Boko Haram violence in northern Cameroon will persist

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Far North ◽  
The Past ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
Northern Cameroon

Significance The attack comes amid growing insecurity in the Far North region over the past year. Residents in Cameroon's north are increasingly the most vulnerable in the Lake Chad Basin to attacks by Boko Haram’s factions, suggesting that some of these are increasingly dependent on their cross-border activities for resources and recruits. Impacts Washington will pressure Yaounde further over its poor human rights record amid rising bipartisan congressional criticism. The Multinational Joint Task Force remains unwilling or unable to degrade Boko Haram in the Far North, undermining touted regional progress. Cameroon’s land border closures appear to have had little or no effect on the illicit movement of goods and people.

scholarly journals National Interests and Regional Security in the Lake Chad: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force

2020 ◽  
pp. 40-49
Author(s):  
Ifeanyichukwu Micheal Abada ◽  
Charles Akale ◽  
Kingsley Chigozie Udegbunam ◽  
Olihe A. Ononogbu
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Security Architecture ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Joint Task Force

This article assessed security architecture for counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The paper diagnosed the impact of conflicting national interests of contributing nations on the performance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security architecture in the LCB. Some scholars and analysts cite corruption, historical contradictions among LCB members, poor funding, and complex nature of the insurgency, as factors responsible for failure of counter-insurgency operations in the LCB. Others contend that resource geopolitics, linguistic differences, and hegemonic politics have impacted negatively on the capacity of the MNJTF to decimate terrorists in the region. This is a qualitative study that draws from the Fund for Peace, International Crisis Group (ICG), Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and research literature dealing with national interest and military alliances, while using content analysis to argue that conflicts in national interests, more than any other factor, have hampered the collaborative efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and weakened the capacity of the MNJTF to engage in robust counterinsurgency against Boko Haram in the LCB.

Deby will face underlying tensions in Chad

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
The Past ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Effective Deterrent

Significance On the instructions of President Idriss Deby, the Independent National Electoral Commission set April 11, 2021 for the next presidential elections and October 24 the same year for legislative elections that have been delayed repeatedly. Deby then partly reshuffled his cabinet on July 14, the most notable move being the appointment of Amine Abba Siddick as foreign minister. Siddick, previously ambassador to France, has been a key player in improving French-Chadian relations over the past three years. Impacts Deby's re-election will draw an outcry from various rebel groups, but none of them appears to pose a serious threat to him. The counter-strike against Boko Haram appears an effective deterrent, but the group's operations in Chad have long been intermittent. Deby, with close ties to Paris, will maintain his pre-eminence among political and security actors in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

scholarly journals Multinational Joint Task Force’s Fight against Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
African Union ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
North East ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Basin Region

Describing north east Nigeria without making mention of insurgency would be incomplete, as the resurgence of insurgent groups particularly Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād commonly refered to as Boko Haram have wreaked havoc in the region for close to 12 years. In response to the activities of insurgent groups, the African Union Peace and Security Council and the authority of the Lake Chad Basin Commission moved to expand the mandate of the MNJJT to include counter insurgency. The task force is made up of orcesrom Cameroon, Chad,Niger Nigeria and Benin republic. The task force have been able to make considerable gains against insurgency, however, insurgency still remains a major challenge in the region, which makes necessary an appraisal of the task force in justifying the purpose of its creation. The study reveals major challenges like inadequate technical knowhow, inadequate funding amongst others threatens the operations of the MNJTF. The paper recommends that military response is solely incapable of addressing insurgency, member States need to re-examine counter insurgency policies to be multidimensional.

scholarly journals Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-134
Author(s):  
Modu Lawan Gana
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Participant Observation ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
The People ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
The Government

Since the year 2013, Nigeria’s northeastern region epicenter of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency waging war for the establishment of an Islamic State has witnessed mass participation of people in a civil militia group. The militia group colloquially describing itself Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to combat the Boko Haram rebellion. Perhaps, the participation of the CJTF in the combating activities was reportedly influential in reducing the Boko Haram hostilities in most communities. Prior to the CJTF, the counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian governments’ Special Joint Task Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Member States of Lake Chad Basin Commission was faced with lackadaisical performances. Whereas the CJTF was reportedly successful, however, the interrupted participation of the people despite the attendant human and material cost has risen suspicion among the population and the critical literature about the groups’ true motivation. This article, therefore, investigated the motivations of the CJTF in northeastern Nigeria. The study was conducted through a qualitative approach designed in a case study. The data was collected from thirteen informants from three groups - CJTF, Community Leaders and State/Local Government authorities. The technique of data collection is in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The finding revealed personal incentive factors of monetary/material gains, and the futuristic interest of employability drives peoples’ participation. To address the economic interests of the CJTF and as a panacea to prevent the manifestation of the security threats associated with the CJTF group, the study recommends for the establishment of charity centers to receive contributions from well to do citizens to ameliorate the economic needs of the participants. The government should also propound strong legal mechanisms to regulate the activities of the CJTF militia.

Radicalisation exposure varies among Sahel states

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Support ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Local Populations ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
Border Areas ◽  
New Challenges

Significance The visit follows Buhari's earlier trips to Chad and Niger. Over June and July, Nigeria's neighbours have experienced a rise in Boko Haram attacks. The uptick comes in reaction to the progress made by the regional military coalition between Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroon against Boko Haram during the first four months of this year. However, the escalation poses new challenges for the governments in N'Djamena, Yaounde and Niamey. Impacts The 8,700-strong Multi-National Joint Task Force should be consolidated shortly, although dates on a renewed surge have not been announced. Contributor countries are seeking more international material and financial support for the campaign. Heavy-handed tactics by the armies in their own border areas may alienate some local populations.

Arrival of the Caliphate’s Soldiers in West Africa

2018 ◽  
pp. 411-414
Author(s):  
Wilāyat Gharb Ifriqiyā
Keyword(s):  
West Africa ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Public Image ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Major Focus ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Joint Task Force

(2 JUNE 2015) [Trans.: Abdulbasit Kassim] Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/06/02/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-arrivals-of-the-soldiers-of-the-caliphate-in-west-africa-wilayat-gharb-ifriqiyyah/ A mark of the post-allegiance to ISIS period for Boko Haram is the lowered profile of Shekau, who ceases to be the major focus of its public image. In this video, the two speakers alluded to the escalation of the conflict between Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Benin. While mentioning the tensions and the context of distrust between Nigeria and her neighbors, the first speaker referred to the comment of the Chadian president, when he said that the fight against Boko Haram is being hampered by poor co-ordination between Chad and Nigeria. He also gave further information of the activities within the caliphate as well as detailed information concerning the soldiers killed in various clashes. This video should be understood within the context of Boko Haram’s display of resilience against the operations of the MNJTF...

STRATEGY OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE MILITIA IN COMBATING BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-360
Author(s):  
Modu Lawan Gana
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Participant Observation ◽  
Northern Region ◽  
Study Data ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Intelligence Gathering ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
The Government ◽  
Inclusive Governance

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.

UK defence review presages global capability upgrade

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Negative Impact ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Transitional Period ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Civilian Workforce ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Defence Spending ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
State Group

Significance SDSR 2015 revealed significant defence commitment decisions. Many of these correct choices made in the preceding SDSR 2010, and constitute an implicit recognition that the government's previous emphasis on cuts and savings may have been an error. Impacts The SDSR will boost Cameron's effort to win parliamentary backing for UK air strikes against Islamic State group (ISG) in Syria. UK-French cooperation will grow, including joint development of a combat drone, and a 10,000-strong Combined Joint Task Force due in 2016. Equipment decisions will boost firms including Lockeed Martin and Boeing (US), Dassault (France) and BAE, Rolls Royce and Babcock (UK). Higher defence spending, especially on replacing all four Trident nuclear submarines, will heighten political arguments over defence issues. A planned 30% cut to the Ministry of Defence's civilian workforce will have a negative impact, at least for a transitional period.

Non-State Security Groups and Their Role in Countering Boko Haram Terrorism in North East Region of Nigeria

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-96
Author(s):  
Jude A. Momodu
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
State Security ◽  
North East ◽  
The North ◽  
East Region ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Good Account ◽  
Joint Task Force

Abstract Non state security groups (NSSGs) have become prominent in contemporary theatres of armed conflicts around the world whether for good or bad. In the North East Region of Nigeria for instance, NSSGs such as vigilantes, hunters and civilian joint task force have given a very good account of themselves in countering the violent activities of Boko Haram terrorists. This article makes a major contribution to the contemporary research works on the role of NSSGs in countering the Boko Haram terrorism as it examines their role, successes and the threats they pose to the ongoing efforts at countering the Boko Haram terrorism and the efforts towards rebuilding the region. The study, also advocates for the incorporation of members of NSSGs that have undergone character vetting into a community or state policing structure with a view to complementing the official government security architecture towards improving peace and security in the North East region.

Out of the Shadows: The Women Countering Insurgency in Nigeria

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Agbiboa
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Community Attachment ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Family Ties ◽  
Suicide Bombers ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Joint Task Force ◽  
Knowledge Brokers ◽  
And Gender

Abstract Moving beyond the focus on violence against women and violence committed by women, this article interrogates violence countered by women. The article sheds new light on the gendered practices of counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria, with critical attention to why women joined the civilian resistance to the Boko Haram insurgency and their complex role and agency as local security providers. Using the voices and lifeworlds of women who joined the Civilian Joint Task Force (yan gora) in Borno State as well as the Vigilante Group Nigeria and Hunters Association (kungiya marhaba) in Adamawa State, the article underscores the layered and gender-bending role of women as frontline fighters, knowledge brokers, state informants, and producers of vigilante technologies. The article finds that women counterinsurgents mobilized after Boko Haram shifted its strategy toward using female insurgents, especially as suicide bombers. Women joined the war against Boko Haram for complex reasons, including personal loss, revenge, family ties, community attachment, patriotism, and a collective yearning for normalcy.

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