Board characteristics and firm value for Indian companies

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Kumar Mishra ◽  
Sheeba Kapil
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics

Purpose This paper aims to explore the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance for Indian companies. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance structures of 391 Indian companies out of CNX 500 companies listed on National Stock Exchange have been studied for their impact on performance of companies. Panel data regression methodology has been used on data for five financial years from 2010 to 2014 for the selected companies. Performance measures considered are market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on asset [ROA]). Findings The empirical findings indicate that the market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) is more impacted by corporate governance than the accounting-based measure (ROA). There is a significant positive association between board size and firm performance. Board independence is found significantly related to firm performance. Number of board meetings is found to be sending positive signal to the market creating firm value. Separation of chief executive officer and chairman of the board is found to be value-creating, and overburdened directors affect firm performance adversely. Research limitations/implications Limitations of the study are in terms of methodology and possible omission of some variables. It is understood that the qualitative dynamics happening inside board meetings impact corporate performance. The strategic decision-making process adopted by the boards to fight competition or to increase market share is not easily available in public domain. The decision-making processes and monitoring for implementation of those decisions could impact corporate governance performance relationship. These parameters and their impact on corporate performance are not covered under the scope of the present study. Originality/value The paper adds to the emerging body of literature on corporate governance performance relationship in the Indian context by using a reasonably wider and newer data set.

Effect of board characteristics on firm value: evidence from India

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Kumar Mishra ◽  
Sheeba Kapil
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Significant Positive Association ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship of board characteristics and firm performance for Indian companies. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance structures of 391 Indian companies out of CNX 500 companies listed on National Stock Exchange have been studied for their impact on performance of companies. Structural equation modeling methodology has been employed on data for five financial years from 2010 to 2014 for selected companies. Market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on asset) have been employed for measuring firm performance. Findings Empirical findings indicate that there is significant positive association between board size and firm performance. Board independence is found significantly related to firm performance. Number of board meetings is found to be sending positive signal to the market creating firm value. Separation of CEO and chairman of the board is found to be value creating and overburdened directors affect firm performance adversely. Findings also suggest that the governance-performance relationship is also dependent upon the type of performance measures used in the study. Research limitations/implications Limitations of this study are in terms of data methodology and possible omission of some variables. It is understood that the qualitative dynamics happening inside board meetings impact corporate performance. The strategic decisions-making process adopted by the boards to fight competition or to increase market share is not available in public domain easily. The decision-making processes and monitoring for implementation of these decisions could impact corporate governance-performance relationship. These parameters and their impact on corporate performance are not covered under the scope of the present study. However, the same could have thrown more light on governance-performance relationship. Originality/value The paper adds to the emerging body of literature on corporate governance-performance relationship in the Indian context using a reasonably wider and newer data set.

Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance of firms in Nigeria and Ghana

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha Coleman ◽  
Mengyun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Structure Index ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThis study investigates the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms with inclusion of compliance and diligence index on corporate performance (CP) of firms in Nigeria and Ghana. It further examines the moderating effect of financial distress on the relationship between CG and CP.Design/methodology/approachThe study used panel data of 102 nonfinancial listed firms of Nigeria and Ghana stock exchange for the period 2012–2016 with total observation of 510. The study first used OLS in estimating the influence of CG mechanisms on CP. Due to multicollinearity in the independent variables, ridge regression was employed.FindingsIt was revealed that ownership structure index and board compliance and diligence index, board size, board disclosure, ownership structure, shareholders' right and board compliance and diligence index had positive influence on ROA and ROE. Growth of Tobin's Q depends on board procedure and board compliance and diligence index. Also, financial distress (ZFS) negatively moderates the relationship between board structure index, board disclosure index, board procedure index, shareholders' right and performance (ROA and ROE) but negatively moderates between ownership structure index and Tobin's Q.Practical implicationsThis study provides interesting findings to policymakers in full implementation of CG codes as stated by OCED (2015) by West African firms with greater emphasis on compliance and diligence index since it positively influences all CP measures.Originality/valueThe study provides evidence of the importance of the introduction of the new index: compliance and diligence, which looks at disclosure of CSR activities. This has been overlooked by most researchers especially in Africa in assessing quality CG mechanisms.

Effect of ownership structure and board structure on firm value: evidence from India

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Mishra ◽  
Sheeba Kapil
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This paper aims to explore the relationship of promoter ownership and board structure with firm performance for Indian companies. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance structures of 391 Indian companies out of CRISIL NSE Index (CNX) 500 companies listed on national stock exchange (NSE) have been studied for their impact on performance of companies. Panel data regression methodology has been used on data for five financial years from 2010 to 2014 for the selected companies. Performance measures considered are market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on assets [ROA]). Findings The empirical findings indicate that market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) is more impacted by corporate governance than accounting-based measure. There is significant positive association between promoter ownership and firm performance. It is also indicated that the relationship between promoter ownership and firm performance is different at different levels of promoter ownership. Board size is found to be positively related to ROA; however, board independence is not found to be related to any of the performance measures. Research limitations/implications Limitations of the study are in terms of data methodology and possible omission of some variables. It is felt that endogeneity and reverse causality might be better addressed using simultaneous equation methodology. Originality/value The paper adds to the emerging body of literature on corporate governance performance relationship in Indian context using a reasonably wider and newer data set.

Corporate governance and firm performance: empirical evidence from Jordan

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Yuosef Alodat ◽  
Zalailah Salleh ◽  
Hafiza Aishah Hashim ◽  
Farizah Sulong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to assess the effect of director board and audit committee attributes and ownership structure on firm performance. In general, resource dependency and agency theories have underlined the superior performance of firms equipped with stronger Corporate Governance (CG) versus those of deficient governance. Concurrently, the study delineated the provisions of ownership structure provision, specifically foreign ownership and institutional ownerships, thus describing the component denoting the structural significance in explicating firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The current study implemented an empirical approach involving the construction of extensive CG measures thus, subjected to 81 non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange spanning the period of 2014–2018. Findings The current study identified the positive and significant relationship between the board of directors and audit committee characteristics with the firm performance measures tested, namely, return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. In terms of ownership structure, both foreign and institutional ownerships yielded a significant and positive relationship with ROE. Meanwhile, Tobin’s Q led to an insignificant and negative relationship between both ownership types and firm performance measures. Practical implications The analytical outcomes substantiate the possibility of enhanced performance shown by growing global firms because of the implementation of CG mechanisms, specifically because of the practices resulting in minimised agency costs. Originality/value The current study offers novel evidence detailing the impact of CG effectiveness towards performance and its implementation in emerging markets following the minimal amount of scholarly efforts on the topic. It is a timely contribution towards the current understanding of the relationship linking governance and performance for the purpose of ensuring the adoption and imposition of a strong corporate governance code by the government.

Corporate governance and corporate performance: financial crisis (2008)

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (11) ◽  
pp. 1494-1515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oskar Kowalewski
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance, as measured by the Corporate Governance Index, on firm performance and dividend payouts during the financial crisis of 2008. Design/methodology/approach The empirical approach followed in the study involved constructing a comprehensive measure of corporate governance for 298 non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the years 2006-2010. Findings The results show that prior to the crisis, there was a positive association between corporate governance and performance as measured by Tobin’s q. Moreover, the study presents evidence that higher corporate governance leads to an increase in cash dividends. Amid the financial crisis, corporate governance was positively associated with a higher return on assets, yet this was not observed when measured by Tobin’s q. Additionally, during this period, better-governed companies paid dividends less generously than firms with lower corporate governance standards did. Originality/value The study provides new evidence on the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation in an emerging market during the financial crisis. Moreover, the study shows that governance mechanisms operate differently in crisis and non-crisis periods.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusheng Kong ◽  
Takuriramunashe Famba ◽  
Grace Chituku-Dzimiro ◽  
Huaping Sun ◽  
Ophias Kurauone
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Negative Effect

This study analyzes corporate ownership as a corporate governance mechanism and its role in creating firm value. Previous research shows that there is no convergence on the firm-value corporate ownership relationship. Most research in this area takes a cross national approach ignoring the uniqueness of each institutional setting particularly those of emerging nations. Using a unique firm level dataset, we investigate how corporate control nature and ownership concentration affect the value of Chinese listed firms. First, non-state owned control is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q while a negative premium is found for state owned. Using the hybrid and the correlated random effects model we confirm a U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q, implying that firm value first decreases and then increases as block holders own more shares. Further investigation reveals that the negative effect of ownership concentration is weaker when a firm equity nature is non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While ownership concentration appears to be an efficient mechanism for corporate governance its effect is weaker for SOEs compared to non-SOEs. The results support privatization of SOEs, sound reforms such as the split share structure reform as crucial for the development of China’s stock market.

Role of discretionary earning management in corporate governance-value and corporate governance-risk relationships

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Affaf Asghar ◽  
Seemab Sajjad ◽  
Aamer Shahzad ◽  
Bolaji Tunde Matemilola
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Single Study

Purpose Corporate governance (CG) is an ongoing interesting topic getting the attention of market participant, business regulators and researchers in today’s business environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the moderating role of earnings management on CG-value and CG-risk relationship in the emerging economy of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach A panel data analysis is used in this study. A panel data of 71 non-financial listed companies of Pakistan for the 2008-2017 period is considered for this study. Secondary data is collected from the annual reports of non-financial firms listed on PSX. Seven econometric equations are developed to test the research hypothesis. Findings The results reveal that CG significantly enhances the firm value and performance measures. Moreover, CG mitigates the practices of earning management and eliminates the risk that develops opportunistic behavior among managers to commit frauds. Practical implications The results of this study suggest that the board of directors (BODs) should intensify their governance role and ensure that the executives perform their duties to maximize the wealth of the shareholders and not engage in any misrepresentation of accounts that may lower the company position and decrease the firm value. Moreover, the managers should be informed about their accountability and acknowledged that at the end of the year, they would be audited by an expert’s auditors for their responsibilities. Concerning regulatory bodies, regulatory authorities should ensure that there must be at least one independent member on the board. The better-governed system reduces both agency conflicts and enhances firm value. Originality/value A number of studies have already been undertaken by multiple investigators to build connection among CG with firm performance, but there is not even a single study in the literature that considers CG, firm value, firm Risk and discretionary earning management as a whole in one model to generalize its results in the emerging economy of Pakistan. A fundamental element of current analyzation process addresses that this is the very first graft of study conducted in Pakistan having combination of four variables together in one revision. There is minimal work that focuses on moderating effects of earning management on the CG-value and CG-risk relationships. This study uses two standard measures of firm performance (i.e. ROA and Tobin’s Q), one proxy of earning management (DEM) and three attributes of CG (board size, audit quality and ownership structure). Previously, researchers have not investigated a model that combines variables (CG as independent and Firm performance and Firm Risk as dependent along with DEM as moderator) in a single study.

scholarly journals Bagaimana Good Corporate Governance (GCG) dalam Keberlanjutan Perusahaan?

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 225
Author(s):  
K. Kurniyati ◽  
K. Khairiyani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Partial Least Square ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

<p>This research aimed to examine the effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) on firm value. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) was measured by the Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). CGPI was assessed by the Indonesian Institute of Corporate Governance (IICG), an independent institute that was conducting the development of Good Corporate Governance in Indonesia. The firm value was reflected by the stock price, PBV (Price to Book Value), and Tobin’s Q. This study used ten firms as a sample consistently listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange and followed the CGPI program during 2014-2019. The sample was determined by using purposive sampling. Analysis of data in this study used Structural Equation Modeling-Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS) with SmartPLS 3rd version. The result showed that CGPI reflected Good Corporate Governance affected firm value (stock price, PBV, and Tobin’s Q).</p>

scholarly journals The Interaction Effect of Financial Leverage on the Relationship Between Board Attributes and Firm Performance; Evidence of Non-financial Listed Companies of Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-122
Author(s):  
Sajjad Nawaz Khan ◽  
Muhammad Noman Yaseen ◽  
Fakhra Mustafa ◽  
Sidra Abbasi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley

The eminence of corporate governance (CG) was grasped after the major blunders incorporate strategies and distinct corporate scandals around the world during the global financial crises. Advanced countries have passed numerous laws such as “Say on Pay” or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to shield the shareholder’s wealth. However, evolving countries are still flourishing to gain recognition in corporate governance (CG) effectiveness. The intention of the study is to probe the link between the CG (board size, outside directors) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). Leverage has been used as an interaction term in the current study. The data had been collected from 130 non-financial firms from the year 2012 to 2015 and Multiple Regression Techniques will be used as the instruments for data analysis. The results indicate that the board size and Tobin’s Q have a significant association and outside directors’ insignificant association with Tobin’s Q. The interaction effect of leverage found a significant connotation between board size, outside directors, and Tobin’s Q.

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of Malaysian listed firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 384-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamsul Nahar Abdullah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Listed Firms

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997/1998, the Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) issued the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2000 (MCCG 2000). It was subsequently revised in 2007 following the Enron and Transmile debacles. In 2012, the SC issued the latest MCCG 2012 which introduced several new recommendations that are in line with developments in other parts of the world. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the structure of the board and its activities on firm performance post MCCG 2007. The study also aims to shed light on the effectiveness of the board of directors since the issuance of MCCG 2000 and of MCCG 2007. It also aims to reveal the preparedness of listed firms in Malaysia to embrace MCCG 2012. Using a population of non-finance listed firms for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 financial years, it was found that board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, directors’ busyness, nomination committee independence, the establishment of a risk management committee (RMC) and board meetings are not associated with firm performance, i.e. Tobin’s q. However, the market appears to be in favour of a larger board size. As for return on assets (ROA), it is not associated with board independence, board size, directors’ busyness and nomination committee independence. On the other hand CEO duality and the establishment of a RMC improve ROA, while board meetings are detrimental to ROA. It can therefore be concluded that board independence is not associated with either Tobin’s q or ROA. Hence, any corporate governance reforms should not over-emphasize the representation of independent directors on the board, rather the focus might be shifted to board activities, such as board meetings and the establishment of a RMC. With regard to board size, since the market is in favour of a larger board size, firms should increase the board’s size to enable the appointment of women directors to the board. Finally, combining the CEO and board chairman roles should not be disallowed as the market views this favourably. Hence, the ‘one-hat approach’ does not appear to be applicable in the case of CEO duality.

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