Diversity, disparate impact, and discrimination pursuant to Title VII of US civil rights laws

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 670-691
Author(s):  
Frank J. Cavico ◽  
Bahaudin Mujtaba

Purpose While the words diversity, disparate impact, and discrimination are commonly read and heard by working adults and professionals, they can at times be confusing and fearful to some managers. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of a specific aspect of US civil rights laws – the disparate impact theory. The authors provide an analysis based on the statute, case law interpreting, and applying the statute, administrative guidelines from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as well as legal and management commentary. The paper illustrates the requirements of a plaintiff employee’s initial case based on the disparate impact theory. The challenging causation component which requires some degree of statistical evidence is given particular attention. Limitations to the paper are stated at the beginning; and recommendations to managers are explored and provided toward the end of the paper. Design/methodology/approach It is a legal paper which covers all the laws related to discrimination based on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. Actual court cases up until this month and Americans laws related to this concept are reviewed and critically discussed. Findings The salient feature of disparate impact is that this legal theory allows a plaintiff job applicant or employee to sustain a case of illegal discrimination without providing any evidence of a discriminatory motive. As opposed to the disparate treatment liability is imposed based on disproportionate adverse results and not discriminatory intent. Research limitations/implications This paper deals with the disparate impact theory pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However, it must be pointed out that the disparate impact theory is also applicable to claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Since the focus of this paper is Title VII federal and state constitutional issues, such as the applicability of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection clause that may arise in disparate impact cases involving government entities will not be addressed. Practical implications Managers and employees can protect themselves in the workplace from illegal discriminatory practices. Initially, employers and managers must be aware of the distinction between a disparate impact case and a disparate treatment case with the latter requiring evidence of intentional discrimination. Evidence, of course, can be direct or circumstantial or inferential. Whereas in a disparate impact case there is no intentional discrimination; and as such proof of discriminatory intent is not required. Rather, the employee has to present evidence that the employer’s neutral on-its-face employment policy or practice caused an adverse disproportionate impact on the employee as a member of a protected class. Social implications Human resources professionals and managers must become educated in diversity laws in order to provide an inclusive workplace for all employees and candidates. Employers have legitimate areas of concern in hiring and promoting employees; and the courts are cognizant of employer responsibilities; and thus the employers must be able to show how specific knowledge, skills, education, training, backgrounds, as well as height, weight, strength, and dexterity are legitimate qualifications that directly relate to successful job performance. Originality/value This is an original paper by the authors.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-88
Author(s):  
Kerri A. Thompson

Employing facial recognition technology implicates anti-discrimination law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when used as a factor in employment decisions. The very technological breakthroughs that made facial recognition technology commercially viable—data compression and artificial intelligence— also contribute to making facial recognition technology discriminatory in its effect on members of classes protected by Title VII. This Article first explains how facial recognition technology works and its application in employee background checks. Then, it analyzes whether the use of facial recognition technology in background checks violates Title VII under the disparate impact theory of liability due to the known issue of skewed data sets and disproportionate inaccuracy on some populations. The Article concludes by calling on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to issue specific guidance warning employers of impending liability under Title VII, including class action liability, due to the use of facial recognition technology, and to use its enforcement authority to file lawsuits against employers who continue to use the technology.


Author(s):  
Timothy Feddersen

In September 2014 Leyth Jamal, a transgender woman, filed suit against her employer, luxury retailer Saks Fifth Avenue. Jamal alleged that she experienced harassment from managers and other employees because of her gender identity while employed by Saks, including verbal abuse and threats of violence. At the time she filed suit, no federal, state, or local laws protected transgender employees from discrimination. However, some federal district courts had recently begun to allow such suits on the premise that discrimination based on gender identity was a form of sex discrimination. Other suits and amicus briefs brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) furthered this trend. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with investigating and supporting claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, so district and appellate courts watched the EEOC's position on the application of Title VII. Socio-culturally, many Americans supported transgender rights, even as they voiced anxiety about transgender men in women's bathrooms. This case has students assume the role of a trusted member of the executive team of Hudson's Bay Company, which owns Saks Fifth Avenue. One Friday afternoon in late December 2014, the Hudson's Bay CEO sends an email to his executive team notifying them that he has approved corporate counsel's motion to dismiss Jamal's case based on the argument that transgender people are not a protected class according to Title VII. The motion will be filed in federal court on Monday. The CEO shares that he personally believes it is preposterous for anyone to think that Saks Fifth Avenue is anything but a strong advocate for LGBT rights, but he invites executive team members to call him if they have any concerns. Members of the executive team have a responsibility to consider the broader strategic implications for the company, so students must decide if and how to respond to the CEO.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-158
Author(s):  
Eniola O. Akinrinade

In many instances, employers have an obligation to conduct criminal background checks on their applicants to ensure that the public that comes into contact with these employees shall not be harmed. In other instances, these criminal background checks are unnecessary as they prove to be of little relevance, yet they have the effect of causing a disparate impact within certain Title VII-protected classes, including Black Americans and Hispanics. To resolve this disparate impact, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has set forth non-biding guidance, proposing an assessment of “Green Factors” that employers should consider before denying an ex-convict employment. In following this guidance, the EEOC aims to create equal employment opportunities for all job applicants including those with criminal histories. While this guidance and these Green factors play a large role in furthering societal benefits, many employers have raised objections to the recent EEOC guidance. Employers argue that the guidance creates a “catch-22,” forcing the employer to choose between being liable for negligent hiring and being liable for violating Title VII. Because the EEOC guidance furthers fundamental societal interests, it should remain in effect. Nevertheless, the guidance must be amended in order to clarify its ambiguous language concerning “business necessity,” which will then resolve the catch-22 conflict that employers currently experience.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Grimmelmann

7 California Law Review Online 164 (2017)Plaintiff Ruminant Defense Lague alleged that the defendant Zootopia Police Department's new algorithmic hiring process unfairly discriminates against herbivores in violation of Title VII. The ZPD responded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that because its algorithmic model does not explicitly consider species, it does not constitute disparate treatment, and that since the model is preedictive of job performance, any disparate impact on herbivores is justified as a business necessity. This case, in other words, squarely presents the problem of “proxies for proscribed criteria" identified by Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst in the article, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 101 (2016).Held: Where the output of an algorithmic model is correlated both with job performance and with membership in a protected class, the employer bears the burden of demonstrating which of these correlations, if either, is causal. Pp. 170–77.(a) It can be a permissible employment practice to use a properly validated predictive algorithmic model in personnel decisions, even if the model disproporionately favors some groups of applicants and employees over others. Pp. 170-71.(b) Where such a model has a disparate impact on a protected group, the employer may rely on a defense of business necessity only if it shows that the factors the model relies on are not just correlated with job performance but causally connected to it. Here, it might be the case that the ZPD's model works not because it identifies the characteristics relevant to successful police work, but only because it identifies the herbivores in an applicant pool where the relevant characteristics are unequally distributed. Pp. 171-72.(c) This allocation of the burden of proof will encourage employers to better understand the algorithmic models they use, and to share that knowledge with the public. Pp. 173-74.(d) Other bodies of law, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act, already require explanations for why models behave the way they do. Pp. 174-76.(e) This modification to the burden-shifting framework of disparate impact borrows from disparate treatment doctrine. Title VII does not permit an employer to do indirectly what it could not do directly. P. 176.Our holding today is simple. Incomprehensible discrimination will not stand.Co-Authored with Daniel Westreich


Author(s):  
Richard A. Rosen ◽  
Joseph Mosnier

This chapter describes the contributions of Julius Chambers and his partners, most particularly Robert Belton, to the LDF's national litigation campaign to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which new law outlawed racial discrimination in the workplace effective July 1965. In October 1965, Chambers filed the nation's first-ever Title VII suit, and soon after filed three additional cases which, when ultimately decided years later, substantially ended overt racial discrimination in American workplaces. These critical victories included Supreme Court triumphs in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975), and the Fourth Circuit's Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. (1971). Griggs, recognized as the era's landmark employment ruling, established the "disparate impact" standard for adjudicating employers' use of "intelligence" tests and other pre-employment screening mechanisms. Together, Griggs, Moody, and Robinson did much to define the federal courts' interpretations of Title VII in a fashion that both opened workplaces to black job seekers and offered some compensatory remedy to those who had suffered under racially discriminatory workplace schemes. By these efforts, Chambers, his partners, and the LDF would leave the American workplace forever changed.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Marialuisa S. Gallozzi

Plaintiff, a United States citizen employed in Saudi Arabia, brought an employment discrimination suit against defendant, a U.S. corporation, alleging violations of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e (1982)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed (per Davis, J.) the district court’s dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held (two to one): (1) that neither the language nor the legislative history of title VII evinces a clearly expressed congressional intent to apply title VII outside U.S. borders; (2) that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, the presumption against extraterritoriality controls; and (3) that no “negative inference” extending the reach of title VII should be drawn from its “alien exemption” provision. Judge King’s dissent discussed international law principles not addressed by the majority. The Fifth Circuit subsequently granted on December 23, 1988, the petition for rehearing en banc submitted by plaintiff and various amici, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).


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