South Korea-US alliance will weather Chinese pressure

Significance Along with the stabbing of the US ambassador to Seoul by a South Korean activist earlier this month, sharp comments from a top US official about Seoul's 'Japan-bashing', and Seoul's potential membership of a new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), this points to new tensions in key regional relationships. Impacts Seoul's foremost challenge, alongside Pyongyang and related, is navigating between its US ally and its neighbour and trade partner, China. Fear of Pyongyang, plus annoyance at Beijing's hectoring, mean that Seoul may agree to host a missile defence battery. Parlous Seoul-Tokyo relations seriously worry Washington, but Park's falling popularity makes it hard to reverse her unbending stance.

Significance This is the first state visit extended to a Japanese prime minister since Junichiro Koizumi's in 2006 under the George W Bush administration. Abe was awarded the honour on April 29 of being the first Japanese prime minister to address together both houses of the US Congress. Impacts Abe has strengthened the military alliance, but fulfilling his promises to Washington will cost him political capital at home. History issues are increasingly able to cause Abe problems in the United States as well as East Asia. The economic alliance is shakier than the military one; the US Congress may still delay the TPP. Tokyo and Washington look isolated as the TPP stalls and regional governments sign up to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.


Subject The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance Since July 2014, China has overseen the establishment of three development finance institutions: the New Development Bank ('BRICS bank'), the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As well as its geopolitical implications, this reshaping of the international financial architecture also represents a shift in the predominant model of development finance. The AIIB will grant Beijing greater influence over international finance, but it also compels China to develop a more financially sustainable, long-term foreign investment strategy through multilateral, transparent and rules-based mechanisms. Impacts China's domestic 'Go West' strategy and inter-provincial rebalancing will receive a significant boost. Regional bond market integration through the Asian Bond Markets Initiative will experience positive spill-over. The ADB will assume a role of providing technical expertise, and turn towards other priorities. China will simultaneously develop parallel development financing mechanisms to pursue more overtly political goals.


Subject ASEAN core countries and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) plans to begin lending in early 2016. Three ASEAN countries -- Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines -- have not signed the bank's articles of agreement, despite their infrastructure development needs. These needs will grow as ASEAN integrates, for instance via the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) free trade area from end-2015. Impacts Should Manila reject the AIIB, this will create an opening for further Japanese support of Philippines infrastructure. Early credibility among lenders could lead to the AIIB's rapid expansion in Asia. Until then, established development lenders will dominate -- the AIIB is untested.


Subject New developments in China-South Korea economic relations. Significance China and South Korea have one of the most important bilateral economic relationships. Politics trumped economics when China imposed de facto sanctions in response to South Korea's hosting of the US military's THAAD missile defence system -- but there are more fundamental changes underway, too. Impacts South Korean companies will be more cautious about investing in China and will further diversify their investment destinations. South Korea's government and firms will work harder to develop South-East Asian markets for the country's tourism and creative industries. Links will develop further between Chinese and South Korean firms within cross-border technological chains. Overall volumes of bilateral trade will continue to increase, regardless of political tension and economic rivalry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801877003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira

What makes states join intergovernmental organizations intended to challenge a hegemon? The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), founded in June 2015, targets the primacy of the US-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the Asia-Pacific region, and is a crucial case for answering this question. I argue that early AIIB members are likely to be politically distant from the US in both international and domestic terms. In contrast, subsequent states seeking AIIB membership include democratic states, existing ADB members and countries internationally aligned with the US, as measured by voting similarity at the United Nations General Assembly. Through logit models, I test these propositions and analyze which states adhered to the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding that signaled Beijing’s willingness to form the Bank and which states joined the AIIB subsequently at its foundation in 2015. The results support my claim that early members tend to score low in democratic governance, while late members are US allies.


Subject The United Kingdom's decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance On March 12, UK finance minister George Osborne announced that the United Kingdom had applied to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) announced by China last year. It was the first large US ally to do so. An unnamed White House official told a journalist that Washington was frustrated about London's "constant accommodation" with Beijing. These developments have sparked fears in some quarters that China's rise could drive a wedge between Washington and its closest friends. Impacts Cooperating with China to reform international financial institutions -- in consultation with Washington -- is a longstanding UK objective. UK objectives vis-a-vis China reflect the sometimes-conflicting priorities of a diverse electorate; they go beyond trade. Boosting trade currently enjoys high-level political favour, but will not be the priority indefinitely or in every policy area.


Subject Prospects for global infrastructure in the fourth quarter. Significance Major agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) need to be accompanied by port and other logistics infrastructure expansions if they are to boost trade substantially in the developing world. New funding sources such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will help in the long term. Yet smaller trade volumes, linked to China's cooling growth, could lead to short-term overcapacity.


Significance Professing fury at the exercises, Pyongyang insulted South Korean President Moon Jae-in and says it will no longer talk to Seoul. The South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers met today in Beijing, amid worsening bilateral relations. South Korea’s presidential office said today that it will review “until the last moment” whether or not to renew the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Tokyo, set to expire on August 24. Impacts With 'face' at stake and populist passions aroused, palpable economic pain may be necessary before Japan and South Korea de-escalate. Pyongyang’s recent flurry of missile tests indicates impatience; longer-range missiles might dent the US president’s professed indifference. A recent top-level North Korean military visit to China signifies a new field of cooperation. North Korea’s army may be regaining political heft in Pyongyang.


Subject South Korea's international relationships. Significance South Korea’s government is celebrating the success of its response to COVID-19, but the country’s four key foreign relationships all face difficulties -- those with the United States, China, Japan and North Korea. No other countries or regions are vital to Seoul, despite vaunted ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ initiatives. Impacts A prolonged deadlock on funding the US military presence in South Korea could push Seoul closer to Beijing. If President Xi Jinping visits South Korea later this year, Washington could easily misread this. Substantial fence-mending with Japan may have to await new leaderships in both countries. South Korean President Moon Jae-in may have tacitly given up on North Korea, which has visibly given up on him.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Urdinez

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the motivations behind the accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a focus on the cases of Brazil and Chile.Design/methodology/approachThe author collected data using a case study methodology, primarily through semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and through official government documentation.FindingsThe findings identified that, overall, the Brazilian politicians who made the decision to join the bank had an unclear perception of its economic benefit and believed that the clearest benefit from accession is political (to support China's initiative). After years of domestic political turmoil and economic crisis, Brazil experienced delayed incorporation into the bank, slow ratification processes in the domestic arena and a reduction in its capital commitment. Chilean decision-makers, on the other hand, seemed to have a clearer idea of the benefits from accessing the bank, which explains that their ratification process has been faster and smoother. Yet, a surprising socio-political crisis delayed incorporation into the bank. Both countries have delayed their accession to the bank due to domestic crises.Practical implicationsThree policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, the entry of Latin American countries into the bank reflects the persuasiveness of Chinese diplomacy in this region. Second, the author finds that interviewees are not always able to differentiate the AIIB from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hold the misguided idea that the AIIB is subordinated to the BRI rather than complementary to it. This might set overly high expectations of the benefits of entering the AIIB. Third, the author foresees that the largest potential of the AIIB in Latin America lies in the possibility of participating in co-financed projects, in particular with the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America.Originality/valueResearch on the AIIB has boomed in recent years, yet there are few in-depth studies about Latin American prospective members. The value of this study lies in offering in-depth data for two of the eight prospective members from this region.


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