Motor experience alters action perception through predictive learning of sensorimotor information

Author(s):  
Jimmy Baraglia ◽  
Jorge L. Copete ◽  
Yukie Nagai ◽  
Minoru Asada
Infancy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 519-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Loucks ◽  
Jessica Sommerville

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1207-1214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Gerson ◽  
Harold Bekkering ◽  
Sabine Hunnius

The role of motor experience in the processing of perceived actions is hotly debated on both behavioral (e.g., action understanding) and neural (e.g., activation of the motor system) levels of interpretation. Whereas some researchers focus on the role of motor experience in the understanding of and motor activity associated with perceived actions, others emphasize the role of visual experience with the perceived actions. The question of whether prior firsthand motor experience is critical to motor system activation during perception of actions performed by others is best addressed through studies with infants who have a limited repertoire of motor actions. In this way, infants can receive motor or visual training with novel actions that are not mere recombinations of previously acquired actions. In this study, 10-month-old infants received active training with a motorically unfamiliar action that resulted in a distinct sound effect. They received observational experience with a second, similarly unfamiliar action. Following training, we assessed infants' neural motor activity via EEG while they listened to the sounds associated with the actions relative to a novel sound. We found a greater decrease in mu power to sounds associated with the motorically learned action than to those associated with the observed action that the infants had never produced. This effect was directly related to individual differences in the degree of motor learning via motor training. These findings indicate a unique effect of active experience on neural correlates of action perception.


Author(s):  
Hadar Ram ◽  
Dieter Struyf ◽  
Bram Vervliet ◽  
Gal Menahem ◽  
Nira Liberman

Abstract. People apply what they learn from experience not only to the experienced stimuli, but also to novel stimuli. But what determines how widely people generalize what they have learned? Using a predictive learning paradigm, we examined the hypothesis that a low (vs. high) probability of an outcome following a predicting stimulus would widen generalization. In three experiments, participants learned which stimulus predicted an outcome (S+) and which stimulus did not (S−) and then indicated how much they expected the outcome after each of eight novel stimuli ranging in perceptual similarity to S+ and S−. The stimuli were rings of different sizes and the outcome was a picture of a lightning bolt. As hypothesized, a lower probability of the outcome widened generalization. That is, novel stimuli that were similar to S+ (but not to S−) produced expectations for the outcome that were as high as those associated with S+.


2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie K. Powell ◽  
Kenira J. Thompson ◽  
Steven C. Bulinski ◽  
Angela M. Sikorski ◽  
Rodney A. Swain

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cowley

To view language as a cultural tool challenges much of what claims to be linguistic science while opening up a new people-centred linguistics. On this view, how we speak, think and act depends on, not just brains (or minds), but also cultural traditions. Yet, Everett is conservative: like others trained in distributional analysis, he reifies ‘words’. Though rejecting inner languages and grammatical universals, he ascribes mental reality to a lexicon. Reliant as he is on transcriptions, he takes the cognitivist view that brains represent word-forms. By contrast, in radical embodied cognitive theory, bodily dynamics themselves act as cues to meaning. Linguistic exostructures resemble tools that constrain how people concert acting-perceiving bodies. The result is unending renewal of verbal structures: like artefacts and institutions, they function to sustain a species-specific cultural ecology. As Ross (2007) argues, ecological extensions make human cognition hypersocial. When we link verbal patterns with lived experience, we communicate and cognise by fitting action/perception to cultural practices that anchor human meaning making.


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