Hardware Implementation for Fending off Side-Channel Attacks

Author(s):  
Yi-Liang Hong ◽  
Yui-Kai Weng ◽  
Shih-Hsu Huang
2012 ◽  
Vol 546-547 ◽  
pp. 1489-1494
Author(s):  
Yi Kun Hu ◽  
Zun Yang Qin

Among the block cipher algorithms, AES or DES is an excellent and preferred choice for most block cipher applications. But AES and DES are not very suitable for hardware implementation because of the high cost that they require large areas of routing and the processing efficiency is low, relatively. So lightweight cipher algorithms come into beings, among which PRESENT is very competitive. Along with the structure of a message authentication algorithm ALRED, a new family of Tunable Lightweight MAC based on PRESENT is proposed, that is TuLP. However, PRESENT is not able to resist side channel attack, so is TuLP, of course. For the above reason, in this paper, we provide an improvement of PRESENT by inserting random dummy cycles as well as shuffling to strengthen the security of PRESENT against side channel attacks. We will implement PRESENT and TuLP in Verilog and do simulation on Xilinx ISim platform. At last, we would like to provide the power analyzing of Xilinx XPower.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Sornalatha ◽  
N. Janakiraman ◽  
K. Balamurugan ◽  
Arun Kumar Sivaraman ◽  
Rajiv Vincent ◽  
...  

In this work, we obtain an area proficient composite field arithmetic Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution (S) byte and its inverse logic design. The size of this design is calculated by the number of gates used for hardware implementation. Most of the existing AES Substitution box hardware implementation uses separate Substitution byte and its inverse hardware structures. But we implement the both in the same module and a control signal is used to select the substitution byte for encryption operation and its inverse for the decryption operation. By comparing the gate utilization of the previous AES S–Box implementation, we reduced the gate utilization up to 5% that is we take only 78 EX-OR gates and 36 AND gates for implementing the both Substitution byte and its inverse. While implementing an AES algorithm in circuitry or programming, it is liable to be detected by hackers using any one of the side channel attacks. Data to be added with a random bit sequence to prevent from the above mentioned side channel attacks.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 2990-2998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao ZHANG ◽  
Ming-Yu FAN

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.


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