The Category of the Mind: Folk Psychology of Belief, Desire, and Intention

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihisa Kashima ◽  
Allison McKintyre ◽  
Paul Clifford
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
The Mind

scholarly journals [MIND AND BRAIN IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCES]

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandro Nannini
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Brain Dynamics ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

[After a brief review of the solutions given to the mind-body problem by philosophers I propose a naturalistic-materialistic solution that is based on a collaboration between the philosophy of mind and neurosciences. According to this solution the three fundamental characteristics of every human state of consciousness – that is, having a content and being conscious and self-conscious - are identified with three higher order properties of brain dynamics from an ontological point of view, although each of them can be described and explained in the language of neuroscience, cognitive psychology and folk-psychology.]

Folk psychology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Stich ◽  
Georges Rey
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Psychological Studies

There is wide disagreement about the meaning of ordinary mental terms (such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’). Sellars suggested that our use of these terms is governed by a widely shared theory, ‘folk psychology’, a suggestion that has gained empirical support in psychological studies of self-attribution and in a growing literature concerning how children acquire (or, in the case of autism, fail to acquire) ordinary mental concepts. Recently, there has been a lively debate about whether people actually ‘theorize’ about the mind, or, instead, engage in some kind of ‘simulation’ of mental processes.

Emotions Are Not Modules1

2006 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 53-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Russell
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Large Spider ◽  
The Way

Jane is calmly strolling through the forest one lovely day. Suddenly, a large spider drops in front of her face. She immediately freezes; her heart races; her hands tremble; her face broadcasts “fear.” She screams and runs away. Both before and after, she concedes that spiders in this forest are harmless.Jane's reaction to the spider contrasts greatly with the way she normally reacts to events. Normally, or so the story goes, Jane weighs her options thoughtfully, choosing a course of action consistent with her beliefs and with the greatest benefit. Indeed, her reaction to the spider contrasts so greatly with calm, rational, deliberate, belief-consistent action that traditional folk psychology supposed two different kinds of mechanism are at work: animal-like emotion (located in the heart and gut) versus human reason (located in the mind). Her emotion explains her reaction to the spider. Her emotion made her do it.

Brains and Beliefs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Unstable Position

I suggest there are three ways to see the role of folk psychology in a mature cognitive neuroscience. First, integration says that folk psychology plays a decisive role in defining the objects of scientific inquiry and guiding that inquiry. Second, autonomy is the view that folk psychology deals in personal rather than subpersonal explanations and as such has aims that are incompatible with science. Third is eliminativism, which argues that folk psychology will be replaced by a scientific theory of the mind. I argue that the integrationist perspective is an unstable position because folk psychology cannot play the role that integrationists have in mind for it. Any psychology that plays this role must be heavily revised enough to count as a successor theory, and that is a vindication of eliminativism from the point of view of scientific theory-construction.

Eliminative Materialism and Ordinary Language

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-426
Author(s):  
Daniel Lorca ◽  
Eric LaRock ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Dependence Problem ◽  
The Mind

Advocates of eliminative materialism (EM) assure us that our current, ordinary approach to describing the mind (dubbed “folk psychology”) will eventually be eliminated, instead of reduced, by a matured neuroscience. However, once we take into account the flexibility, explanatory power, and overall sophistication of ordinary language, then the promissory note offered by eliminative materialism (EM) loses all credibility. To bolster the preceding claim, we present three original problems for EM: (1) the accountability problem, (2) the substitution problem, and (3) the discourse dependence problem.

scholarly journals Perceptions Regarding the Care and Education of Children from Birth to Age Three among Students of Early Childhood Education: Changes between Pre-training and Post-training

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Gila Russo-Zimet ◽  
Itzhak Gilat
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Early Childhood Education ◽  
Child Development ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Childhood Education ◽  
Folk Pedagogy ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact

Many theoreticians focus on understanding the belief system regarding the mind of the learner – The Mind Theory. Olson & Brunner (1996) referred to this belief system as "folk psychology". They named the processes required to promote learners' knowledge and understanding "folk pedagogy". In their opinion, folk pedagogy reflects the learners' folk psychology. In other words, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centered on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires.The present study set up to characterize the folk psychology (contains expressions and summaries of various settings as a way of informally shaping quite general meanings or organizing experience) and the folk pedagogy, which deals with where, when and why people teach or educate one another in various ways for the sake of making out of things (Olson & Bruner, 1996) in early childhood education students with respect to education and care during the first three years of life and examine whether these views change during the course of their formal education.The sample comprised of 379 students of education majoring in early childhood education at three colleges in Israel. Data was gathered by a structured questionnaire examining five domains: the impact of year of life on child development, domains affecting child development, care and educational settings, care and educational methods and the role of caregivers. The findings reveal that the perceived influence of family care centers and daycare centers influence on child development decreases between the beginning and the end of their studies. The perceived effectiveness of coping through awareness increased, while strict coping methods were perceived as less effective after the training.

Fixing Reference on Intentionality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Mendelovici
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
The Mind

This chapter fixes reference on our target, intentionality. "Intentionality" is sometimes defined as the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states. While such definitions succeed at gesturing towards the phenomenon of interest, they are too fuzzy and metaphorical to fix firmly upon it. This chapter recommends an alternative ostensive way of defining "intentionality" as the feature of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively in ourselves and are tempted to describe using representational terms like "of" or "about". This chapter argues that this definition does a better job than alternative definitions—such as those in terms of folk psychology, the mind-brain sciences, and truth and reference—at capturing the phenomenon that talk of "aboutness" and "directedness" is gesturing at.

How Homo economicus lost her mind and how we can revive her

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter DeScioli
Keyword(s):  
Economic Thought ◽  
History Of Economic Thought ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Target Article ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThe target article by Boyer & Petersen (B&P) contributes a vital message: that people have folk economic theories that shape their thoughts and behavior in the marketplace. This message is all the more important because, in the history of economic thought, Homo economicus was increasingly stripped of mental capacities. Intuitive theories can help restore the mind of Homo economicus.

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