Facilitating "fuzzy to formal" requirements modelling

Author(s):  
J. Bubenko ◽  
C. Rolland ◽  
P. Loucopoulos ◽  
V. DeAntonellis
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Dyakov ◽  
E. G. Mikhaylova

The article contains some comments on the project of the National Program for the Development of the Far East until 2025 and for the future till 2035. It is noted that the project does not meet the formal requirements of the program document, has a number of unreasonable proposals and measures, the implementation of which may threaten the sustainable development of the region. The authors believe that in the development process it is necessary to take into account the principles of environmental and economic balance. The conclusion is made about the feasibility of developing a methodological framework for evaluating such documents as a tool for achieving sustainable development goals.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


IMA Fungus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Catherine Aime ◽  
Andrew N. Miller ◽  
Takayuki Aoki ◽  
Konstanze Bensch ◽  
Lei Cai ◽  
...  

AbstractIt is now a decade since The International Commission on the Taxonomy of Fungi (ICTF) produced an overview of requirements and best practices for describing a new fungal species. In the meantime the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICNafp) has changed from its former name (the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature) and introduced new formal requirements for valid publication of species scientific names, including the separation of provisions specific to Fungi and organisms treated as fungi in a new Chapter F. Equally transformative have been changes in the data collection, data dissemination, and analytical tools available to mycologists. This paper provides an updated and expanded discussion of current publication requirements along with best practices for the description of new fungal species and publication of new names and for improving accessibility of their associated metadata that have developed over the last 10 years. Additionally, we provide: (1) model papers for different fungal groups and circumstances; (2) a checklist to simplify meeting (i) the requirements of the ICNafp to ensure the effective, valid and legitimate publication of names of new taxa, and (ii) minimally accepted standards for description; and, (3) templates for preparing standardized species descriptions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Robinson Guitarrari

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p285 The understanding of conceptual relativity in Putnam’s and Kuhn’s writings should not be restricted to the claim that the existence is relative to, but not in virtue of, a conceptual scheme. This approach does not capture some significant differences between their positions about the notion of conceptual scheme. We understand that the thesis of conceptual relativity contains a statement about the close relationship between conceptual scheme and content, and another claim about the differences between conceptual schemes. Based on these two formal requirements, we propose a reconstruction of the Putnam’s treatment of it and show how it can be understood from Kuhn’s perspective of scientific development. We defend that, although both fulfill a critical role against metaphysical realism, they are applied to distinct domains: while Putnam’s conceptual relativity is in the record of the conceptual structure of scientific theories and presupposes a choice between cognitively equivalent conceptual schemes, Kuhn considers the field of the dynamics of development of science. Thus, we note relevant scientific cases of conceptual relativity that do not involve semantic incommensurability.


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