The analysis on the collective forest property rights institution reform with game theory

Author(s):  
Dai Fang ◽  
Shi Dong-mei ◽  
Dai Jing
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 272
Author(s):  
Ruitao Zhang ◽  
Ammar Saad ◽  
Ying Xia

The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a process of evolution along with the equilibrium point of the game theory. It is also an institutional change involving China’s primary economic system and rural basic management system. This paper used the stakeholder theory to determine the main stakeholders in the RCPRSR and then analyzed the behavior mechanism of the main stakeholders through the method of game theory. The results indicate that the main stakeholders are farmers, village organizations, and government. The Nash equilibrium solution is executing and joining respectively village organizations and farmers. Game theory also suggests that the RCPRSR is a gradual and repetitive dynamic process, not the result of one-time rational design. Based on the conclusions of the research, it indicates that should raise the enthusiasm of the village organization. This can increase the income of farmers and flourish the rural economy of China.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
André Casajus ◽  
Helfried Labrenz

AbstractWe suggest a recognition of non-controlling interest in consolidated financial statements that takes into account the property rights structure within subsidiary companies, in particular, majority requirements on restructurings, which may differ between countries. Our approach rests on a property rights index based on cooperative game theory. This index captures a parent company’s ability to acquire future gains of the subsidiary.


2013 ◽  
Vol 791-793 ◽  
pp. 1558-1561
Author(s):  
Zu Xu Zou ◽  
Yun Xia Xue

In the paper, we start with the game theory, by building the game theory model of Venture Capitalist (human capital owner) and Venture Investor (physical capital owner),and with the analysis and derivation of the game theory model , conclusions can be got that Venture Capitalists should share the enterprise property rights and so on. Then some researches are made to know whether limited partnership system arrangement reflects the idea that Venture Capitalists should share the enterprise property rights. At last, some ways are known for Venture Investors to realize their maximum benefits.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus

AbstractThe “welcome return” to “substantive political philosophy” that Rawls's A Theory of Justice was said to herald has resulted in forty years of proposals seeking to show that philosophical reflection leads to the demonstrable truth of almost every and any conceivable view of the justice of property rights. Select any view—from the justice of unregulated capitalist markets to the most extreme forms of egalitarianism—and one will find that some philosophers have proclaimed that rational reflection uniquely leads to its justice. This is, I believe, a sort of ideological thinking masquerading as philosophizing. In this paper, using some tools from game theory as well as experimental findings, I seek to sketch a non-ideological approach to the question of the justification of property rights. On this approach the aim of political philosophy is, first and foremost, to reflect on whether our social rules of property are within the “optimal eligible set” of rules acceptable to all.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyril Hédoin

Abstract This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are generally considered constitutive of any ontological inquiry. I argue that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can contribute to advancing the debate on an issue of particular importance, regarding the specific form of dependence characterizing the relation between institutions and individuals’ attitudes about them. I tackle this issue by taking Francesco Guala's claims about the nature of institutions made in his book “Understanding Institutions” as a point of departure. In particular, I reject Guala’s functionalism about institutions. On the basis of the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account, I claim that it is futile to search for constitutive features of general institutions (money, property rights, family…) and that the best we can have is a knowledge of what are the rules within a specific institution, which the agents consider to be essential in their institutional practice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Harris ◽  
Meina Cai ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili
Keyword(s):  

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