Eliminative Materialism and Ordinary Language

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-426
Author(s):  
Daniel Lorca ◽  
Eric LaRock ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Dependence Problem ◽  
The Mind

Advocates of eliminative materialism (EM) assure us that our current, ordinary approach to describing the mind (dubbed “folk psychology”) will eventually be eliminated, instead of reduced, by a matured neuroscience. However, once we take into account the flexibility, explanatory power, and overall sophistication of ordinary language, then the promissory note offered by eliminative materialism (EM) loses all credibility. To bolster the preceding claim, we present three original problems for EM: (1) the accountability problem, (2) the substitution problem, and (3) the discourse dependence problem.

scholarly journals On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 130-142
Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Why Thomas Reid Matters to the Epistemology of the Social Sciences

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (279) ◽  
pp. 282-301
Author(s):  
Laurent Jaffro ◽  
Vinícius França Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Action ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Reasoning ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology.

Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption that Humans are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 387-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Mitch Hodge
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Cultural Representations ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
Parsimonious Explanation ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Funerary Rites ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

AbstractThis article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, and that the mind is the sole source of identity) are not compatible with cultural representations such as mythologies, funerary rites, iconography and doctrine as well as empirical evidence concerning intuitive folk reasoning about the mind and body concerning the afterlife. Finally, the article suggests an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for understanding intuitive folk representations of the afterlife.

The Category of the Mind: Folk Psychology of Belief, Desire, and Intention

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihisa Kashima ◽  
Allison McKintyre ◽  
Paul Clifford
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
The Mind

The meaning of the particle lah in Singapore English

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Besemeres ◽  
Anna Wierzbicka
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Discourse Markers ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Cultural Pragmatics

In this paper we try to crack one of the hardest and most intriguing chestnuts in the field of cross-cultural pragmatics and to identify the meaning of the celebrated Singaporean particle lah — the hallmark of Singapore English. In pursuing this goal, we investigate the use of lah and seek to identify its meaning by trying to find a paraphrase in ordinary language which would be substitutable for lah in any context. In doing so, we try to enter the speakers’ minds, and as John Locke (1959 [1691]:99) urged in his pioneering work on particles, “observe nicely” the speakers’ “postures of the mind in discoursing”. At the same time, we offer a general model for the investigation of discourse markers and show how the methodology based on the “NSM” semantic theory allows the analyst to link pragmatics, via semantics, with the study of cognition.

scholarly journals The Nature of Information, Semantics, and Effectiveness for Artificial Intelligence and Cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry Brown
Keyword(s):  
Emergent Properties ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Symbolic Reasoning ◽  
Theoretical System ◽  
Nature Of Information ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Information Semantics ◽  
Embedding Methods ◽  
Semantic Processes

This manuscript puts forward claims to help address foundational gaps in understanding Cognition and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), including the nature of Emergence, Semantics, and Information. This includes criteria for assessing true understanding in AI models. How symbolic reasoning conceptualizes phenomena is described. Without a subsymbolic perceptual level to generate concepts, there is no symbol grounding. Grounding requires dynamics outside of its own symbolization. Grounding forms the set of symbols used at the conceptual level. It is claimed that this role explains Semantics. This approach naturally leads to established research on Conceptual Spaces and has implications for Semantic Vector Spaces learned via Neural Embedding methods. It also has implications for Information Theories. A claim is made that Semantic Processes form Shannon-like microstates and macrostates, while Effective Processes constrain Semantic Processes. Unlike existing Semantic Information Theories, Semantic Processes are pre-informational. The claims provide perspective on the Mind. It is natural to conflate percepts with the modified version necessarily created when conceptualizing through explication. The ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’ is related to this Percept/Concept distinction. Concepts are always subject to Eliminative Materialism. The nonconceptual properties of Percepts cannot be eliminated. Intrinsic are Extrinsic Emergence are distinguished. It is common to assume extrinsic emergent properties are intrinsic to the systems evoking them. This presents a challenge for proving intrinsic emergence in AI. However, criteria are proposed for claiming a theoretical system intrinsically processes information and grounds symbols. By leveraging the functional properties of Grounding, the criteria can be considered for actual systems.

scholarly journals I feel, therefore I am

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-63
Author(s):  
Adriana Montheiro
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
The Body ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Kind Permission ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

This paper appeared originally in Portuguese as Sinto, logo Sou - um estudo sobre o significado das emoções e suas funções. Revista Brasileira de Análise Transacional XXI, 2011, n.1, 29-41 and is reproduced here by kind permission of UNAT-BRASIL - União Nacional de Analistas Transacionais – Brasil. Emotion is not a concept that can be accurately defined, even if in ordinary language it refers to affective states. The theory of transactional analysis, created by Berne and developed by his followers, is impregnated with the concept of emotion. In order to bring more light to these questions, the present article discusses the biopsychology of emotions, considering their objectives and functions, considering the influence of neuroscience. We also refer to authors who did a theoretical review of transactional analysis from the perspective of biology and the mind, such as Allen and Hine. We have also included authors with a body approach such as Reich and Levine for their significant contributions both to understanding how the scripting system is embedded in the body, and to consider the possibility of developing a systematic body approach within Adult decontamination methodology. We conclude that there are no destructive emotions. Destructive is the way one learns to deal with feelings, with sensations and emotions. And working on emotions is working on lifescript.

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