Japanese conservative messages propagate to moderate users better than their liberal counterparts on Twitter

To examine conservative–liberal differences in the extent to which partisan tweets reach less partisan moderate users in a nonwestern context, we analyzed a network of retweets about former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The analyses consistently demonstrated that partisan tweets originating from the conservative cluster reach a wider range of moderate users than those from the liberal cluster. Network analyses revealed that while the conservative and the liberal clusters’ internal structures were similar, the conservative cluster reciprocated the follows from moderate accounts at a higher rate than the liberal cluster. In addition, moderate accounts reciprocated the conservative cluster’s following at a higher rate than they did for the liberal cluster. The analysis of tweet content showed no difference in the frequency of hashtag use between conservatives and liberals, but there were differences in the use of emotion words and linguistic expressions. In particular, emotion words related to the propagation of messages, such as those expressing “dislike”, were used more frequently by conservatives, while the use of adjectives by conservatives was closer to that of moderate users, indicating that conservative tweets are more palatable for moderate users than liberal tweets.

Integrating CDA with ideological rhetorical criticism in the investigation of Abe Cabinet’s discursive construction in “Indo-Pacific Strategy”

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad concept have been introduced and advocated by various countries. Since the second term of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has been widely promoted. Assisted by corpus linguistics, this paper aims to explore the implicit ideology by providing insight into the context model from CDA perspective, and to decode the discursive construction by combining “ideographs” and “policy triggers” as Ideological Rhetorical Criticism instructed. The study shows these political texts are rich in forms of rhetorical strategies of “routinization”, “hegemony”, “uniformization” and “naturalization” used to construct a discursive system to distinguish “them” from “us”, so that to realize political aims.

Making Sense of Japan’s Export Restrictions against South Korea

Why did Japanese Prime Minister Abe impose controversial export restrictions after rulings by the South Korean Supreme Court on wartime forced laborers? This article answers this question through the lens of domestic symbolism in economic sanctions studies. We argue that domestic political calculations led the Japanese government to adopt hawkish measures against South Korea. Abe wanted to ensure continued support from his constituents and to win the upcoming election. A series of political reforms since the early 1990s have empowered the prime minister and made LDP politicians pay more attention to public opinion than to factional topography. Strong anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public reduced the leadership’s concerns about the audience costs of economic countermeasures. Through an examination of the interplay among various domestic actors over the policy measure, this study provides insights on how domestic symbolism can serve as an origin of foreign policy decision-making in democracies.

Evolution of Japanese security policy and the House of Councilors

Japanese security policy has undergone a significant degree of evolution since the early 1990s. As a result, the range of responses Japan can make in international crisis has significantly expanded. The gradual evolution and expansion of the Japanese security policy culminated in the legislation of security-related bills under the second Abe administration in September 2015. The security-related bills dramatically transformed Japanese security policy as it allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective defense when certain conditions are met. The gradual change of Japanese security policy has so far gathered much academic attention. There is a strong claim in the existing literature on Japanese security policy that changes in security policies became possible because of reforms in domestic institutions, which had expanded the Japanese prime minister's power. It is the contention of this article that the Japanese prime minister is still faced with severe constraints from the Diet, in particular from the House of Councilors even after a series of institutional reforms has empowered Japanese prime ministers to significantly alter Japanese security policy. It demonstrates that as the House of Councilors has significant power in the Japanese political system, some Japanese prime ministers had to have the implementation of some security policies delayed or was driven to revise some policies they had originally envisioned through several case studies.

Passive Revolution in Japan: The Restoration of Hegemony under Abe?

This article draws on Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution to explore the second tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō from 2012 to 2020. It sees the high degree of political stability that Abe achieved as a contrast to the preceding two decades of Japanese politics and asks what accounts for Abe’s success in restoring Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) dominance in an era of enduring economic and social crisis. The article argues that Abe executed a strategy of passive revolution that incorporated two “faces”: an “outward” face oriented around consent and an “inward” face rooted in coercion. The former involved economic policies (in particular “Abenomics”) designed to appear capable of resolving chronic economic stagnation, growing inequality and other social and economic problems, restoring popular support for the LDP without undermining conditions for capital accumulation or empowering subaltern classes. In contrast, the latter involved various low-profile security and administrative policies that enabled the Abe government to dramatically increase its power while silencing or disarming potential rivals and critics. The article sees this two-sided strategy of passive revolution as effective in restoring LDP dominance but unlikely to prove the basis for a more expansive hegemony or a resolution to Japan’s organic crisis.

Back to Strategic Competition? Assessing Japan’s Emerging China Policy under the Suga Administration

While Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide pledged to loyally inherit Abe Shinzo’s foreign policy, his administration’s emerging policy has undergone a major shift in recent months. The new foreign policy has swayed from one that is relatively more independent and balanced to one that is more responsive to America’s competitive China policy, an intensive security agenda, tightened scrutiny of economic and technological cooperation with China, and open intervention in issues that China deems as domestic affairs. This article seeks to make an initial assessment of the nature, scope and prospects of the Suga administration’s China policy.

Japan’s Policy on Net Carbon Neutrality by 2050

Japan eventually joined the 2050 net carbon neutrality club soon after the Suga administration emerged. What are the primary drivers of Japan’s decision and why this timing? This article argues that the interactions of domestic and international factors can explain this policy change in the context of global competition over energy transition and technological breakthroughs to mitigate climate change. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s move was almost an established policy line brewed during the predecessor government.

The Policymaking Process in Japan

Long into the postwar period, the policymaking power of the Japanese prime minister was limited. The cabinet’s collective responsibility did not allow him to control the executive branch independently from the cabinet. The Cabinet Law divided the executive power among cabinet ministers, allowing the sectionalism that developed among different ministries. As a result, a bureaucratic supremacy developed in the policymaking process. The long-time governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), also developed a decentralized, bottom-up policymaking structure. As a result, the prime minister had difficulty exercising strong leadership in government decision-making. This situation changed after the 1994 electoral reform, which encouraged Diet members to become policy generalists and weakened the influence of the LDP policy subcommittees. Further, the administrative reform efforts under the Ryūtarō Hashimoto cabinet strengthened the authority of the prime minister and his cabinet. Benefiting from these institutional changes, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi introduced a top-down policymaking process. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) governments in 2009–2012 tried to further strengthen political leadership in policymaking. However, instead of political leadership, they created a weak bureaucracy with lowered moral. During the second Shinzō Abe government, the prime minister successfully established the cabinet-led policymaking system.

Emerging Challenges of Japan’s Cooperative Approach to China

The administration of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe implemented a strategy understood as a “dual approach” that proactively promotes economic cooperation with China. What kind of economic cooperation will Abe’s successor, Yoshihide Suga, implement with China in the context of the escalating competition over security? In 2018, Japan–China Third Country Business Cooperation (TCBC) project was launched treating China as an equal partner. However, Japan and China have different concepts of “economic cooperation” under the TCBC framework, leading to discrepancies in their expectations.