Armed opposition disputes threaten Ethiopian stability

Significance The development was met with silence from the OLF leadership and little fanfare from the government, even though the two sides had been involved in rising conflict over recent months, with disarmament at the centre of the dispute. Impacts If the OLF remains militarily active, other returned armed groups could reassess their options. The lack of credible commitments between former armed groups and the government could undermine the agreements between them. Rebel activism along ethnic lines could deepen inter-communal mistrust and lead to ethnic violence and further displacements. Deepening violence in Oromia, the largest of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal states, could destabilise the entire country.

Subject Outlook for Myanmar's ceasefire process after eight ethnic armed groups agreed to sign up. Significance Myanmar's government will sign a ceasefire agreement on October 15. Despite the deal's "nationwide" title it covers only eight of 15 ethnic armed groups, raising security and political concerns ahead of national elections on November 8. Impacts The government will push for current non-signatory ethnic armed groups to join the ceasefire. The National League for Democracy will foster links with ethnic groups, anticipating the post-election period. The military vote may be used to manipulate the election's result.


Significance The move follows Duque's cancellation of peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) on January 18, after a bomb attack on a Bogota police academy that killed 22. On February 6, Duque announced a new Defence and Security Policy (PDS) ruling out any prospect of bilateral ceasefires with non-state armed groups and launching a renewed focus on hardline security strategies. Impacts A return to open war will undermine hopes of an economic ‘peace dividend’ following the peace process with the FARC. An increase in militarised security policies and forcible coca eradication will lead to more human rights abuse and extrajudicial killings. Increased violence will breed contempt for the government among rural communities, making the removal of armed groups more difficult. With Venezuela’s crisis looking set to worsen, Colombia’s security situation shows little prospect of improvement in the coming years.


Subject Situation regarding Myanmar's ethnic armed organisations. Significance The government and military in Myanmar and leaders of ten ethnically based guerrilla groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) last week pledged to step up their commitment to the peace process, to transform the NCA into a lasting settlement. Several other armed groups are still in conflict with the state, notwithstanding occasional ceasefires. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will very likely retain control over the civilian part of government following this year’s general election, but ethnic parties will probably make parliamentary gains at its expense. Impacts Suu Kyi is very unlikely to face pressure to step down even if the NLD’s parliamentary majority is heavily reduced. Even with increased seat share in parliament, ethnic parties will struggle to influence policy. China and India will double down on their support for the Myanmar military.


Significance The talks are part of the effort to end decades of fighting between Myanmar's military (Tatmadaw) and various ethnic minority armed groups (EMAGs). Impacts Myanmar's government will need further Chinese support to bring north-eastern EMAGs back into the peace process. Vested economic interests will likely complicate reaching any peace deal. The government will have difficulty securing new NCA signatories while managing ties with the FPNCC. Pressure will grow for greater civil society involvement in the Panglong process, including media, hitherto barred.


Subject Myanmar's political landscape ahead of next year's elections. Significance As the next general election appears on the horizon, parliament last month began debating possible amendments to the constitution. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which controls the civilian portion of government, wants to reduce the military’s reserved parliamentary quota. Meanwhile, the NLD faces increased criticism from parties representing the country’s ethnic minorities. Impacts There is unlikely to be any progress in the country's peace process, aimed at ending conflicts between the military and ethnic armed groups. The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party will aim to enhance its internal organisation. As attention turns to the polls, the government will devote even fewer resources than currently to resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis.


Significance The delay, while long-expected, fatally undermines the 'December 31 Agreement', a compromise agreed in 2016 between the government and opposition intended to lead to elections by December 2017. Impacts Despite wider international pressure, regional governments will not intervene unless the crisis spills over borders. Deteriorating relations with donors will further slow election progress, as domestic election funding falls short of needs. Armed groups may seek to capitalise on national issues to further local agendas.


Subject Conflict resolution in Sudan's Two Areas. Significance Peace talks on February 1-4 between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM/N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu failed to reach a relatively limited deal on a cessation of hostilities and provision of humanitarian assistance. While many outside observers had held high hopes for the talks, the outcome suggests that, even if conflict may remain limited for now, peace is a long way off. Impacts Hilu’s attempts to extend collaboration with other opposition forces, especially Darfur armed groups, will have little material impact. The government will use the military lull to seek outside patronage to bolster the economy and defuse austerity protests. Humanitarian conditions in the Two Areas will continue to worsen.


Significance The Syrian pound’s weakening beyond 1,000 to the dollar on the parallel market has exposed the chronic weakness of the economy, even as President Bashar al-Assad’s forces move ever closer to realising his goal of winning back control over the entire country. The government and central bank have maintained the official rate and resorted to a mixture of deterrents and inducements, seeking to stem the currency slide. Impacts The pressure on the parallel exchange market will push up living costs, despite government efforts to control prices. The government’s first issue of Treasury bills since 2011 will help finance the fiscal deficit but have limited impact on the exchange rate. The clampdown on informal transactions and suspension of licensed exchange houses may not draw more foreign exchange into official channels. Assad may seek to restore relations with Gulf countries to garner financial support, possibly in return for loosening ties with Iran.


Significance MONUSCO on February 11 had already halted its support for the planned offensive, linking its decision to concerns over human rights abuse allegations against two Congolese generals tasked with leading the operations. Tensions between the government and its main international partners come at a time of growing instability in the eastern provinces, threatening to reverse gains made since the 2013 defeat of the main rebel group in the Kivu provinces, the M23 Movement. Impacts The UN is the international donor community's main entry point into DRC, making it a key diplomatic pawn. MONUSCO is unlikely to withdraw completely given the range of security and development functions it offers. However, its offensive role against armed groups through the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) will become increasingly political.


Significance The clashes come shortly after the government on May 15 signed a new agreement -- the Algiers Accord -- with northern armed groups. The major Tuareg rebel groups allied under the name of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) did not sign it. President Ibraham Boubacar Keita (IBK) and the mediation have said that the accord will remain open for non-signatories to join, but their visions for northern Mali's future are vastly different. Impacts Attacks on MINUSMA and French troops will continue where they are regarded as threatening to the influence of local groups. Those groups with little representation in Algiers, or more radical self-proclaimed Islamist groups, will continue to use violence. Presidential and parliamentary elections -- last held in 2013 after the 2012 coup -- are unlikely to be held before 2018.


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