How peer monitoring and punishment affect the performance of the group contract
2018 ◽
Vol 10
(1)
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pp. 119-134
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Keyword(s):
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of three types of peer monitoring and punishment tools on the performance of a group contract for the control of agricultural non-point source pollution (ANPSP) in China. Design/methodology/approach Experimental economics. Findings All the three tools result in efficiency improvement and show little difference in performance. In addition, they break the theoretical Nash equilibrium of the team entry auction and help to better reveal bidders’ private cost information. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this study can be the first laboratory experiment study in the area of ANPSP in China and might provide some beneficial lessons for China’s policy-makers.
2021 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
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Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 9
(1)
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pp. 3-20
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Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
◽
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 9
(3)
◽
pp. 319-328
2020 ◽
Vol 39
(5)
◽
pp. 1145-1156
Keyword(s):