, passes through all phases of the mark test: (i) social reactions towards the reflection, (ii) repeated idiosyncratic behaviours towards the mirror (contingency testing), and (iii) frequent observation of their reflection. When subsequently provided with a coloured tag, individuals attempt to remove the mark in the presence of a mirror but show no response towards transparent marks, or to coloured marks in the absence of a mirror. This remarkable finding presents a challenge to our interpretation of the mark test – do we accept that these behavioural responses in the mark test, which are taken as evidence of self-recognition in other species, mean that fish are self-aware? Or do we conclude that these behavioural patterns have a basis in a cognitive process other than self-recognition? If the former, what does this mean for our understanding of animal intelligence? If the latter, what does this mean for our application and interpretation of the mark test as a metric for animal cognitive abilities?

1997 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethel Tobach ◽  
Alexander J. Skolnick ◽  
Isobel Klein ◽  
Gary Greenberg

Reports on self-recognition in great apes have been mostly derived from experimental studies of mirror behavior (mark test) requiring anesthetization of the animals. We investigated a relatively noninvasive technique to study this behavior. In two experiments with a group of captive orangutans (1 adult male, 3 adult females, 1 juvenile male, and 1 juvenile female), we presented combinations of blank posters, life-size portraits of each individual in the group, a mirror, and videos. Durations of viewing and patterns of viewing were recorded. The prominent features of the viewing were the differences among the individuals in frequency, duration, and pattern of viewing. Some evidence of mirror-based self-referent behavior (behavior in which the activity of the animal with its body was related to the activity of the image in the mirror) was seen in the juvenile female, but more was seen in one adult female. This adult female spent the most time viewing the mirror and was the only animal to view her own portrait more than the other portraits in one session. In addition, she moved from one portrait to another, and back to the first, and to her own portrait and the mirror in a pattern resembling comparison of the two portraits as well as of her portrait and her mirror image. It is suggested that data based on self-referent behavior of the same animal during self-viewing in a mirror and during viewing of its self-portrait and on behavior observed in the mark test are worth further investigation.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay E. Murray ◽  
James R. Anderson ◽  
Gordon G. Gallup

AbstractMirror self-recognition (MSR), widely regarded as an indicator of self-awareness, has not been demonstrated consistently in gorillas. We aimed to examine this issue by setting out a method to evaluate gorilla self-recognition studies that is objective, quantifiable, and easy to replicate. Using Suarez and Gallup’s (J Hum Evol 10:175–183, 1981) study as a reference point, we drew up a list of 15 methodological criteria and assigned scores to all published studies of gorilla MSR for both methodology and outcomes. Key features of studies finding both mark-directed and spontaneous self-directed responses included visually inaccessible marks, controls for tactile and olfactory cues, subjects who were at least 5 years old, and clearly distinguishing between responses in front of versus away from the mirror. Additional important criteria include videotaping the tests, having more than one subject, subjects with adequate social rearing, reporting post-marking observations with mirror absent, and giving mirror exposure in a social versus individual setting. Our prediction that MSR studies would obtain progressively higher scores as procedures and behavioural coding practices improved over time was supported for methods, but not for outcomes. These findings illustrate that methodological rigour does not guarantee stronger evidence of self-recognition in gorillas; methodological differences alone do not explain the inconsistent evidence for MSR in gorillas. By implication, it might be suggested that, in general, gorillas do not show compelling evidence of MSR. We advocate that future MSR studies incorporate the same criteria to optimize the quality of attempts to clarify the self-recognition abilities of gorillas as well as other species.


Author(s):  
Theresa Schilhab

Mirror self-recognition (MSR) refers to the empirical investigation of self-awareness, also known as the ‘mirror and mark test’ introduced by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup (1970). The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth or to groom the eye by the aid of mirrors has been interpreted as the recognition of the self and evidence of a self-concept. Unknowingly, a similar approach was developed independently with children (Amsterdam 1972). The successful passing of the mirror and mark test has been widely used as a benchmark for distinguishing conscious and non-conscious species within fields with a general interest in evolutionary perspectives on consciousness and cognition such as comparative psychology and cognitive ethology, although controversies about the methodology and theoretical framework persist. These disputes question our intuitions about consciousness and accentuate the epistemic difficulty of obtaining evidence on mental states in others.


PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9685
Author(s):  
Gladez Shorland ◽  
Emilie Genty ◽  
Jean-Pascal Guéry ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler

The question of whether animals have some sort of self-awareness is a topic of continued debate. A necessary precondition for self-awareness is the ability to visually discriminate the self from others, which has traditionally been investigated through mirror self-recognition experiments. Although great apes generally pass such experiments, interpretations of results have remained controversial. The aim of this study was to investigate how bonobos (Pan paniscus) respond to different types of images of themselves and others, both before and after prolonged mirror exposure. We first presented presumably mirror-naive subjects with representations of themselves in three different ways (mirror image, contingent and non-contingent video footage) as well as representations of others (video footage of known and unknown conspecifics). We found that subjects paid significantly less attention to contingent images of themselves (mirror image, video footage) than to non-contingent images of themselves and unfamiliar individuals, suggesting they perceived the non-contingent self-images as novel. We then provided subjects with three months of access to a large mirror centrally positioned in the enclosure. Following this manipulation, subjects showed significantly reduced interest in the non-contingent self-images, while interest in unknown individuals remained unchanged, suggesting that the mirror experience has led to a fuller understanding of their own self. We discuss implications of this preliminary investigation for the on-going debate on self-awareness in animals.


PLoS Biology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. e3000021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masanori Kohda ◽  
Takashi Hotta ◽  
Tomohiro Takeyama ◽  
Satoshi Awata ◽  
Hirokazu Tanaka ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 213-222
Author(s):  
Juliet M. Silberstein ◽  
Amy E. Pinkham ◽  
Philip D. Harvey

Unawareness of illness has been known to be a feature of schizophrenia since the first descriptions of the condition in the early 1900s. Recently it has become clear that unawareness, accompanied by perception biases, also extends to awareness of cognitive abilities, social cognition, and social competence, and the ability to perform everyday activities. These problems in awareness, referred to as introspective accuracy (IA), have several correlates, including depression, reduced life experience, and some elements of cognitive impairment. This chapter reviews the characteristics and correlates of IA impairments as well as their major functional implications. Although IA is also inaccurate in healthy people, the concurrent cognitive and environmental challenges experienced by people with schizophrenia increase their impact. Treatment of IA and related biases has been attempted, with some success in improving everyday outcomes in people with schizophrenia. Future challenges include identification of the neurobiological substrates of these impairments.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Roberto Cazzolla Gatti ◽  
Alena Velichevskaya ◽  
Benjamin Gottesman ◽  
Karen Davis

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