Middle East repression fears drive Islamist pragmatism

Significance Islamist movements saw rapid political successes in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, but this was followed by the brutal repression of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from July 2013. The movement has now been formally banned in Egypt (since December 2013), Saudi Arabia (since March 2014), and the United Arab Emirates (since November 2014). However, Islamists elsewhere are proving to be highly adaptable. Impacts The fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is still pushing Islamist movements in the region to act cautiously and pragmatically. Behind the scenes, Islamist leaders are divided as they try to revise their ideologies to accommodate the new post-2011 politics. Despite widespread challenges, Islamists are likely to remain important political actors across the region for years to come.

Subject Mapping the Muslim Brotherhood. Significance Doha’s support, whether tacit or active, for Islamist groups in the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, alienated it from some Arab neighbours. The recent boycott by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt is party driven by their own problems with local Brotherhood affiliates that were linked to the broader political reform movement during the 2011 Arab uprisings. Impacts Brotherhood affiliates will be significant military players in conflict-torn Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In parliamentary systems, cooperation with secular opposition will be increasingly important to countering international terrorism charges. The Muslim Brotherhood’s transnational links will become more personal and less institutional.


Significance The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s five-year term ended on May 31. PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif faces a tough fight to become prime minister, with the main challenge set to come from Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and further opposition provided by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Impacts With Khan as prime minister, the military would likely have free rein to pursue an anti-India foreign policy. Khan would step up his criticisms of the war in Afghanistan and likely have a difficult relationship with US President Donald Trump. Pakistan under any government will pursue balanced diplomacy in the Middle East, seeking good ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.


Subject Islamist movements in the smaller GCC states. Significance The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings placed political Islam at the centre of political debate in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc. Qatar's support for Islamists abroad was unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who consider the group to pose a serious threat to both the regional status quo and their domestic monopoly on power. Local Islamist movements remain a force within the smaller GCC states of Qatar, Kuwait and UAE. Governments have significantly adapted their approach to them in response to the Arab uprisings and the subsequent rise of the Islamic State group (ISG). Impacts Differences over Islamist movements impede GCC cooperation on regional policy and security. Longer-term, Islamists would be one of the main beneficiaries of any constitutional reforms that open up political space in the GCC. Sectarian conflict in the region and tougher economic conditions at home may reinforce conservative religious sentiment in the Gulf. The UAE will maintain the toughest policies, while Kuwait and Qatar will pursue more lenient approaches.


Subject Saudi-Emirati strategic partnership. Significance The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are accelerating their strategic partnership. On June 6 they held the inaugural meeting of the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council (SECC), signalling increased assertiveness and a deliberate turning-away from the wider Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The partnership has become pivotal for the region but has delivered mixed results. Impacts The new SECC will eclipse the troubled GCC as the driver of Gulf policies and may deter US efforts to convene a GCC summit in September. Excluded Kuwait and Oman may look for other regional ties, as they face increasing pressure from the Saudi-Emirati duo. The two countries’coordination against Iran will define long-term alliances in the Middle East region.


2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivian W.Y. Tam ◽  
S.X. Zeng

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship among cultural values, using the dimension of power distance (PD), and employee job satisfaction in engineering firms in United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Design/methodology/approach – A well-known leading survey design, the Value Survey Module 94 developed by Hofstede (1980), is used in measuring PD as a quantitative methodology in the form of a questionnaire survey in UAE and Saudi Arabia. Findings – Power distance index (PDI) show variation not only at country level, but also at firm level. Consultative is found to be the most preferred manager type by the employees. Employees perceiving their managers to be consultative are the least afraid of disagreement with their managers. “Work”, “co-workers” and “operating procedures” find to be the major job satisfaction facets while “opportunities for promotion” and “reward” are the least attracted to job satisfaction. Age is found positively correlated with “pay”, “work”, “opportunities for promotion” and “benefits”. “Work” and educational qualification of the employees are negatively correlated but no significant correlations appear to exist with other job satisfaction facets. No significant correlation existed between education level and PDI is found. Originality/value – This paper is one of the first studies on PD and job satisfaction in UAE and Saudi Arabia. This can provide significant insight of how the Middle East countries, UAE and Saudi Arabia, react with globalization in the recent years. Recommendations for improving the existing job satisfaction in the Middle East countries are also explored.


Subject Islamist movements. Significance One of the key issues facing policymakers globally, as well as the wider public, is the phenomenon of religiously inspired politics from Muslim communities. This is commonly described as 'Islamism', but the phrase is used as a catch-all label for quite different types of movement. Impacts Indiscriminate crackdowns against non-violent Salafi movements could end up radicalising their supporters. In Saudi Arabia, Salafi religious authorities will continue to encourage a more conservative society than elsewhere in the region. Internal challenges to Salafism within Saudi Arabia could eventually alter the country's religious outlook.


Significance The two-day visit has not averted the growing confrontation between Turkey on one hand and the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other. This is forming a new and important cleavage in the politics of the Middle East. Impacts Turkish exports to the Gulf countries look vulnerable. Turkey will avoid allowing its political differences with Saudi Arabia to affect business links. Saudi investments in Turkey, at about 6 billion dollars, will be a stabilising factor. Joint ventures in the arms industry could be the main casualties.


Subject Middle East hydrocarbons routes. Significance Geopolitical uncertainty is increasing in the Middle East due to the confrontation between Iran and its Arab neighbours, and the internal splits within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These include the breach between Qatar and the group of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain; as well as -- to a much lesser extent -- the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone dispute. Impacts Hormuz access will always be indispensable to Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Iran itself. Competition will increase around the Bab al-Mandab -- a key secondary energy transit route -- among Turkey, Egypt, Iran and the GCC states. The boycott of Qatar by its neighbours will complicate and weaken Arab countries’ responses to Iran and to higher oil prices.


Significance The summit is the focus of rising speculation that the 30-month rift between Qatar and fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain may be nearing an end. Security concerns after the September 14 attacks on Saudi oil installations attributed to Iran are motivating GCC rulers to de-escalate regional tensions. Impacts Improved relations may re-energise the regionwide implementation of value-added tax, originally planned for 2018. A GCC revival will strengthen but not transform defence cooperation, which continued under the US-led Middle East Strategic Alliance. Gulf states' concerns about Iran could also help to resolve aspects of the conflict in Yemen.


Significance Indian nationals are struggling to maintain jobs in the Middle East as GCC states contend with historically low oil prices as well as the economic fallout of the pandemic. Gulf countries have meanwhile expressed concern at what they regard as growing anti-Muslim sentiment in India. Impacts Pakistan will step up efforts to gather support from GCC countries regarding the Kashmir issue. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will increase investment in India’s health and tech sectors. The number of Indian migrant workers in South-east Asia, Australia and Canada will gradually increase.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document