Corporate Governance And Its Effect On Firm Performance In An Emerging Economy

Having a board of directors is very important to ensure the smooth running of business processes and have an impact on the company's financial performance. This study to determine the impact of board characteristics namely board size, board ownership and board composition on the financial performance of organizations as measured by Return on Assets. The study employed a descriptive-explanatory research design based on a cross-sectional approach. Correlation and regression analyses were conducted to determine the depth and extent of the relationship between the variables. The study revealed a positive and significant association between the board size and financial performance on an average of 9 board members. Board composition revealed that having more external directors had no effect on the financial performance, it neither increased it nor decreased it, leading to the rejection of the hypothesis. On the other hand, board ownership was found to be beneficial in terms of having directors as owners of the business, corroborating the Stakeholder Theory. The studies showed that there was still a need to select board members with caution striking a balance between the number of directors as well as their composition to ensure that the organization reaps maximum benefits from the board.

The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership

The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, that is, CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO’s propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, that is, employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board.

The effect of audit fees, audit quality and board ownership on tax aggressiveness: evidence from Thailand

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of audit fees, auditors' quality and board ownership on tax aggressiveness in Thailand.Design/methodology/approachThe sample of this study is based on 215 firm-year observations of SET-100 listed companies in Thailand during the 2010–2018 periods. This study employs a panel least square regression with period fixed effects. The study retrieved the corporate governance variables from the downloaded annual reports, whilst the remaining data were collected from the EMIS database.FindingsThis study provides evidence that audit fees reduce tax aggressiveness and board ownership enhance tax aggressiveness among the firms. Nonaudit services provided by auditors impair auditors' independence and lead to higher tax aggressiveness. The result supports the agency theory, which explains that managers and blockholders may enjoy private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders in the absence of market control. Thus, firms need good governance practices such as incentives paid for the effort of auditors and nonaudit services monitoring to curb such exploitation.Research limitations/implicationsThe results provide implications to the firms and regulators that incentives to the monitoring parties such as auditors can reduce tax aggressiveness among the firms. Nevertheless, higher ownership given to boards as incentives may lead to concentrated ownership and thus lead to the type 2 agency problem, which is between majority and minority shareholders. The result also provides caution to the regulators to monitor the nonaudit services provided by the auditors as it might impair their independence and compromise the tax paid to IRB.Originality/valueThis study is pioneer research discussing tax avoidance in Thailand. The Thai Government has been noticing that tax avoidance is being performed in the country, but academic discussion on this topic had never been elaborated.

The Effect of Board and Ownership Structure on the Possibility of Financial Distress

Research aims: This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance, specifically relating to the ownership structure and board structure, on the possibility of financial distress.Design/Methodology/Approach: The sample used in this study are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2015 to 2019, excluding the financial industry. Conditional logistic regression is used as the study uses paired data based on the total assets of the company.Research findings: The results of this study indicate that board ownership, independent commissioners, and the board of directors can increase the likelihood of financial distress. On the other hand, institutional ownership and concentrated ownership are proven to have no effect on the likelihood of financial distress. The results of sensitivity testing using logistic regression showed different results on the variable institutional ownership, which is that institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress. Meanwhile, the other variables showed the same outcome as the main regression used in this study.Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the knowledge on the relationship of board ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, independent commissioners and board size and the possibility of financial distress. Also, this research found that the provision of incentives in the form of shares to the board may not be an effective way to overcome financial distress in Indonesian firms.

Does Board Ownership Affect Bank Risk-Taking?

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of board ownership on risk-taking. The study uses a sample of 31 Kenyan banks and data for 2008-2018. The study finds that board ownership has a significantly negative effect on risk-taking. In addition, the results indicate that firm age, size, and bank capitalization positively affect risk-taking. Thus, the study has both managerial and policy implications.

Analisis Pengamanan dan Pemanfaatan Tanah Desa Berdasarkan Peraturan Desa Sapta Mulia Nomor 14 Tahun 2017 Tentang Pedoman Pengelolaan Aset Desa (Studi di Desa Sapta Mulia Kecamatan Rimbo Bujang Kabupaten Tebo)

The purpose of this research is to analyze the security and distribution of village cash land based on the regulation of sapta mulia village, The research method used is an empirical juridical method the results of the research show that the safeguard and utilization has not been running in accordance with Sapta Mulia Village Regulation No. 14 of 2017. For administrative safeguards it was found that the village land assets did not yet fully have documents or archives supporting the legitimate administration, for the protection of the land law the village was new in the form of a land deed and did not have a valid land certificate of ownership, and for physical security it was found that no attempt to install a placemark or peg and name board ownership of the village's land assets made vulnerable to claims by other parties. On the utilization side such as the utilization of land in the form of leases, it was found that for the leasing of the village land was not done in writing and it was still found that many communities had expired their leases but they did not renew the lease. For the utilization of land in the form of borrowed use, it was found that for the loan of use has not been implemented at all, while for the utilization of land in the form of cooperation, it was found that there has been no cooperation in engaging other parties to manage the land, and researchers assessed the Sapta Mulia Village Government in creating cooperation with third parties seemed lacking initiative and innovation so that the land could not be utilized as it should be.