Attacking and Defending Masked Polynomial Comparison for Lattice-Based Cryptography

In this work, we are concerned with the hardening of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) against side-channel attacks, with a focus on the comparison operation required for the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform. We identify critical vulnerabilities in two proposals for masked comparison and successfully attack the masked comparison algorithms from TCHES 2018 and TCHES 2020. To do so, we use first-order side-channel attacks and show that the advertised security properties do not hold. Additionally, we break the higher-order secured masked comparison from TCHES 2020 using a collision attack, which does not require side-channel information. To enable implementers to spot such flaws in the implementation or underlying algorithms, we propose a framework that is designed to test the re-encryption step of the FO transform for information leakage. Our framework relies on a specifically parametrized t-test and would have identified the previously mentioned flaws in the masked comparison. Our framework can be used to test both the comparison itself and the full decapsulation implementation.

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Power Side-Channel Analysis of RNS GLV ECC Using Machine and Deep Learning Algorithms

ACM Transactions on Internet Technology ◽

10.1145/3423555 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 21 (3) ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Mohamad Ali Mehrabi ◽

Naila Mukhtar ◽

Alireza Jolfaei

Keyword(s):

Deep Learning ◽

Elliptic Curve ◽

Smart Cities ◽

Information Leakage ◽

Side Channel ◽

Side Channel Attacks ◽

Public Key Cryptosystems ◽

Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems ◽

Hardware Implementations ◽

Substantial Progress

Many Internet of Things applications in smart cities use elliptic-curve cryptosystems due to their efficiency compared to other well-known public-key cryptosystems such as RSA. One of the important components of an elliptic-curve-based cryptosystem is the elliptic-curve point multiplication which has been shown to be vulnerable to various types of side-channel attacks. Recently, substantial progress has been made in applying deep learning to side-channel attacks. Conceptually, the idea is to monitor a core while it is running encryption for information leakage of a certain kind, for example, power consumption. The knowledge of the underlying encryption algorithm can be used to train a model to recognise the key used for encryption. The model is then applied to traces gathered from the crypto core in order to recover the encryption key. In this article, we propose an RNS GLV elliptic curve cryptography core which is immune to machine learning and deep learning based side-channel attacks. The experimental analysis confirms the proposed crypto core does not leak any information about the private key and therefore it is suitable for hardware implementations.

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Side-channel information leakage of encrypted video stream in video surveillance systems

IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications ◽

10.1109/infocom.2016.7524621 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Hong Li ◽

Yunhua He ◽

Limin Sun ◽

Xiuzhen Cheng ◽

Jiguo Yu

Keyword(s):

Video Surveillance ◽

Information Leakage ◽

Video Stream ◽

Side Channel ◽

Surveillance Systems ◽

Channel Information

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A Comprehensive Side-Channel Information Leakage Analysis of an In-Order RISC CPU Microarchitecture

ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems ◽

10.1145/3212719 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 23 (5) ◽

pp. 1-30 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Davide Zoni ◽

Alessandro Barenghi ◽

Gerardo Pelosi ◽

William Fornaciari

Keyword(s):

Information Leakage ◽

Side Channel ◽

Channel Information

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Generic Side-channel attacks on CCA-secure lattice-based PKE and KEMs

IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems ◽

10.46586/tches.v2020.i3.307-335 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 307-335 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Prasanna Ravi ◽

Sujoy Sinha Roy ◽

Anupam Chattopadhyay ◽

Shivam Bhasin

Keyword(s):

Experimental Validation ◽

Error Correcting Codes ◽

Public Key ◽

Side Channel ◽

Public Key Encryption ◽

Side Channel Attacks ◽

Key Recovery ◽

Binary Information ◽

Channel Information ◽

Standardization Process

In this work, we demonstrate generic and practical EM side-channel assisted chosen ciphertext attacks over multiple LWE/LWR-based Public Key Encryption (PKE) and Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) secure in the chosen ciphertext model (IND-CCA security). We show that the EM side-channel information can be efficiently utilized to instantiate a plaintext checking oracle, which provides binary information about the output of decryption, typically concealed within IND-CCA secure PKE/KEMs, thereby enabling our attacks. Firstly, we identified EM-based side-channel vulnerabilities in the error correcting codes (ECC) enabling us to distinguish based on the value/validity of decrypted codewords. We also identified similar vulnerabilities in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform which leaks information about decrypted messages applicable to schemes that do not use ECC. We subsequently exploit these vulnerabilities to demonstrate practical attacks applicable to six CCA-secure lattice-based PKE/KEMs competing in the second round of the NIST standardization process. We perform experimental validation of our attacks on implementations taken from the open-source pqm4 library, running on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our attacks lead to complete key-recovery in a matter of minutes on all the targeted schemes, thus showing the effectiveness of our attack.

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Design Time Engineering of Side Channel Resistant Cipher Implementations

Theory and Practice of Cryptography Solutions for Secure Information Systems - Advances in Information Security, Privacy, and Ethics ◽

10.4018/978-1-4666-4030-6.ch006 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 133-157 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alessandro Barenghi ◽

Luca Breveglieri ◽

Fabrizio De Santis ◽

Filippo Melzani ◽

Andrea Palomba ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Power Consumption ◽

Information Leakage ◽

Smart Phones ◽

Mobile Systems ◽

Side Channel ◽

Security Level ◽

Embedded Devices ◽

Design Time ◽

Secret Keys ◽

Channel Information

Dependable and trustworthy security solutions have emerged as a crucial requirement in the specification of the applications and protocols employed in modern Information Systems (IS). Threats to the security of embedded devices, such as smart phones and PDAs, have been growing since several techniques exploiting side-channel information leakage have proven successful in recovering secret keys even from complex mobile systems. This chapter summarizes the side-channel techniques based on power consumption and elaborates the issue of the design time engineering of a secure system, through the employment of the current hardware design tools. The results of the analysis show how these tools can be effectively used to understand possible vulnerabilities to power consumption side-channel attacks, thus providing a sound conservative margin on the security level. The possible extension of this methodology to the case of fault attacks is also sketched.

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Thermal-aware 3D design for side-channel information leakage

2016 IEEE 34th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD) ◽

10.1109/iccd.2016.7753336 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Peng Gu ◽

Dylan Stow ◽

Russell Barnes ◽

Eren Kursun ◽

Yuan Xie

Keyword(s):

Information Leakage ◽

Side Channel ◽

3D Design ◽

Channel Information

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Formal Analysis of the Entropy / Security Trade-off in First-Order Masking Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2011 ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_4 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 22-39 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

Maxime Nassar ◽

Sylvain Guilley ◽

Jean-Luc Danger

Keyword(s):

Formal Analysis ◽

Side Channel ◽

Side Channel Attacks ◽

Trade Off ◽

First Order

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Side-Channel Protections for Picnic Signatures

IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems ◽

10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.239-282 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 239-282

Author(s):

Diego F. Aranha ◽

Sebastian Berndt ◽

Thomas Eisenbarth ◽

Okan Seker ◽

Akira Takahashi ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Hash Function ◽

Proof System ◽

Side Channel ◽

Side Channel Attacks ◽

Zero Knowledge ◽

Signature Schemes ◽

First Order ◽

The Third ◽

Zero Knowledge Proof

We study masking countermeasures for side-channel attacks against signature schemes constructed from the MPC-in-the-head paradigm, specifically when the MPC protocol uses preprocessing. This class of signature schemes includes Picnic, an alternate candidate in the third round of the NIST post-quantum standardization project. The only previously known approach to masking MPC-in-the-head signatures suffers from interoperability issues and increased signature sizes. Further, we present a new attack to demonstrate that known countermeasures are not sufficient when the MPC protocol uses a preprocessing phase, as in Picnic3.We overcome these challenges by showing how to mask the underlying zero-knowledge proof system due to Katz–Kolesnikov–Wang (CCS 2018) for any masking order, and by formally proving that our approach meets the standard security notions of non-interference for masking countermeasures. As a case study, we apply our masking technique to Picnic. We then implement different masked versions of Picnic signing providing first order protection for the ARM Cortex M4 platform, and quantify the overhead of these different masking approaches. We carefully analyze the side-channel risk of hashing operations, and give optimizations that reduce the CPU cost of protecting hashing in Picnic by a factor of five. The performance penalties of the masking countermeasures ranged from 1.8 to 5.5, depending on the degree of masking applied to hash function invocations.

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