Preference Aggregation, Functional Pathologies, and Democracy: A Social Choice Defense of Participatory Democracy

2000 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 977-998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Radcliff ◽  
Ed Wingenbach
2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyze several contemporary theories of democracy, and secondly, to propose a theoretical framework for further investigations based on analyzed theories. The following four theories will be analyzed: pluralism, social choice theory, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy.


Author(s):  
G. Bingham Powell

This article talks about aggregating and representing political preferences. It presents the challenge of social choice analysis and identifies the conditions for representative democracy and preference aggregation. Multiple issue congruence, vote correspondence, and single dimensional issue congruence, which are the three major approaches to the comparative study of preference aggregation, are discussed as well.


Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.Narrowly understood, social choice theory is a specialized branch of applied logic and mathematics that analyzes abstract objects called preference aggregation functions, social welfare functions, and social choice functions. But more broadly, social choice theory identifies, analyzes, and evaluates rules that may be used to make collective decisions. So understood, social choice is a subfield of the social sciences that examines what may be called “voting rules” of various sorts. While social choice theory typically assumes a finite set of alternatives over which voter preferences are unrestricted, the spatial model of social choice assumes that policy alternatives can be represented by points in a space of one or more dimensions, and that voters have preferences that are plausibly shaped by this spatial structure.Social choice theory has considerable relevance for the study of legislative (as well as electoral) institutions. The concepts and tools of social choice theory make possible formal descriptions of legislative institutions such as bicameralism, parliamentary voting procedures, effects of decision rules (e.g., supramajority vs. simple majority rule and executive veto rules), sincere vs. strategic voting by legislators, agenda control, and other parliamentary maneuvers. Spatial models of social choice further enrich this analysis and raise additional questions regarding policy stability and change. Spatial models are used increasingly to guide empirical research on legislative institutions and processes.


Politik ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malthe Munkøe

Social choice research has shown that collective preference aggregation mechanisms under some conditions will produce arbitrary results, and are prone to endless cycles or strategic manipulation. is prompted Tul- lock (1981) to ask the question “Why so much stability”? at is to say, what explains the discrepancy between these results which implicates that politics is chaotic and random, and general understanding of how politics works in practice. e literature has identi ed a number of mechanisms, including “structure-inducing” in- stitutions that have a stabilizing e ect on the political system. As such it is ultimately an empirical question to what extent a political system is stable or not, and what institutions, norms and arrangements engender stability. is article considers the Danish political system from the point of view of social choice theory and discusses which institutions and arrangements work to stabilize it. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler

Abstract:Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Ideal-advisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian social choice theory.


Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Pivato

AbstractWe briefly review Condorcet's and Young's epistemic interpretations of preference aggregation rules as maximum likelihood estimators. We then develop a general framework for interpreting epistemic social choice rules as maximum likelihood estimators, maximum a posteriori estimators, or expected utility maximizers. We illustrate this framework with several examples. Finally, we critique this program.


2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 518-522
Author(s):  
Mohammed H. I. Dore
Keyword(s):  

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