STRATEGY OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE MILITIA IN COMBATING BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-360
Author(s):  
Modu Lawan Gana

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-134
Author(s):  
Modu Lawan Gana

Since the year 2013, Nigeria’s northeastern region epicenter of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency waging war for the establishment of an Islamic State has witnessed mass participation of people in a civil militia group. The militia group colloquially describing itself Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to combat the Boko Haram rebellion. Perhaps, the participation of the CJTF in the combating activities was reportedly influential in reducing the Boko Haram hostilities in most communities. Prior to the CJTF, the counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian governments’ Special Joint Task Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Member States of Lake Chad Basin Commission was faced with lackadaisical performances. Whereas the CJTF was reportedly successful, however, the interrupted participation of the people despite the attendant human and material cost has risen suspicion among the population and the critical literature about the groups’ true motivation. This article, therefore, investigated the motivations of the CJTF in northeastern Nigeria. The study was conducted through a qualitative approach designed in a case study. The data was collected from thirteen informants from three groups - CJTF, Community Leaders and State/Local Government authorities. The technique of data collection is in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The finding revealed personal incentive factors of monetary/material gains, and the futuristic interest of employability drives peoples’ participation. To address the economic interests of the CJTF and as a panacea to prevent the manifestation of the security threats associated with the CJTF group, the study recommends for the establishment of charity centers to receive contributions from well to do citizens to ameliorate the economic needs of the participants. The government should also propound strong legal mechanisms to regulate the activities of the CJTF militia.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-469
Author(s):  
Modu Lawan Gana

Since 2013, the north of Nigeria has witnessed an increased involvement of the militia group ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) in combating the Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram. The mobilization of the Civilian Joint Task Force brought a tremendous success to the counterinsurgency operation. Before the CJTF’s engagement, the antiterrorism efforts of the government were marred by negligent performance. In addition to helping decrease the attack frequencies and number of fatalities caused by the insurgent group, the militia succeeded in expelling Boko Haram fighters from the towns and villages they had previously occupied. However, the unprecedented participation of the Civilian Joint Task Force in the counterinsurgency campaign has raised certain suspicions of the public in regards to the CJTF’s ulterior motives. This paper, therefore, explores the motives that triggered people’s participation in the Civilian Joint Task Force with the aim to combat the Boko Haram insurgent group. The current paper is a qualitative research, designed as a case study. The empirical data were collected by means of an in-depth interview involving 13 respondents, among who were the members of the CJTF, community leaders and government officials in Yobe State, Nigeria. The findings show that people’s participation in the CJTF is voluntary, with the main motivation being the necessity to defend the community due to the state’s failure to provide adequate protection. The article points out an urgent need to demobilize and deradicalize the participants in order to prevent the CJTF from further jeopardizing local communities’ peace and stability.


2018 ◽  
pp. 411-414
Author(s):  
Wilāyat Gharb Ifriqiyā

(2 JUNE 2015) [Trans.: Abdulbasit Kassim] Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/06/02/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-arrivals-of-the-soldiers-of-the-caliphate-in-west-africa-wilayat-gharb-ifriqiyyah/ A mark of the post-allegiance to ISIS period for Boko Haram is the lowered profile of Shekau, who ceases to be the major focus of its public image. In this video, the two speakers alluded to the escalation of the conflict between Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Benin. While mentioning the tensions and the context of distrust between Nigeria and her neighbors, the first speaker referred to the comment of the Chadian president, when he said that the fight against Boko Haram is being hampered by poor co-ordination between Chad and Nigeria. He also gave further information of the activities within the caliphate as well as detailed information concerning the soldiers killed in various clashes. This video should be understood within the context of Boko Haram’s display of resilience against the operations of the MNJTF...


Author(s):  
Ifeanyichukwu Micheal Abada ◽  
Charles Akale ◽  
Kingsley Chigozie Udegbunam ◽  
Olihe A. Ononogbu

This article assessed security architecture for counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The paper diagnosed the impact of conflicting national interests of contributing nations on the performance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security architecture in the LCB. Some scholars and analysts cite corruption, historical contradictions among LCB members, poor funding, and complex nature of the insurgency, as factors responsible for failure of counter-insurgency operations in the LCB. Others contend that resource geopolitics, linguistic differences, and hegemonic politics have impacted negatively on the capacity of the MNJTF to decimate terrorists in the region. This is a qualitative study that draws from the Fund for Peace, International Crisis Group (ICG), Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and research literature dealing with national interest and military alliances, while using content analysis to argue that conflicts in national interests, more than any other factor, have hampered the collaborative efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and weakened the capacity of the MNJTF to engage in robust counterinsurgency against Boko Haram in the LCB.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-96
Author(s):  
Jude A. Momodu

Abstract Non state security groups (NSSGs) have become prominent in contemporary theatres of armed conflicts around the world whether for good or bad. In the North East Region of Nigeria for instance, NSSGs such as vigilantes, hunters and civilian joint task force have given a very good account of themselves in countering the violent activities of Boko Haram terrorists. This article makes a major contribution to the contemporary research works on the role of NSSGs in countering the Boko Haram terrorism as it examines their role, successes and the threats they pose to the ongoing efforts at countering the Boko Haram terrorism and the efforts towards rebuilding the region. The study, also advocates for the incorporation of members of NSSGs that have undergone character vetting into a community or state policing structure with a view to complementing the official government security architecture towards improving peace and security in the North East region.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Agbiboa

Abstract Moving beyond the focus on violence against women and violence committed by women, this article interrogates violence countered by women. The article sheds new light on the gendered practices of counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria, with critical attention to why women joined the civilian resistance to the Boko Haram insurgency and their complex role and agency as local security providers. Using the voices and lifeworlds of women who joined the Civilian Joint Task Force (yan gora) in Borno State as well as the Vigilante Group Nigeria and Hunters Association (kungiya marhaba) in Adamawa State, the article underscores the layered and gender-bending role of women as frontline fighters, knowledge brokers, state informants, and producers of vigilante technologies. The article finds that women counterinsurgents mobilized after Boko Haram shifted its strategy toward using female insurgents, especially as suicide bombers. Women joined the war against Boko Haram for complex reasons, including personal loss, revenge, family ties, community attachment, patriotism, and a collective yearning for normalcy.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Agbiboa

Ce rapport RESOLVE, l’un de trois, cherche à comprendre l’origine, la dynamique et les moteurs des groupes armés communautaires ou GAC (community-based armed groups ou CBAGs) en Afrique. En tant qu’étude exploratoire, ce rapport implique la collecte, l’organisation et la synthèse des informations disponibles sur les acteurs de la sécurité non étatiques et leurs relations avec les communautés locales et les agences officielles de l’État, comme les systèmes d’application de la loi et de justice. Le rapport s’appuie sur des ouvrages académiques qui explorent les relations entre l’État et la société civile, en cherchant à remettre en question les rendus simplistes de ceux-ci en tant qu’entités distinctes avec des frontières clairement définies. Le rapport est également alimenté par des entretiens avec des membres de la Force d’intervention civile conjointe ou FICC (Civilian Joint Task Force ou CJTF), une milice pro- gouvernementale qui aide à repousser la violente insurrection de Boko Haram dans le nord-est du Nigeria.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2 (Supp)) ◽  
pp. 170-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanjay K. Rai ◽  
Sanjay Zodpey ◽  
Sanghamitra Ghosh ◽  
A Kadri

A Joint  Task  Force of eminent public health experts of India was constituted by IPHA, and IAPSM to  help the Government of India for containment of COVID-19 pandemic in the country. The terms of reference of the Joint Task Force was to 1) To review and collate the scientific epidemiological literature pertaining to COVID-19 in India at national and state level; 2) To develop consensus amongst the experts regarding COVID-19 disease epidemiology and trends and develop action plan based on the  consensus; 3) To widely disseminate the consensus statement and action plan with  public health experts, other medical professional associations and other key stakeholders; 4) To share the consensus statement with the policy makers at highest level at centre and state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-57
Author(s):  
Chinyere N. Alimba ◽  
Nemanda Salihu

Boko Haram insurgency is the most devastating experience encountered during Nigeria’s fourth republic. It is therefore imperative to investigate the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency in the country. To achieve the objective of the study, a total of ninety members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) operating in Maiduguri in Borno State were sampled through the use of a self-structured questionnaire, and key informants were interviewed in thirty-four cases to concretize data generated through the questionnaire. The study discovered that cultural practices (x̄=3.311), high rates of illiteracy (x̄=3.167), political interests of the elites (x̄=3.156), foreign influence (x̄=3.144), and bad governance (x̄=3.078) were the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Thus, it is recommended that cultural practices capable of provoking violence should be reviewed and reshaped; leaders should be held accountable for their actions; quality and access to education should be provided; citizenship consciousness on leadership issues should be activated, and Nigeria’s foreign policy principles concerning her neighbors should be redefined to determine how the country will be looked upon in this critical stage of its democratic development.


Author(s):  
Ibrahim Sani Kankara

The paper focuses on security efforts of local vigilante groups against Boko Haram (BH) insurgency in Northern Nigeria. The fight against BH insurgency is a major source of concern throughout the Nigerian Federation. The use of charms and locally fabricated small arms by the Vigilante and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a factor in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgents. Through data obtained from interviews, newspapers and secondary texts, the article analyses the emergence and role of the vigilante in the fight against insurgency. The groups serve as an alternative security in the areas affected by the insurgency. The different groups use variety of locally made charms in their confrontation with Boko Haram group. Furthermore, this paper attempts to evaluate role of CJTF/Vigilante in the fight against insurgency, the nature of traditional mechanisms use by the local groups in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. In this context, the innovation and cultural practice by the vigilante groups greatly helped in the fight against insurgency. It is concluded that there is likelihood the vigilante to pose danger to the security in the post war against insurgency period.


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