Muslim Brotherhood will survive the Middle East crisis

Subject Mapping the Muslim Brotherhood. Significance Doha’s support, whether tacit or active, for Islamist groups in the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, alienated it from some Arab neighbours. The recent boycott by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt is party driven by their own problems with local Brotherhood affiliates that were linked to the broader political reform movement during the 2011 Arab uprisings. Impacts Brotherhood affiliates will be significant military players in conflict-torn Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In parliamentary systems, cooperation with secular opposition will be increasingly important to countering international terrorism charges. The Muslim Brotherhood’s transnational links will become more personal and less institutional.

Significance Islamist movements saw rapid political successes in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, but this was followed by the brutal repression of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from July 2013. The movement has now been formally banned in Egypt (since December 2013), Saudi Arabia (since March 2014), and the United Arab Emirates (since November 2014). However, Islamists elsewhere are proving to be highly adaptable. Impacts The fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is still pushing Islamist movements in the region to act cautiously and pragmatically. Behind the scenes, Islamist leaders are divided as they try to revise their ideologies to accommodate the new post-2011 politics. Despite widespread challenges, Islamists are likely to remain important political actors across the region for years to come.


Subject UAE politics and internal security. Significance In a turbulent region, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a rare island of stability. Yet rising concern about Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State group (ISG) has led to mass arrests and an assertive foreign policy in recent years. The internal stability outlook will also be determined by leadership transitions in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the relationship between these two emirates, and popular reactions to economic adjustments to low oil prices. Impacts There is a small but real risk of terrorist attacks, but any incidents are unlikely to harm the business environment. Abu Dhabi and Dubai's differences over Iran will remain challenging in the post-sanctions environment. Differences with Saudi Arabia over the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen could become serious if southern Yemen tries to secede.


Author(s):  
Marina Calculli ◽  
Matteo Legrenzi

This chapter examines the Middle East’s security dilemmas by reconsidering the balance of power and threats in light of the Arab Spring. Although external actors are still important, as is regime security, in this balance, an important feature of the current scene is the ‘securitization of identities’ whereby rival regimes mobilize different identities to preserve and consolidate their positions against the destabilizing effects of change. The chapter also explores the emergence of a region-based rivalry between monarchies and republics and how they were affected by the Arab uprisings; the strategic competition between Sunni and Shia Islam; and the impact of the ‘Shia crescent’ from 2003 to the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways that competition among rival Sunni regimes in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings has been ideologically shaped in terms of support for/opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.


Subject Islamist movements in the smaller GCC states. Significance The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings placed political Islam at the centre of political debate in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc. Qatar's support for Islamists abroad was unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who consider the group to pose a serious threat to both the regional status quo and their domestic monopoly on power. Local Islamist movements remain a force within the smaller GCC states of Qatar, Kuwait and UAE. Governments have significantly adapted their approach to them in response to the Arab uprisings and the subsequent rise of the Islamic State group (ISG). Impacts Differences over Islamist movements impede GCC cooperation on regional policy and security. Longer-term, Islamists would be one of the main beneficiaries of any constitutional reforms that open up political space in the GCC. Sectarian conflict in the region and tougher economic conditions at home may reinforce conservative religious sentiment in the Gulf. The UAE will maintain the toughest policies, while Kuwait and Qatar will pursue more lenient approaches.


Significance This comes following high tensions with teachers, who engaged in a series of widespread protests after the Attorney-General ordered the closure of the Teachers' Union and forcible dissolution of its leadership on July 25. There were scores of arrests and an unprecedented reporting ban. Impacts The government will lack capacity to fulfil economic pledges made to public sector workers in 2019. Further setbacks to the much-delayed political reform process will complicate Western pledges of financial support. If November elections are compromised, the current government of Omar al-Razzaz could face dissolution. Negotiations for Emirati aid could lead to harsher measures against the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkish or Qatari influence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-428
Author(s):  
Effrosyni Georgiadou ◽  
Catherine Nickerson

PurposeCommunicating CSR through corporate websites is one of the most effective ways for organizations to inform and engage stakeholders, earn legitimacy and reap the intangible and tangible benefits of practicing CSR. However, in emerging economies in the Middle East, online CSR disclosure remains limited while corporate websites are not used effectively as strategic tools. This study explores online CSR communication (CSRC) by banks in the dynamic, emerging economy of the United Arab Emirates.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses an adaptation of the analytical framework used by Chaudhri and Wang (2007) to examine the prominence and extent of the CSR information on the corporate websites of domestic and global banks in the UAE. It further compares domestic and global banks' CSRC patterns as well as domestic/government-owned versus private banks and conventional versus Islamic banks.FindingsAbout 70% of the domestic banks in the UAE provide information about their CSR activities. CSR information is moderately to highly prominent for the majority of the domestic banks, but the extent of the information presented is minimal (1–2 pages). Domestic/government-owned and conventional banks communicate their CSR more prominently and extensively than private and Islamic banks. Domestic/government-owned banks tend to follow the CSRC patterns observed in global banks.Originality/valueDespite the increasingly important role of the United Arab Emirates within the Middle East as well as on the global business arena, very little is known about whether and how companies in the country approach CSR. This is the first study focusing on CSRC within the entirety of a single business sector within the United Arab Emirates.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Duguid

The need for social change has been recognized by most of the politically important forces in the Middle East today, but differences remain concerning its implementation. These differences are centered on the type of change and the rate at which it should take place. There are three basic social groups taking part in this conflict; the traditional elements of society, typified by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, many of the ruling families, and large sections of the peasant population; the ‘modern’ man of the liberal era such as evolutionary–liberalist politicians, doctors, landowners, bureaucrats, merchants, and the like; and the ‘modern’ men of the era of technology (material-scientific) such as army officers, agronomists, planners and industrialists.


Significance King Mohammed VI has committed forces to the Saudi-led coalition conducing operations in Yemen to reinforce the alliance with Gulf states. It may be because of these ties that Morocco's Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) survived the regional political backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood -- with which the PJD has some parallels, but no formal links. Prime Minister and PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane has developed a close working relationship with King Mohammed and the royal court. With the economy performing well, Benkirane's chances of prolonging his mandate look promising. Impacts Local elections will signal the level of popular support for the PJD. If Benkirane retains the premiership post-2016, he may seek a more prominent role for the PJD -- in cabinet and the civil service. This could bring him into conflict with the king.


Subject Civil society protest movements in Iraq and Lebanon. Significance Protest movements in the Middle East have been curtailed severely by retrenched autocratic governments and civil wars since the Arab uprisings in 2011. With their relatively open political systems, Lebanon and Iraq never participated in these protests fully. However, over the past year they have seen a resurgence in grassroots politics that could influence civil society across the region. Impacts Protest movements provide an outlet for popular frustration; their repression increases the risk of longer-term political instability. Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have the most favourable conditions for a revival of civil society protest movements. Such movements could play a larger role in Yemen, Libya and Syria after conflicts have ended. In the longer run, these movements could benefit business in the region by driving efforts to fight corruption and improve transparency.


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