DeepEM: Deep Neural Networks Model Recovery through EM Side-Channel Information Leakage

Dependable and trustworthy security solutions have emerged as a crucial requirement in the specification of the applications and protocols employed in modern Information Systems (IS). Threats to the security of embedded devices, such as smart phones and PDAs, have been growing since several techniques exploiting side-channel information leakage have proven successful in recovering secret keys even from complex mobile systems. This chapter summarizes the side-channel techniques based on power consumption and elaborates the issue of the design time engineering of a secure system, through the employment of the current hardware design tools. The results of the analysis show how these tools can be effectively used to understand possible vulnerabilities to power consumption side-channel attacks, thus providing a sound conservative margin on the security level. The possible extension of this methodology to the case of fault attacks is also sketched.

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Thermal-aware 3D design for side-channel information leakage

2016 IEEE 34th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD) ◽

10.1109/iccd.2016.7753336 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Peng Gu ◽

Dylan Stow ◽

Russell Barnes ◽

Eren Kursun ◽

Yuan Xie

Keyword(s):

Information Leakage ◽

Side Channel ◽

3D Design ◽

Channel Information

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Attacking and Defending Masked Polynomial Comparison for Lattice-Based Cryptography

IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems ◽

10.46586/tches.v2021.i3.334-359 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 334-359

Author(s):

Shivam Bhasin ◽

Jan-Pieter D’Anvers ◽

Daniel Heinz ◽

Thomas Pöppelmann ◽

Michiel Van Beirendonck

Keyword(s):

Information Leakage ◽

Side Channel ◽

Side Channel Attacks ◽

First Order ◽

Comparison Operation ◽

Security Properties ◽

Channel Information ◽

Comparison Algorithms ◽

Lattice Based Cryptography ◽

Do So

In this work, we are concerned with the hardening of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) against side-channel attacks, with a focus on the comparison operation required for the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform. We identify critical vulnerabilities in two proposals for masked comparison and successfully attack the masked comparison algorithms from TCHES 2018 and TCHES 2020. To do so, we use first-order side-channel attacks and show that the advertised security properties do not hold. Additionally, we break the higher-order secured masked comparison from TCHES 2020 using a collision attack, which does not require side-channel information. To enable implementers to spot such flaws in the implementation or underlying algorithms, we propose a framework that is designed to test the re-encryption step of the FO transform for information leakage. Our framework relies on a specifically parametrized t-test and would have identified the previously mentioned flaws in the masked comparison. Our framework can be used to test both the comparison itself and the full decapsulation implementation.

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